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ABSTRACT 
The current thesis is a collection of essays on costly signaling, smoothing (partial 
adjustment), and risk shifting through various pay outs by bank holding firms. The 
thesis is based on three chapters, or sections, which are through econometric 
investigations on the above mentioned topics. The major findings of the investigations 
are, one, a detailed firm level information content analysis of costly signaling by banks 
via different pay out methods, two, that partial adjustment or smoothing via pay outs 
can also be perceived as costly signals which is based on the information content of 
allied measures like bank specific speed of adjustments, and half-life periods, three, 
that rather than dividend pay outs share repurchases play relatively significant role in 
risk shifting exhibited by banking firms. 
 
Chapter 1 is devoted to the analysis of different types of dividend and other pay out 
signaling under information asymmetry (between the outsider shareholders of banks 
and the insider managers), and impact of various bank specific variables on the levels 
of pay outs/ signaling, thus revealing the information content of such signaling. Both 
panel data analysis and vector auto regression analysis have been conducted to achieve 
these findings. Another finding in this section is a comparative analysis between share 
repurchases and dividend pay outs by bank holding firms. 
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Chapter2 is devoted to the investigation of bank specific partial adjustments of 
dividends, a modified partial adjustment model is used which is capable of 
investigating bank specific speeds of adjustments and half-life periods which may vary 
over periods. Such a model is an improvement over basic smoothing models in the 
standard literature which have mainly investigated the industry average speed of 
adjustment, and hence less efficient in investigating the bank specific information 
content of such measures. 
 
Chapter 3 provides analysis based on a system of equations model on, one, whether risk 
shifting has been exhibited by the bank holding firms for a comprehensive period 
between 1990-2015, and two, which are the specific pay out channels through which 
such risk shifting or wealth transfers have taken place. 
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CHAPTER1 
1.1.1 Introduction: dividend signaling, smoothing and risk shifting by banking 
firms 
There is a long-standing debate in corporate finance literature regarding the value-
adding role of dividend payouts by firms. The basic question is whether dividends add 
to shareholder value, in the light of modern corporate finance theory which suggests 
that the principal objective of any firm is to maximize shareholder value. 
The seminal dividend irrelevance proposition theory proposed by Miller and 
Modigliani (1958) holds that under a perfect capital market assumption, dividends are 
irrelevant to rational utility maximizing shareholders; rather, when dividend taxation is 
included, such pay-outs should become more costly for the shareholders. 
However, the dividend irrelevance proposition breaks down when market frictions are 
introduced in the model. One such very important friction is information asymmetry, or 
opacity between insider managers, who are agents but also the controllers of resources 
and decision-makers regarding investments and retained earnings, and outsider 
shareholders, who are the active and dominant principal group. 
In the perfect capital market scenario, the outsider principal group can access any 
hidden information of insider agents free of cost, and also can effectively monitor the 
insiders. Since the principals can access insider information freely, there is no so-
called adverse selection problem, which indicates that the principals can cost 
effectively choose between high risk and low-risk firms, and price them accordingly 
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in the debt or equity markets1. 
Again, since agents can also be monitored effectively, there is no feasibility of 
misbehavior by managers (i.e. investing in excessive risky projects and hence 
destroying shareholders’ wealth)and, hence, no so-called moral hazard problem.2 
However, in incomplete capital markets, there are severe adverse selection or moral 
hazard problems (Stiglitz & Wiess, 1981, Stiglitz 1990), which have unintended 
consequences3. For example, in equity markets with adverse selection, there can be 
average pricing which may deter the good or safer firms from remaining in the market 
since the effective cost of capital for safer firms in such a scenario is too high and, 
ultimately, such markets can be occupied only with high risk or bad firms, which may 
even lead to complete market failure (Akerlof, 1970). In the presence of moral hazard 
problems, firms may face underinvestment problems.4 
Committing to paying higher dividends can also be very costly during periods of 
falling5 earnings) for the firms, which helps in establishing signaling solutions where 
the good firms with potential investment opportunities and higher earnings perspectives 
can continue to remain committed to stable dividend payouts, but the bad firms, which 
lack potential earnings growth, cannot remain committed so eventually withdraw from 
the markets. This is the classical (Bhattacharya, 1979, 2001) signaling solution to the 
adverse selection problem in the capital markets. Hence, under information asymmetry 
                                                          
1 This issue is often termed as the lemons premium or information premium in financial markets. 
2 Hence in the presence of information asymmetry, between outsiders and insiders, and also between 
outsider investors themselves, there can be different types of adverse selection and moral hazard 
problems. Specifically in case of baking industry such problems are severe since there are many stake 
holders involved, and also the severe negative externality of bank failure has to be accounted for. 
3 In various markets like credit markets, to used car markets if the adverse selection problem persists 
market can even collapse, such scenarios are common in subprime mortgage markets with a very high 
level of opacity or information asymmetry about the quality of products. 
4 Underinvestment problem means that firms facing adverse selection cost may forgo profitable 
projects, since it may be too costly for such firms to raise capital from the external market in the first 
place. 
5 Under such imperfect capital market conditions, dividends can assume central importance for solving 
or mitigating such adverse selection and moral hazard problems. Against this background, costly 
dividend signaling literature has been well studied, where dividends prove to be costly signals (costly 
since, firstly, from the perspective of shareholders, dividends are taxed higher than capital gains and, 
secondly, from the perspective of insider managers, the cost of paying dividends may comprise raising 
costly external financing due to a lack of retained earnings while investing in positive NPV projects. 
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friction, dividends assume signaling and value-adding roles. 
Along with adverse selection solutions, costly dividends can also be used to mitigate 
agency cost problems. Specifically, the Jensen’s free cash flow hypothesis (1984) states 
that for large and matured firms with fewer investment opportunities and large retained 
earnings, the agency cost of monitoring is high. In such a scenario, it is optimal for the 
insider managers to pay out the retained earnings as dividends to convince shareholders 
of not destroying value or investing in excessive risky projects. 
There is an indirect impact of dividend payouts in disciplining managers since 
they require moving to external financial markets to raise capital more frequently, 
and thus will subject themselves to greater effective monitoring of markets. 
Dividend signaling, as is explored in detail later, has been explained from various 
perspectives or theories, mainly, signaling theory (Miler & Rocks, 1985), pecking 
order theory (Myers & Mazluf, 1984, Myers, 1984) and dividend life cycle theory 
(Deangelo  et, al, 2006, 2008)6. These theories often predict nearly opposite 
hypotheses. This contrasts with how the predictions play a critical role in the current 
thesis when it comes to analysing dividend signaling. 
Later theoretical models (Leary and Roberts, 2011 ) have shown that dividends are 
not paid randomly; rather, there is generally a partial adjustment of dividends 
towards a target level, which is determined by firm-specific factors (so to say, 
endogenised); hence, relative to the stochastic earnings, the dividends are rigid, 
with varying speeds of adjustments. 
Such a phenomenon is well established in the empirical literature (Leary & 
Roberts,2011) and theoretical models also predict such so- called dividend smoothing. 
The matter under investigation is whether such smoothing can be considered as 
signaling too? And what do such adjustment processes signal? 
 
                                                          
6 In the 2006 paper De Angelo et al demonstrated the irrelevance of the irrelevance of the dividend pay 
out proposal as in the original Miller and Modglianni versions. 
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As of yet, the common tendency in the empirical literature has been to test the 
predictions of the underlying theoretical models (as mentioned above) for non-banking 
or non-financial firms using various panel data or time series estimations. However, it 
is surprising that there has been scarce theoretical or empirical study of dividend 
signaling by banking firms.  
There are strong grounds on which banking firms should be studied. First, as will be 
explored later, a strong strand of empirical literature has observed that banking firms 
are relatively more opaque7 than non-financial firms, which should mean that there 
could be signaling roles for outs like dividends. Second, the same strand shows that 
banks are even more opaque during crisis periods. So, what do the dividend pay-outs 
during crisis periods by banks convey? For banks, the nature of agency conflict is 
much more complex, since there are many stakeholders involved, viz, depositors, other 
creditors, shareholders, managers and regulators, and, of course, society at large (due 
to the negative externalities of bank failures or crises). Hence, there should be value-
adding roles of costly dividend signaling in mitigating such agency costs. There are 
rather more severe problems of risk shifting via dividend payouts in banking which 
have not been studied empirically as of yet8 . 
 
Hence studying the signaling and the information content of dividend signals for 
banking firms will most likely reveal intriguing insights into the theory of banking too.9  
 
                                                          
7 Opacity here refers to the information asymmetry between the insider managers and the share 
holders or the general creditors. Opacity is significantly large in case of banking firms since the asset 
portfolios, or the loan portfolios held by the banks are opaque, or banks are very reluctant to divulge 
information on the quality of such assets, or credit history, or default probabilities. Such opacity has 
also lead to the problem of surmounting non performing assets in the banking industry of developed as 
well as developing nations. 
8 These insights are fundamentally different from that of standard corporate finance of agency conflicts. 
Then, of course, dividend smoothing by the banking firms follows. 
 
9 Recently Acharya, et al (2011) have developed theoretical models of bank dividend payouts based on 
information asymmetry and risk shifting. In the current thesis risk shifting in banking has also been 
briefly studied in the 4th chapter. 
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1.1.2 Research questions and objectives 
Based on the main research aim to investigate the dividend signaling and smoothing 
by banking firms, the primary aim is to investigate what the nature and significance 
of the impact of information asymmetry level on dividend pay-outs and speed of 
adjustments in case of dividend smoothing are. (In this thesis, the opacity level is 
estimated based on the information asymmetry between outsider principal groups, 
mainly shareholders, depositors, and the insider agents, namely, managers, who are 
also the controller of resources, mainly, free cash flows.) 
Hence, the following research questions are framed, which are supplemented by 
more bank-specific issues later. 
 
1. Is there any causality flowing from opacity level measures to dividend payout levels 
for bank holding companies? 
What are the underlying theories explaining such causality, for example, signaling 
theory or pecking order theory, or dividend life cycle theory? 
 
2. More generally, is there any causality flowing from opacity levels to payout 
policies in general, for example, cash dividends, stock dividends and share 
buybacks? 
 
4. What is the information content of dividend pay-outs? 10 
 
 
5. Based on recent empirical studies, are dividend payouts also a signal for risk 
shifting? Have such phenomena increased over the crisis period of 2008-?  
                                                          
10 Information content has the standard meaning here of what may be the external factors impacting 
the levels of dividend pay outs, in the current thesis different types of dividend pay outs have been 
studied including shar repurchases. 
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6. Based on the theoretical models of dividend or payout smoothing in general, 
what is the nature of the impact of bank specific opacity levels on bank-specific 
speeds of adjustments?  
 
7. More generally, what is the nature of the impact of bank-level opacity on 
adjustments of pay-out policies in general?  
 
8. If smoothing is also a form of signaling, then what is the information content?  
 
 
9. What are the underlying theories explaining signaling via dividend smoothing?  
 
 
10. Can risk shifting happen through the smoothing of dividends? And has this 
phenomenon increased over the crisis period of 2007-09 11 
 
The above research questions are general, and are motivated by the general costly 
signaling theory of dividend pay-outs. However, such questions are important too for 
building upon more bank-specific research questions. The main difference between the 
banking and non- banking firms related to costly signaling is based on the specific 
information content of the dividends signaling, also in the form of dynamic payouts.12 
The following section provides a detailed sketch of specific banking variables that are 
required to perform such a systematic study, which also distinguishes the current study 
                                                          
11 Risk shifting here again is to mean the standard process of shifting of wealth (hence risk in the 
opposite direction) from the depositor, or general creditor group to the share holders, hence violating 
the first principle of corporate finance which maintains that shareholders are the residual claimants of 
wealth generated by firms. 
12 Dynamic pay outs here means partial adjustment of pay outs. 
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from the general empirical literature on dividend signaling.  
1.1.3 Theoretical and empirical studies on dividend signaling 
In studies on developed economies, mainly US-based studies, it has been 
demonstrated on multiple occasions that dividends contain information or can be used 
as costly signals. An example is the study by Aharony and Swaray (1980). Although 
most of these studies have been done for non-banking firms, of late there is a budding 
literature on bank dividend signaling, which is discussed later in the thesis in relevant 
sections. In this section, a general overview of signaling and the need for the same is 
discussed. 
 
Signaling is required in the context of incomplete information where there are adverse 
selection or moral hazard problems. Such problems might arise due to several factors. 
For example, adverse selection in the equity market is well known. This also deters the 
good firms with earnings potential and investment opportunities since they fail to 
secure fair pricing and have to pay extra premiums in such incomplete markets. 
 
Moral hazard issues might arise due to agency conflict problems. An example is the 
well-known free cash flow problem, which holds that for mature firms, there is a 
higher agency cost, which would mean that the outsider shareholders are not effective 
monitors of insider managers; hence, in such a scenario, managers might invest in 
value -destroying projects using the free cash flows. Hence, dividends are warranted in 
such scenarios to prevent such inefficient investments13. Similarly, there are studies on 
market response to dividends also, such as the one summarised by Al-Yahayee et al. 
(2009), where generally there are positive responses to the dividend increases and 
                                                          
13 The main argument put forward for such arguments is the signaling hypothesis, which holds that 
under conditions of opacity, dividends contain information. 
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negative responses for dividend omission and cutbacks.14 
A seminal example in this literature is the study by Bhattacharaya (1979), where a 
theoretical model was built where dividends might be costly signals to remove 
information asymmetry regarding true firms’ values. There are two main signaling 
costs in this regard. One is the differential tax treatments between dividends and capital 
gains. A second is the external financing costs which firms need to bear to remain 
committed to their dividend policies. It is argued in most of the theoretical literature 
that such costs are not worth bearing by bad firms which lack future earnings potential, 
and, hence, only good firms are able to absorb such costs. Thus, via this mechanism, 
dividends become signals which create separating equilibrium between good firms and 
lemons. Again in the same seminal paper, Bhattacharaya (1979) argued that the 
strength of dividend signal might be a positive function of the level of personal tax on 
dividends. This is also related to the managers’ task of maximising shareholder value 
after taxes on wealth. 
 
Hence, a higher taxation rate provides a greater incentive to the managers to signal 
the true earnings potential, which the poor performers fail to imitate. Multiple 
theoretical models, for example, the one by John and Williams (1985), have been 
established on a similar line of thinking, where the taxation cost is the main source 
of costly signaling. 
 
Here, however, one should note that in the case of banking firms, there might be 
different costs and information content of dividends, and such studies are explored in 
later sections. An important point can be mentioned here, that is, the information 
content of signaling for bank dividends is more related to underlying liquidity and 
                                                          
14 Certainly all such market responses can not be fully explained by dividend signaling theory, for 
example the behavioral finance studies have found larger negative responses from the shareholders in 
case of cuts and omissions as compared to positive responses for similar increase in pay outs, loss 
aversion rather than risk aversion can help analyze such responses.  
14 
 
solvency measures. 
 
Again, there is a difficult problem of risk shifting via dividend payouts from 
shareholders to the depositors in banking firms. Such risk shifting phenomena are 
observed in general, but for banking, they are more intensive (Acharya, 2012, 2013) 
since there are implicit bailout guarantees or deposit insurance guarantees. 
 
1.1.4 Signaling and agency cost literature 
The separation between ownership and control is the main source of agency conflict, 
where the agents or managers might not work to optimise principals’ or shareholders’ 
wealth. This problem then forces the shareholders to assume extra agency costs to 
monitor the shareholders effectively. Easterbrook (1984) was the first researcher to 
propose that dividends might reduce such agency costs by preventing insider managers 
from investing free cash flows in bad projects. Again, if the managers are forced to 
commit to stable dividend payouts, then there will be external financing needs also, 
which would also discipline the managers, a so-called hard capital rationing or hard 
budget constraint. 
 
Jensen (1986) further proposed that managers might be driven by compensation and 
human capital incentives, which might cause over-investment of cash flows in the 
absence of good investment opportunities. Here too, costly dividends are a tool to 
mitigate such moral hazard problems. Hence, the positive market response to 
dividend payouts is consistent with the reduction in agency cost15. In traditional 
studies like that by Ashqith and Mullins (1983), some versions of a dividend 
                                                          
15 There have been numerous empirical studies conducted on the impact of dividend announcements 
on stock prices, and most of the studies report that changes in the stock prices follow the same 
direction as the changes in the dividends. However, the current thesis is more focused on the causation 
of the dividend payouts rather than the information content of such signals (an important area, which 
is discussed in later sections). 
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prediction model were used. Here, we can also relate such studies to the dividend 
smoothing studies, where the firms have exhibited remarkable rigidity in paying out 
dividends. 16 
Authors such as Jagannath et al. (2001), DeAngelo et al. (2000) and Guay and Harford 
(2000) have observed that dividends can work as signals, as explained earlier, only 
when firms remain 
Committed to a consistent payout policy. Their suggestion is consistent with the 
paper on dividend smoothing by Lintener (1956), where the author observed that 
managers avoid reducing or omitting dividends. Later in the thesis, whether dividend 
smoothing might emerge as a costly signal from the typical dividend signaling models 
is discussed17. There are a few studies which have considered partial adjustments of 
dividends vis-à-vis stochastic underlying earnings being costly signals in a continuous 
time framework. 
 
1.1.5 Opacity in the banking industry: the literature 
Since the current thesis is based on the questions of whether banking firms use payout 
policies to signal under information asymmetry to the outside shareholders and 
whether particularly partial adjustments of payouts are used as signals, an obvious 
matter of importance is to investigate whether banking firms are relatively more 
opaque than non-banking firms. In this area, however, the studies are not in agreement 
with each other. Some authors suggest that it is better to accept the above as a 
hypothesis than a fact. 
Authors provide empirical evidence that banking firms are more opaque than non-
banking firms. Hence, from this perspective, these firms should face greater urgency 
                                                          
16 Mainly in the case of banking firms, there have been fewer dividend cuts or omissions even during 
crisis periods, measures which were recommended for capital requirement purposes. 
 
17 Its worth noting that Lintner (1956) in the original thesis did not theorize dividend smoothing as a 
costly signaling process, rather costly signaling literature emerged later. The original thesis was 
empirical in nature which reflected the pay out rigidity practiced by most of the corporate.  
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in signaling to the market participants about future earnings or solvency for mitigating 
adverse selection or moral hazard problems18. 
There are alternative perspectives too. For example, Flannery et al. (2013)19 have 
shown that banks are relatively more opaque only in times of crisis. The same authors 
have investigated the share trading characteristics of banks before and during the last 
financial crisis, and have found strong evidence that prior to crises there was no 
significant difference in opacity between banks and non-banks; however, during the 
crisis, there was a sharp increase in opacity for both small and large banks. 
Nevertheless, they have also observed that it is difficult to relate a specific asset class 
to an opacity measure for banks. 
 
One critical departure from the current thesis for such studies on bank opacity is that 
the current work is rather focussed on the response of the banking firms to the opacity 
or on the question of whether the more opaque banks try to mitigate the bad 
consequences of greater opacity by signaling and smoothing. Such questions are not 
addressed by the above strand of literature. 
 
 
1.1.6 Dividend signaling theory for banking firms 
There are a few studies which investigate the signaling role of dividend payouts in 
banks. Kauko (2012) is one such study that has challenged the classical Miller and 
Modigliani irrelevance paradigm, which holds that under perfect capital market and 
complete information conditions, there is no value-adding role for dividends. Kauko 
                                                          
18 Recent studies have provided strong empirical evidence for the signaling behaviour of banks via 
dividend payouts or payouts in general, although here too, effectively, no study has been carried out to 
investigate the dynamic behaviour of dividends or related payouts and whether information 
asymmetry impacts such adjustments or smoothing. 
 
19 In the current thesis the crisis period of 2007-09 has been included to verify whether there has been 
a significant change in the pay out levels, or the adjustment speed of pay outs by banking firms. 
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argues that with imperfect information, that is, when bank managers have better 
information about liquidity and solvency than the outsider shareholders20, dividends 
can be used as costly signals21.  
Such a proposition is also made in the paper by Myers and Mazluf (1984), which 
suggested a pecking order for the capital structure under incomplete information 
(the same theory also has strong implications for dividend payouts, which is 
discussed later). 
 
Khan and Kiang (2002) observed that there might be a positive association between 
dividend payouts and the information asymmetry level at the firm level, and the same 
authors also proposed that institutional monitoring theory is not capable of explaining 
the dividend policy of firms, but rather that the free cash flow hypothesis is a better 
candidate in the same scenario. 
 
Another interesting argument by Kauko is that since banks do not like to cut back 
dividends once committed to them, there might be more liquidation of assets if equity 
is used more. Hence, there are implications for maintaining stable dividend payout 
policies. Such a policy is related to dividend smoothing or partial adjustments of 
dividends, though the model is a discrete time multi-period model without smoothing. 
 
There has been comparatively less empirical, and theoretical work on bank dividend 
policies in general. Baker et al. (2008) have investigated how the managers in financial 
and non-financial firms perceive standard dividend payout theories, for example, 
signaling theories, agency conflict based theories, clientele theories and life cycle 
                                                          
20 Hence in the current thesis some measures of solvency has been used to investigate the impact on 
pay out levels and adjustment speeds of specific banks. 
21 This proposition is also based on the fact that most bank managers find equity capital 
costlier than debt capital, the reason being that in equity markets, due to the presence of 
adverse selection problems, banks have to pay a greater premium, which is also known 
as the lemons premium. 
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theories, and found that the managers of financial firms act significantly differently 
from the managers of non-financial firms. One main difference pointed out in the study 
is that bank managers perceive dividends as a stronger signaling device than non-
financial firm managers. 
There are a few empirical studies which support signaling and agency conflict theory 
predictions for the dividend payouts by banks. One such early study is the one by 
Boldin and Legget (1995), who provided empirical evidence based on 207 US-based 
banks that dividend signaling by such banks improved credit ratings22. Bessler and 
Nohel (1996), in a comprehensive event study analysis, found that there were 
significant negative abnormal returns around the dividend omissions or cutbacks 
made by banks. 
In a more recent study by Abrue and Gollamhosen (2013), clear evidence was 
presented that bank holding companies use dividends as signals for future growth 
prospects. Such a finding is in accordance with signaling theory in general. Forti and 
Schiozer (2015) provided a comprehensive information content study of dividend 
signaling by banks in the Brazilian banking system, and the results show that these 
banks have used dividends as a signal to information sensitive depositors for asset 
quality and liquidity. 
 
Again, the same study showed that such signaling is significantly stronger during 
financial crises, when there are rising problems of information asymmetry, the 
opaqueness of asset quality and the concerns of common depositors. There can be 
interesting differences between the dividend policies of banks for different economies 
and regulatory environments. For example, Basse et al. (2014) provided evidence that 
for the European commercial banks, there was neither consistent dividend signaling 
                                                          
22 Changes in credit ratings over periods are also used as proxy measures of opacity (), though it is a 
very indirect measure since it is based on the perception of credit raters and investors which 
themselves can be biased, we can relate such biasness to the banking crises of 2007-09 where very low 
quality bonds were also given high ratings. 
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nor smoothing during the 1998-2008 period. 
 
As explained elsewhere in the current thesis, the agency-based models of dividend 
payouts hold that dividends can be used as mechanisms for solving agency problems 
between managers and shareholders (although, it is argued later in the thesis that the 
agency problem in banking is much more complex since there are many other creditors 
to banks, and there can be agency conflicts among different combinations of principals 
and agents which may generate risk-shifting problems23. John et al. (2010) observed 
that the agency problem in banking was far more severe when there was extremely high 
leverage. Collins et al. (1996) investigated the change in the dividend payout ratios 
with the insider holdings, and they are of the view that the dividend policy of banks can 
be compared with that of unregulated firms or sectors. Asraf and Zheng (2015) found 
that bank managers may not use dividends to solve the conflict between inside and 
outside debt holders. 
Recently, the debate on bank dividend policies has shifted towards an investigation on 
risk shifting by banks, mainly during the financial crisis of 2007-09. Acharya et al. 
(2011) started the related debate by investigating the pre-crisis dividend policies of 25 
large US financial institutions. The authors found that these institutions paid large 
dividends in the pre-crisis period and also maintained a smooth dividend payout policy 
even in mid-2008. In a later theoretical analysis, Acharya et al. (2014) suggested that a 
combination of risk-shifting incentives and the low charter or franchise value of banks 
may generate such dividend patterns. In the same study, the authors also suggested that 
risk shifting based on coordinated dividend policies between banks may be severe 
during crises periods. Empirically, Kanas (2013) has provided strong evidence of risk 
shifting from 1992 to 2008, with high-risk banks being more likely to pay higher 
dividends. Onali (2014) has provided evidence that dividends and default risk are 
                                                          
23 In theoretical modeling such a scenario may be called as multiparty signaling, where the same type of 
signal may convey different meanings to different parties. 
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positively associated24. 
 
Generally, the bank dividend literature finds size, growth opportunities and 
profitability measures (Fama and Fench, 2001) are important determinants of dividend 
payouts. Empirical studies often suggest that the stocks of large banks are widely held 
by investors, and, hence, such banks have greater and cheaper access to external 
financial markets and, therefore, have less dependence on internal financial markets. 
There are differences between standalone banks and the BHCs too since the latter 
types of institutions pay more dividends25. More recently, Abreu and Gulamhussen 
(2013) have shown that for US banks, size and profitability are important determinants 
of dividend payouts. Ashraf et al. (2015) have found similar results for the Italian 
banks. On the other hand, banks with higher growth opportunities pay fewer 
dividends26. 
A dividend policy implies the payout of free cash flows or internally retained earnings 
by firms to the shareholders. Such payouts can be justified based on various market 
fractions, such as information asymmetry or agency costs; however, such dividends are 
not value adding at all in cases of perfect market conditions. In the case of information 
asymmetry, the good firms wish to pay dividends in order to distinguish themselves 
from the bad firms, or in other words, those  
firms which do not have earnings potential find dividend payouts very costly and, thus, 
are not in a position to maintain them and fall out of the market. This is called signaling 
equilibrium, where dividends can act as costly signals (Miller & Rock, 1985). For 
mature firms, when there are fewer investment opportunities in place, the shareholders 
                                                          
24 However positive association may not exactly show risk shifting, we need to investigate the channels 
of such risk shifting, enabling factors and the types (whether from depositors to share holders or other 
types), which have been briefly studied in the 4th chapter. 
25 Which again shows the complicated agency conflict faced by the BHCs. 
26 No doubt all such results are not in unison to each other, pecking order theory, dividend life cycle 
theory and alike may provide conflicting predictions about the causes of dividend pay outs, the issue is 
briefly discussed later. 
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demands greater dividend payouts since the insider managers might invest in value 
destroying projects (DeAngelo et al., 2006). Hence, from either a signaling or agency 
conflict view, dividends are quite critical. 
Even after few decades, economists argue that dividends have remained a puzzle where 
there is no consensus among the various schools (Bratton, 2004; Amidu and Abor, 
2006; Rashid and Rahman, 2008; Gill et al. 2010). There are initial perfect capital 
market models where the theorists believe that dividends do not matter (dividend 
irrelevance theory), since the shareholders are indifferent about capital gains and 
dividends, and might generate homemade dividends to nullify any payout policies by 
firms (Miller & Modigliani, 1958, 1961)27.  
Of late there have been studies on so-called partial adjustments of dividend policies, 
which means that firms do not payout random dividends but actually have targets to 
set according to various firm-specific parameters and then slowly adjust towards the 
target (Baker, et al. 2001; Naceur et al. 2006; Andres et al. 2009). There are 
differences in targets and speeds of adjustments for various firms according to firm-
level determining factors like life cycle factors and opacity level factors28. Hence, the 
study of such factors for financial firms is rare.29 
 
Information content of bank dividends 
There is a strong strand of literature on the information content of dividends and 
payouts in general (e.g. share repurchases) by the non-banking firms, but the 
                                                          
27 However, there are then taxation considerations. For example, dividends are taxed more than capital 
gains; hence, why should shareholders prefer payouts? Tax clientele theory states that investors’ 
clienteles different income or consumption needs; hence, firms might pay according to that (Allen et al., 
2000). In empirical analyses, there has been less evidence presented for perfect capital markets. 
 
28 Again in the standard dividend smoothing literature, the speed of adjustment means an average 
speed for the sector, or a group of firms in that sector, firm specific speeds of adjustment is not 
generally computed. However the firm specific characteristics like life cycle features are not captured in 
such standard models. The current thesis attempts to modify such models by computing the firm 
specific adjustment speeds.  
29 There can be some justification found for this exclusion of banking firms, for example, banks are 
significantly highly leveraged, or banks are significantly opaque as compared to non banking firms. 
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comparatively very thin literature on the information content of dividend signaling by 
banks. The empirical literature on the information content of bank dividend payouts 
(Forti & Schiozer, 2015) again has not been extended to the dynamic behaviour of 
dividends or dividend smoothing per se. 
 
Generally, the gap in the empirical literature is surprising since, as Dickens et al. 
(2002) have shown, the banking sector is the largest payer of dividends in developed 
economies, namely, the US. Even then, banks are generally excluded from any 
typical sample for investigating payouts by firms. 
 
There are a few studies which investigate the impact of dividend payouts by banks 
on price reactions (Bessler & Nohel, 2000, for example) and find positive 
significant responses. However, these studies have not investigated the information 
which is conveyed by the dividend payouts to shareholders or debt holders in 
general. 
 
Kauko’s theoretical study (2012) suggests that banks may use dividend payouts to 
signal liquidity and profitability to the depositors. Recently, Forti and Schiozer (2015) 
conducted a comprehensive investigation of the information content of bank dividend 
payouts to information sensitive depositors. A brief discussion of the specific variables 
which are found to have probabilistic impacts on dividend payouts in the above-
mentioned study is provided below. 
 
1. Size: Size, which is measured by the natural logarithm of the total assets of 
banks, has been found to have a very consistent positive impact on the 
probability of paying higher dividends.  
2. Profitability: A general measure of profitability is ROA, or return on assets, 
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which is obtained by dividing income by total assets is used, and a consistently 
positive impact is found for all TOBIT regression-based results on the 
probability of paying higher dividends. Such an observation is again consistent 
with Kauko’s (2012) theoretical model, as discussed earlier. 
 
3. Leverage: Leverage capital is obtained by dividing liabilities by equity 
capital, a standard measure of capital structure. This variable is found to 
have a consistent negative impact on the probability of paying higher 
dividends.  
 
4. Capital: Capital adequacy ratio is calculated by taking the ratio of the equity capital 
and the risk-weighted assets. Capital has been found to have a consistent negative 
impact on the probability of paying dividends.  
 
5. Loan risk/credit risk: This is a measure of risk of the bank loan portfolio, which is 
obtained by the ratio of non-performing assets to total loans. The very study has 
found a consistently negative probabilistic impact on the dividend payouts.  
 
6. Credit growth: This is a measure of the growth rate of the loan portfolio, which 
is obtained by subtracting the last period’s loan portfolio value from the current 
loan portfolio value and dividing it by the previous year’s portfolio value. This 
variable is also found to have a consistently negative impact on the probability 
of paying higher dividends.  
 
7. Crisis dummy: In the current thesis, crisis dummy is used, which captures the 
banking crisis period, i.e. the dummy has the value 1 if for the quarters between 
2007 third quarter and 2009 first quarter, and 0 otherwise.  
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The above impacts can be explained from the perspective of different theoretical 
strands, which are given detailed attention later in the thesis. Forti and Schiozer 
(2015) observed that dividend payouts have worked as costly signals for depositors in 
general and institutional investors (the category whom they identified as the 
information sensitive depositors) specifically, and that the significant impact of the 
above bank-specific variable increased over the period of crisis. The last observation 
lends support to the earlier observations made by the authors, who found banks assets 
turn more opaque during crisis periods; hence, the need for signaling intensifies. 
 
Acharya et al. (2013) reported that in US-based surveys, dividends might have been 
used as a risk shifting or expropriation tool during the crisis, which means that having 
given implicit bailout guarantees, banks paid out excessive dividends during the crisis 
to shift wealth from the depositors to the shareholders. 
 
However, the study by Forti and Schiozer (2015) found a consistently negative impact 
of crisis dummy variables and the risk measures on the payout probabilities, which 
clarifies that such risk shifting or wealth expropriation is not generally observed. 
 
Based on the extant literature as referred to in the above section, the current thesis aims 
to investigate and extend some of the critical gaps which are mainly related to the 
empirical literature, the most critical one being the systematic analysis of partial 
adjustment or dynamic dividend behaviours by bank-holding companies in relation to, 
first, the impact of the level of opacity on speed of adjustment (the gap which has been 
mentioned earlier while framing the main research questions), and, second, what the 
information content of such dynamic behaviour is; the latter area has not been 
investigated in the literature as of yet. Along with dividend payouts and dividend 
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smoothing or partial adjustment by banks, the thesis also attempts to investigate 
signaling by other payout types, for example, net share repurchases30 by banks, total 
dividend payouts, which also includes stock dividend payouts, and total payout, which 
is the combination of cash dividends, stock dividends and share repurchases. Later, a 
growing strand of literature is discussed (for example, even theoretical models, viz, 
Lambrecht & Myres, 2013) which, for firms in general, takes the view that partial 
adjustment behaviours are relevant for various types of payouts. 
 
However, there is no such systematic study for banking firms, where the signaling 
nature and content of different payouts by banks have been studied, and certainly not 
in the form of dynamic dividends and other forms of payouts, or smoothing. Hence, 
based on the information content of signaling and other forms of payouts, several 
additional research questions are posed, as follows. 
 
The difference between this set of further questions and the earlier set is that 
the latter is specifically focussed on the information content of signaling via 
dividends and other payouts, both in the form of absolute payout levels and 
partial adjustments31. The research questions are as follows:  
 
1. Does profitability have any significant probabilistic impact on levels of 
dividend payouts?  
                                                          
30 In standard literature there is an ongoing debate on whether share repurchases can be good 
substitute of dividends as pay out strategies by firms, the so called substitution hypothesis. 
31 More specifically, the extant literature on bank dividend pay outs is focused on the standard empirical 
tests of predictions from agency cost theory of firms (for example the free cash flow hypothesis), 
however given the nature and level of bank opacity more specific questions need to be analyzed based on 
pay out levels and speed of adjustment of pay outs. The purpose of such research questions should be to 
investigate the relationship between several bank specific variables and pay outs/ speed of adjustment. 
Over all these questions also bring out the signaling content of bank dividend pay outs. 
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2. Does profitability have any significant probabilistic impact on other payout 
levels by banking firms, viz, net share repurchase levels? Etc.  
 
3. Does profitability have any significant probabilistic impact on the 
speed of adjustment of dividends by banking firms?  
 
4. Does profitability have any significant probabilistic impact on the 
speed of adjustments of other payouts, viz, total payout, including 
share repurchases?  
 
5. Does capital adequacy ratio have any significant probabilistic impact on 
bank-specific dividend payouts? Does the same variable have any 
significant impact on share repurchases by individual banks?  
 
6. Does a bank-specific capital adequacy ratio impact bank-specific 
adjustment speeds where speeds are related to dividend smoothing as well 
as other payout adjustments?  
 
7. What is the nature and significance of the impact of credit growth on 
dividend payouts and other payouts viz share repurchases at the bank 
level?  
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8. What is the nature and significance of the impact of credit growth on the speeds of 
adjustments for dividends and other payouts at the bank level?  
 
9. Does loan risk/credit risk have any significant impact on such payout levels?  
 
 
10. Does loan risk have a significant impact on speeds of adjustments of such payouts at 
the bank level?  
 
Along with these specific questions, various life cycle variables are also employed in the 
research, namely, investment opportunity measures, free cash flow measure, namely, retained 
earnings to total assets/total equity, which is a standard measure of maturity as per the dividend 
life cycle theory (DeAngelo et al.op cit), among others. Hence, the impact of such lifecycle 
control variables on payouts, the speed of adjustments and allied measures reveal further 
information about bank payout signaling in general.32 
 
1.1.7 Research objectives 
Based on the research questions, the following research objectives are pursued in the current 
thesis. 
 
1. To perform a systematic investigation of the impact of bank level opacity on 
various bank-level payouts. Such an investigation will be conducted by employing 
standard methods based on the relevant literature, which is explained in detail in the 
following sections.  
 
2. To perform a systematic investigation of the information content of bank-specific 
                                                          
32 Hence lifecycle variables act as control variables in the models developed in the current thesis. 
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payouts and also to provide a comparative study of the differences between the 
signaling content of different payouts, for example, differences between dividend 
signaling content and share repurchase signaling content. Such comparisons are 
again based on underlying relevant theories, an area explored in detail in the relevant 
sections. 33 
 
3. To perform a systematic investigation of the dynamic payout behaviours at the 
bank level, comprising dividend smoothing along with other payouts. Here again, 
the primary objective is to estimate the bank-specific speeds of adjustments (related 
to different types of payouts) under the impact of bank-specific opacity levels, along 
with standard life cycle variables.  
 
4. To employ a modified form of the partial adjustment model (referring to the 
longstanding empirical literature developed since Lintner (1956)) which is capable 
of estimating firm-specific adjustment speeds over periods. This would be a 
fundamental improvement on earlier adjustment models, which are used only to 
estimate average adjustment speeds at sectoral or industry level.  
 
5. To perform a systematic analysis of information content of such 
adjustments, specifically the signaling content of speeds of adjustments and 
allied measures, for example, half life (Oliver et al., 2015).  
 
6. To perform detailed subsample analyses, which are expected to reveal more 
information regarding the change in bank payout behaviours over the last financial 
crisis period.  
                                                          
33 This will help us to study the conflicting hypotheses developed by different underlying theories: signaling, 
pecking order, and dividend lifecycle theories. 
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Overall, the thesis is divided into three sections, as follows. 
 
 
1. The first section provides a comprehensive investigation on bank specific dividend and other 
payout signaling, and the information content of such signals.  
 
2. The second section provides a comprehensive estimation of bank-specific adjustment speeds 
and the information content of such dynamic signals.  
 
3. The third section provides a brief account of a specific phenomenon, risk shifting via 
dividend payouts during the crisis period, which has been claimed to be observed (Acharya et 
al., 2013),  although this is not agreed upon widely (Forti & Schiozer, 2015). This section will 
extend such analyses to investigate whether risk shifting is observed via the smoothing of 
payouts. More recently, Duran and Vivas (2015) have demonstrated that large European and 
US-based BHCs have exhibited multiple types of risk shifting, for example in their terms 
‘double sided’, ‘deposit based’ and ‘non deposit debt based’ risk shifting (such terms will be 
explained in detail in the third section); however, they found that such phenomena have 
prevailed during the crisis period and have withered away since 2009. Again, the authors have 
also not examined such risk shifting through payouts and payout smoothing. The current thesis 
will be the first such work to build upon the literature. 
 
Further motivation for the current thesis is drawn from a more systemic and policy-based 
literature. Molenuex (2015) has observed that since the banking crisis of 2008, both in the US 
and the EU, there have been sustained efforts by central banks and governments to, firstly, 
provide guarantees for bank liabilities, secondly, provide recapitalizations of banks, thirdly, 
provide asset supports (relieving banks of troubled assets), and fourthly, provide banks with 
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various liquidity buffers. Molenuex (2015) notes that the large banks have started being or are 
being perceived by states as public utility firms, which means their failures now amount to very 
large negative externalities for the rest of the economy. Given this backdrop, one pertinent 
question is how it is possible for the banks to gain the confidence of the depositors in specific 
cases and shareholders and other creditors in general. Regulatory requirements alone may not 
be sufficient; banks also have to signal solvency, liquidity and future stable earnings, etc. to the 
market in an effective way. Hence, from such a systemic perspective, a thorough investigation 
on bank payout strategies amidst the lack of confidence created by the crisis is warranted, 
which the current thesis attempts to achieve. 
 
1.1.8 Plan for methodology 
 
The methodology in the current thesis draws upon several standard and modified econometric 
models. Before specifying the broad domains of the econometric models, the purpose can be 
summarized again. The main broader objectives, which encompass the research questions and 
objectives specified earlier are, one, to investigate the signaling content of different payout 
levels based on bank-specific information and, two, to investigate the signaling content of the 
speed of adjustments or the partial adjustments of different payouts based on similar bank-
specific information. 
 
Hence, the thesis is divided into two broad sections, one, in which the causality between opacity 
variables and different payouts is investigated first, which reveals the signaling nature of such 
payouts. This step is estimated by using a multivariate vector autoregressive model. 
 
The second step of the first section is to investigate the signaling content of such absolute 
payout levels, for which, based on the standard literature (Forti & Schiozer, 2015), TOBIT 
models have been constructed. 
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The second section of the thesis is devoted to estimating the bank-specific adjustment speeds 
for different payouts, and allied measures like half-life estimations (Oliver et al., 2014). For 
this step, a modified three-step partial adjustment model has been constructed. 
 
The second step in the section is to again investigate the bank-specific signaling content in 
such speeds of adjustments, which reflects the process of adjustment. Hence, TOBIT models 
are again used. 
 
Along with these main methods, several univariate subsample tests have been done. These are 
required for investigating changes in bank-specific payout characteristics before and during the 
crisis period. Standard significance tests of difference in median levels of various 
characteristics variables have been done, as these can reveal such information. 
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Chapter 2 
Impact of opacity on dividend signaling by banks and information content of signaling 
The current study provides a comprehensive analysis of information content of banking 
firms pay outs. The current study deviates from the standard literature on determinants of 
dividend pay outs, since it uses various bank specific explanatory variables which make 
bank holding firms special. Based on a data set of bank holding firms from the merged data 
bases of CRSP and COMPUSTAT and for the period between 1990-2015 the current study 
is an early investigation on the information content of different types of dividend pay outs 
by banks as well as share repurchases which is of significant importance to the information 
sensitive depositors and creditors alike. 
Key words : opacity, agency conflict, dividend signaling, share repurchases , BHC 
(bank holding companies) 
2.1.  Introduction 
Theoretical studies (Bhattacharya, 1979, Boldin et al, 1995) construct dividend signaling and 
dividend smoothing models under information asymmetry between the insider managers and 
outsider investors of a firm in general, later empirical studies (Lierry et al, 2011) examine 
various firm specific factors which impact the dividend pay out levels, as well as the dynamic 
adjustment of dividends. Among the standard factors analyzed there are agency conflict 
measures, life cycle measures, and information asymmetry measures34. 
 
However, there is a critical gap in the same area for banking firms, both theoretically and 
empirically as has been explored in the introductory section of the thesis. Hence based on the 
gap in this paper the author examine the impact of information asymmetry, among other 
factors, on the level and probability of dividend pay outs (signaling), and the information 
content of signaling(Forti and Schiozer, 2015). 
                                                          
34 However in the very paper authors have found less significant impact of information asymmetry or opacity 
level on the speed of adjustment. Again here the speed of adjustment is an average measure rather than firm 
specific. 
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Standard literature has employed probabilistic models to investigate the information content of 
dividend signals. The current section builds upon the standard bank specific studies, but also 
extends on the same by comparing and contrasting between information content of different 
types of pay outs, namely, dividends and share repurchases35. 
 
General theoretical models have held that there can be a separating equilibrium created via 
costly dividend signaling. Kirmani and Rao (2000) have provided a simple way of 
conceptualizing the equilibrium. If one considers a market with adverse selection problem, 
then the market can be thought of comprising good and bad quality firms, however the type of 
firms are a private information to the managers. 
 
In that scenario if a good firm signals dividend then the pay-off is say A, where as if it does not 
signal then the payoff is say B, where as if a bad firm signals dividend then the payoff is C and 
if it does not signal then the pay off is D. then in this scenario there will be a separating 
equilibrium if and only A>B and C>D. this is what gives the signaling its cost. 
 
In the empirical literature there  are only a few papers (For example, Fort and Schiozer, 
2015) which have included some firm specific variables which reflect the cost of 
signaling, in the current section such variables are included to bring out the nature of 
costly signaling by the bank holding companies. 
 
Here one important distinction needs to be made between the banking and non banking firms 
when it comes to the concept of quality which is signaled through dividends, for example. As 
Connelly et al (2011) argued that quality is the unobservable ability of the signaler for meeting 
                                                          
35 For example the substitution hypothesis between the dividend pay outs and share repurchases, whether they 
are both impacted by opacity levels in similar ways. 
34 
 
the needs or demands of the outsiders observing the signal. For general firms this value/ quality 
is captured by the insider information about the future earnings/ future investment 
opportunities. However for banks there are other quality issues for example future solvency36. 
Hence in the current section and in the thesis several bank specific variables are used which are 
beyond the standard measures of profitability or investment opportunities. 
 
There are two fold contributions of this section to the banking literature, one, it provides a 
comprehensive evidence for dividend signaling  under opacity which is robust across various 
heterogeneous characteristics of banks and over regimes (pre-crisis and post-crisis), two, the 
section employs bank specific variables (for example credit risk, default risk, capital 
adequacy, credit growth etc) to investigate the specific signaling content of different pay outs 
of bank holding companies, which distinguishes banks from non banking firms. This 
investigation is a further development on standard scarce literature on determinants of bank 
dividend pay outs (for example Dickens et al, 2000, or Forti and Schiozer, 2015), which have 
either treated banks similarly as non-banks and investigated standard hypotheses based on 
traditional theories, viz, signaling, pecking order, life-cycle theory etc, or have only restricted 
to one type of pay out namely dividend. 
There is another additional observation regarding the risk shifting behavior by banks via 
dividend pay outs. Recently there has been multiple critical surveys which have shown that in 
developed economies, specifically in USA there has been dramatic persistence of dividend 
payments by banking firms even during financial crisis, when actually banks should have 
omitted or cut dividends to remain solvent. Authors(Achraya et al, 2013) have marked this 
behavior as risk shifting by banks, where the banks would like to shift the wealth from 
depositors to shareholders, and hence the risk in opposite direction. Again such behaviors have 
been more exhibited by financially distressed banks or where the default probabilities are very 
                                                          
36 Hence one critical point of difference between banks and non banks is the measure of quality of assets, 
solvency and liquidity becomes more important for banking firms, in typical theoretical models of signaling 
generally these factors are not considered. 
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high. Later authors (Forti and Schiozer, 2015) have termed such wealth transferring or risk 
shifting behavior as cashing out by the shareholders37. 
In the current section an additional investigation is done on the evidence of such cashing out 
behavior, however in the current analysis other pay outs are also included. Hence the section 
provides an intriguing investigation on the impact of high default risk on share repurchases 
too which has not been studied comprehensively. 
2.1.1. Difference between the current study and more traditional studies 
The main difference lies in the fact that though earlier studies (Dickens, 2000 etc as mentioned 
earlier) have found that financial markets do influence pay out decisions, or as in the words of 
Forti and Schiozer (2015) shape dividends, they are mainly limited to the equity market 
responses, for example price reactions to dividend pay outs, however the current study is based 
on a more new trend in banking literature (Oliveira, 2015, Forti and Schiozer, 2015) which 
investigates the signaling role of pay outs from the perspective of depositors, or creditors in 
general. 
Hence in the following investigation there are two phases, one, a general causality analysis 
flowing from opacity level to pay outs which indicates signaling nature of pay outs, and two, 
more specifically the signaling content of pay outs from the perspective of depositors in 
particular, for which the study has used bank specific variables based on the recent papers. 
First, the study is related to the information content of dividends (Sant and Cowan, 1994; 
Michaely etal, 1995; Nissim and Ziv, 2001; Koch and Amy,2004 and others) but also extends 
to other pay out types. Second, the study is also related to the role of financial markets in 
influencing dividend policy (Brav et al, 2005; Leary and Michaely, 2011; Michaely and 
Roberts, 2012) but extends that to the depositor side more. Third, the study is also related to the 
traditional bank dividend literature, as argued earlier which mainly was an extension of non 
financial, or general dividend signaling theories (Boldin and Legget, 1995; Bessler and Nohel, 
                                                          
37 Cashing out is equivalent to risk shifting, however, for an elaborate study of risk shifting we need to investigate 
the channels, types and enabling factors which is not apparent just by observing any cashing out phenomenon.  
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1996; Casey and Dickens, 2000; Dickens etal, 2002). 
2.2. Literature review 
Since there are fewer studies on banking firms in related areas, it’s required to benchmark the 
paper with related studies for non-financial firms, and then it can be analyzed further whether 
similar results hold for banking firms too. Hence in this section a synthesis of main stream 
studies, both theoretical and empirical is provided. 
2.2.1 Failure of efficiency market theory and emergence of dividend signaling 
In the corporate finance literature there has been a long-standing debate on the purpose of 
dividend pay-outs. Under complete information, with no market frictions and full rationality 
of the agents, there seems to be no value adding role for dividend pay-outs (Miller & 
Modigliani, 1958). In the presence of information asymmetry between insiders (managers) 
and outsiders (shareholders), dividend pay-outs can be used as signaling healthy financial 
performance of the firm, i.e. Signaling the stability of underlying and future expected 
earnings (Bhattacharya, 1979, Boldin et al, 1995). This literature is primarily motivated by 
the broader signaling literature based on the works of Akerlof (1972) and Spence (1977), 
where costly signals generate full separating equilibriums. 
 
There have been very thorough review articles on the relevance of dividend signaling, or 
dividend pay out policies in general across industries (for example in Bhattacharya, 2007), 
however as Basse et al (2014) note that surprisingly there is a dearth of good econometric 
studies when it comes to banking firms. One of the justifications is that banking firms are still 
viewed from the perspective of Miller and Modigliani models, and if so this automatically 
leads to the conclusion that dividend pay outs are irrelevant events practiced by naïve firms. 
Rozef (1982) performed a comprehensive econometric study across industries however 
avoided banking industry, and that also without much justification. 
Related to banks there have been some earlier studies (Gupta and Walker , 1975) which are of 
survey paper types, and these authors have mainly pointed out some bank level variables (for 
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example in the referred paper, corporate profit, total asset growth, and liquidity measures) 
which have significant positive impact on pay out levels, however there is nearly no attempt to 
explain these observations from the fundamental theoretical perspectives, as explored earlier. 
 
In this context a seminal empirical work is by Bessler and Nohel (1996) who documented that 
there is a significant negative impact on bank abnormal returns in their sample, if there have 
been dividend cuts, or omissions. Hence their work lends indirect support to the information 
asymmetry theories, which suggests dividends as costly signaling which can resolve adverse 
selection problems. 
 
More recently Dickens et al (2003) have provided comprehensive evidence on USA banking 
firms regarding the bank level factors impacting the pay out levels, and the factors are, risk, 
agency conflict level, investment opportunities, size and dividend history. Interestingly though 
the authors have not explored theoretical underpinnings, there are indications regarding 
signaling as well as smoothing in their analysis (for smoothing / partial adjustment dividend 
history is critically relevant). 
 
Other authors like Theis and Dutta (2009) have supported the very findings. In case of 
European banking firms the studies are even fewer, for example, Eriotis et al (2007) have 
observed that Greece banks have statistically significantly different dividend policies as 
compared to the industrial firms in the same economy. Such empirical studies do point out 
that banks should be treated differently from the other firms as regard to dividend / pay out 
policies in general. One of the justifications might be that for banks the agency conflict 
structure is far more complex, since there are many principals (share holders, creditors, 
depositors) and stake holders (society at large, regulators) involved, and also that there is a 
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trade off between maintaining capital base of banks and paying out dividends (more later).38 
Earlier studies like by Allen and Michaely, 1995; Collins et al., 1996 and others have also 
pointed that though there might be some similarities between the dividend pay out policies 
by the industrial firms and banking firms, further empirical evidence should be provided to 
draw clear inferences. As regards to the information asymmetry theory again, Brav and 
Heaton, 1998, have observed that measure of tangibility (net equipment and plants) is 
expected to have a negative impact on adjustment speed (in terms of smoothing). 
Frank and Goyal (2003) and Lemmon and Zender (2010) have observed and explained that 
firms with greater size and more age smooth less, and by this we should understand that for 
larger firms since the information led problems are relatively less as compared to more opaque 
and smaller firms, the speed of adjustment for the larger and matured firms is significantly 
higher than the smaller firms. O'Hara, 2003, have considered other measures for information 
asymmetry such as earnings and stock return volatility. 
 
2.2.2 Three contending information asymmetry models for explaining dividends 
Even recent studies..have agreed that till now it's not clarified why firms in general sets 
dividend pay out policies, and more specifically exactly how factors like agency costs impact 
dividend pay outs. Along with the earlier mentioned adverse selection models, or the proposal 
of information asymmetry hypothesis there is another contending theory which is also based on 
the information asymmetry between outsider investors and insiders of firms, namely, the 
pecking order theory Deshmukh 2005, argues that empirical literature has done surprisingly 
little study on the implications of pecking order theory for dividend pay outs. Seminal work by 
Myers and mazluf, 1984, argued that in the presence of incomplete information firms might 
suffer from underinvestment problems. 
                                                          
38 Rather this trade off between buffer capital and pay outs may vary significantly over the periods, mainly in the 
crisis period it is interesting to investigate how this trade-off or ratio differs from that in the non crisis period. 
Stiglitz and Helman (2000) have put forward the skin in the game model for banks which requires more of own 
capital to stake. 
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This problem arises when the firms face limited capital to invest in the good projects and 
would not bear the lemons premium in the capital market, mainly due to adverse selection 
problem in the equity market. In such a scenario the standard solution is to use the retained 
earning for investments rather than than paying dividends. Hence this theory suggest that 
higher the information asymmetry level lower is the dividend pay outs for mitigating 
underinvestment problems. 
This prediction is contradictory to that of the signaling model, for example Miller and 
rocks(1985), in their seminal signaling model proposed that dividend signaling level is an 
increasing function of the level of information asymmetry. 
This is a standard explanation since as the current thesis observes in the earlier theoretical 
section that faced with adverse selection problem costly dividends can create separating 
equilibrium to distinguish good firms from lemons. Hence these two predictions are opposite 
to each other, and hence can be distinguished. 
Pecking order theory holds that the likelihood of underinvestment can destroy firms value ex 
ante, and this is caused by the adverse selection problem in the equity market which forces 
firms to pay extra premium which is often called the lemons premium. Hence here the 
solution posed is to increase slack through detention of earnings, which further implies cut 
back or omission of dividends. Hence here the use of dividend policy is to control the 
problem of underinvestment. The theory thus suggests that optimal dividend pay out policy 
should be to pay less or no dividends at all under greater information asymmetry. 
 
On the other hand a substantial component of theoretical as well as empirical studies is based 
on costly signaling role of dividends. Miller and Rocks(1985). Provided a seminal model where 
the dividends might signal greater underlying earnings, hence might act as an optimal policy for 
the insider managers. In the very model if dividends reveal greater level of current earnings 
then further earnings might be inferred from the signaling too, since earnings are assumed to be 
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correlated over time. 
Earlier empirical studies, for example, Easterbrook(1984), reveal that underlying agency costs 
might be the main explanatory factor for dividend pay outs under the assumption of imperfect 
capital markets. Later a seminal study by Dickens et al (2002) extended similar models to bank 
holding companies. 
In fact the same authors observed five explanatory variables which in their sample exhibited 
significant impact on the bank dividend levels, those factors were namely, size, risk, 
investment opportunity, insider holdings level, and dividend history. 
Though in the seminal study the same authors provided agency theoretic explanation of 
the impact of explanatory variables, mainly the insider holdings level, an important 
dimension is not captured in such studies which is whether opacity degree within BHC 
s directly cause banks to signal more dividends. As has been pointed earlier too that 
most of the agency conflicts between the insider managers and outsider shareholders 
and creditors at large fundamentally is based on incomplete information between 
principals and agents. 
 
Later in the thesis however another growing literature is explored which investigates the 
information content of dividends payed by banks, hence confirming the basic costly signaling 
purpose of dividends. 
 
Interestingly there are a few empirical study, for example, Li and Zhao(2008), which have 
found rather a negative linear relationship between the information asymmetry level for non 
financial firms and the dividend pay out levels, which is contradictory to the standard 
signaling theory. 
 
However one must note that validity of such studies have to be made on the construction on 
variables too, at times use of market driven variables like dispersion of investors opinion 
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around future earnings are taken as opacity measures which might be misleading, since these 
measures might also convey optimism by the investors rather the degree of adverse selection in 
the capital market, hence might provide contradicting results, as observed by some seminal 
studies like in Chaterjee et al, 2013 and others.39 
 
Referring back to the two contending models, namely pecking order and signaling, there is no 
comprehensive empirical study as of yet for banking firms. Hence this thesis provides first of 
its kind empirical results on this front based on panel data estimations using vector auto 
regressive models and Tobit or censured regression models40. 
 
2.2.3 Dividend life cycle hypothesis 
 
In their seminal study Fama and French (2001) provided comprehensive evidence that the USA 
based firms had reached a peak in paying out dividends in 1978 and then onwards there had 
been a decline, so called the problem of disappearing dividends. They also noted that the main 
factor responsible for less propensity of the firms to pay dividends is the increase in the 
proportion of small firms with greater investment opportunities or in other words lower retained 
earnings. 
 
Hence a lifecycle theoretic perspective can be used to explain such phenomenon, or trend, I.e 
relatively younger firms with relatively larger investment opportunity sets would prefer to pay 
less dividends and use retained earnings to invest in value adding projects more. 
 
However there are two limitations here as far as the current thesis is concerned, one, these studies 
are mainly done for non financial or non banking firms, two, since it's also conjectured that smaller 
firms are more opaque in nature then why not they use dividends as costly signals? 
 
                                                          
39 There are measures like bid-ask spread of stock prices as proxy for information asymmetry which might also 
reflect the information asymmetry between the investors themselves: less informed and more informed traders. 
40 Hence one of the objectives of the thesis is also to investigate which underlying theoretical model can explain 
the pay outs by bank holding firms better. 
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Grullon et al (2002) in their robust empirical study have also suggested that there is a 
permanent dividend increase hypothesis, which means that dividend increasing firms would 
never cut back or omit dividends rather in the line of Lintners (1956) seminal study, would 
smooth dividends. Hence there seems to be a smoothing hypothesis based on the life cycle 
parameters, in other words matured and large firms with greater retained earnings would 
smooth dividends more. 
 
DeAngelo et al (2006) is certainly the most cited study in the very field, and they have measured 
lifecycle based on the earnings contribution mix, which is the ratio of retained earnings to total 
assets or total equity. According to their study the firms with low ratio would mean they are in the 
capital infusion stage and would need to raise external capital more , and thus would cut back 
dividends, on the other hand firms with very high capital contribution mix are in the maturity 
stage with less investment opportunities and thus would be good candidates for paying out 
dividends since they might face free cash flow problems41. 
 
2.2.4 Empirical literature on bank dividend pay outs 
 
 
Authors (Forti and schizer, 2015) have observed that even though banking firms are the largest 
payers of dividends (Dickens et al 2002 observed that about 92% of US banks paid dividends in 
2000 compared to only 49% in the non banking sectors) a few  studies have been done on the 
pay out strategies, or policies of banking firms. Systematically banks have been excluded from 
the empirical studies, based on the premise that banking firms are different from the non 
financial firms, such differences are based on heavy regulation and also high leverage for the 
banking firms. 
 
However it is also true that authors have observed that BHC s are relatively more opaque than 
the non financial firms, and more the so in the crisis periods. Hence if pay outs are perceived 
                                                          
41 We can observe here that dividend lifecycle theory is rather complex and contains elements from other 
theories too, for example signaling and agency cost theories. 
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as costly signals to mitigate the information related problems, or agency cost related problems 
like adverse selections and moral hazards then banks should be investigated more. 
 
 
2.2.5 Empirical studies on other pay outs types by banks (share repurchases) 
 
 
Following the last financial crisis there has been considerable increase in the bank share 
repurchases (Floyd et al 2015), and the bank holding companies are reported to buy back 
shares even at depressed prices. Hence share repurchases by bank holding companies should 
be included in the pay out policy in general, and there can be interesting differences between 
the information content of such signaling as compared to that of dividend pay outs. 
 
A scarce but standard literature on share buy backs by banks (Hirtle, 2001, for example) holds 
that share buy backs do convey information to the equity markets, mainly in two dimensions, 
one, banks may prefer to distribute cash to shareholders if the future investment is shrinking, 
two, share buy backs can also reveal private information regarding increase in future 
profitability. However such signals are strong mainly for the publicly listed banks, for closely 
held banks information content may be weak or different. 
 
Another striking feature about stock repurchases by banks is that the aggregate level of 
repurchases have increased immediately after recovery from any banking crisis, for example 
during the recovery from financial stress of early 1990s (Hirtle, 2001). There is a steady trend 
for bank holding companies in returning larger proportions of earnings to shareholders and 
share repurchase is playing increasingly growing role in the process. 
 
However the earlier studies (as summarized in Hirtle, 2001) have mainly mirrored the general 
investigation on the determinants of share repurchases by non-financial firms (Jagganathan et 
al, 1999, Ikkenberry et al, 2000, Choi and Chen, 1997). In the standard literature one school 
holds that firms with more volatile cash flows tend to prefer more flexible stock buy backs than 
dividends (Jagganathan et al, 1999), which suggests that such firms prefer to distribute 
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temporary profit to shareholders, and prefer dividends only when the insider expectation is that 
earnings have risen permanently.42 
 
On the other hand the second school in the standard discourse holds that share repurchases 
(similar to dividend pay outs) may mitigate Jensens (1986) free cash flow problem in a 
principal agent frame work43. There are some evidence for such free cash flow (alternatively 
life cycle hypothesis) hypothesis in Grullon (2000), Lie (2000), Nohel and Tarhan (1998) 
among others. 
 
However in above mentioned studies there is no systematic investigation on more bank specific 
information revelation(for example, the bank specific variables which have been mentioned 
earlier in the thesis, based on more recent studies, viz, Forti and Schiozer, 2015) via share 
buyback signaling, and whether such information content may differ from dividend pay outs, 
specifically when in after math of the last financial and banking crisis there is a growing trend 
of buy backs even more than dividend pay outs. 
 
Overall the following limitations or incompleteness surface from the extant studies in this area 
 
 
1. There are clear contradictions among the testable hypotheses based on signaling 
theory, pecking order theory, and lifecycle theory.  
 
2. There are rare studies based on the above theories for banking firms  
 
 
3. There are rare studies on the information content of dividend signaling, or, what 
bank specific information is revealed through such costly signals.  
 
The following hypotheses building section thus draws upon both the general corporate finance 
based studies and bank specific literature. 
 
                                                          
42 This view then may not be compatible with substitution hypothesis. 
43 Hence more akin to substitution hypothesis. 
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Brief account of share repurchases by the bank holding companies 
 
 
Dividend resilience till the crisis period is well documented (Srivastav et al, 2013), however it 
is only a part of the story, since share repurchases have played a very critical role before the 
crisis period. From the perspective of standard theory share repurchases and dividends have 
similar impact on the balance sheet, since both entails reduction in capital and pay out to 
shareholders in form of cash (though certainly stock dividends also have been found to account for 
a significant portion of dividend pay outs, as is documented in the current thesis too). 
Hirtle (2014) observes that in contrast to dividend pay outs repurchases suddenly dried up in the 
crisis period and reached the minimum point by 2008. There were many BHCs who reduced 
share repurchases to zero but continued paying dividends for several quarters. In some of the 
cases dividend were paid for more than a year after the share repurchases have stopped. 
 
It has been argued in the standard empirical literature that dividends in general can play the role 
of signal for value for long run, however share repurchases may not act as costly signals since 
there is less commitment for continuing share repurchases. It has been argued that share 
repurchases are more volatile in nature and are used in periods where the income is high, and 
this trend is observed both for the financial as well as non financial firms (Jagannath et al, 
2000; Hirtle, 2004). 
 
In banking industry it’s a common practise to pay out dividends on quarterly basis after been 
approved by the firm’s board of directors. Where as at least in the past repurchases have been 
made more irregularly after public announcements of the same. Hirtle (2014) argues that bank 
holding companies were quick to reduce repurchases after the crisis deepened in 2008 and 
uncertainty increased about financial strength. One benefit to the bank holding companies could 
have been that they could continue paying dividends by cutting back repurchases. 
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However recently again this convention has been challenged (for example in Andirosopolous, 
2013 and others ) who have observed consistent repurchases by BHCs over a considerable 
period of time. This argument is however based on the underlying assumption that only 
dividend pay outs can work as costly signals, however in theoretical literature (discussed 
shortly afterwards) these two types of pay outs can be perfect substitutes, and there is some 
argument for repurchases also to play a signaling role. 
 
One additional feature which the current thesis investigates is the information content of share 
repurchases of bank holding companies, and whether there can be a comparative study of the 
same with that of dividends information content. 
2.2.6 Are dividends and share repurchases substitutes? 
 
 
The most fundamental perfect market theory suggests (Miller and Modigliani, 1961) that the 
dividends and share repurchases are perfect substitutes. Which means that given the investment 
policy the residual cash can either be distributed in form of dividends or repurchase. The same 
is suggested by the agency conflict theory by Easterbrook (1984) and Jensen (1986), where the 
theory holds that shareholders can control managerial action by removing excess cash out of 
the firms. Hence the final out come will be in the favour of mitigating agency conflict 
irrespective of the pay out method. 
 
Signaling theories in general always hold that share repurchases and dividends are perfect 
substitutes. All forms of transaction costs are either related to raising new capital, or reducing new 
investments and have nothing in relation to choice of payments(Bhattacharya, 1979; Miller and 
Rocks, 1985). The only exceptional model is by John and Williams (1985) which holds that 
signaling cost arise from the taxation on dividends and repurchases and dividends are not 
interchangeable. Another limitation of these general signaling models is that there has never 
been any systematic study of signaling characteristics of share repurchases. 
 
Allen etal (2000) also have developed a model where the repurchases and dividend pay outs 
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are not substitutes since dividend pay outs attracts the institutional investors, since the 
institutional investors are more interested to discover whether the firms are undervalued or 
overvalued since they also have the means and expertise to gather costly information. Hence 
the undervalued firms use this situation and signal via dividends. Interestingly signaling 
equilibrium is not reached in this model by repurchases. 
 
To estimate the degree of substitutability between the dividends and repurchases De Angelo et 
al (2000) examined the disappearance of special dividends and emergence of repurchase events 
across boards for the non financial firms. However the authors have not found any significant 
evidence for repurchases. Hence question can be raised if repurchases are independent signals. 
Jagannath et al (2000) have again argued that dividends are payed from the permanent earning 
streams whereas repurchases are used to pay extraordinary transitory earnings. 
 
There is a lack of systematic study in comparing the implications of dividends and repurchases 
from the signaling perspective. More the so in banking sector there are only some good survey 
based studies which observes the trends in the pay outs by bank holding companies. The 
following analysis in the current section is aimed at resolving the questions related to the 
signaling characteristics of the pay outs. 
2.2.8 Hypotheses building 
 
 
Based on the main objective of analysing dividend signaling by banking firms under 
information asymmetry, again the type of signaling here refers to the value signaling as in the 
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theoretical neo-classical literature(Miller and Rocks, 1985) (of the type between the bank 
managers and the out side investors/ share holders), the following hypotheses are proposed 
for the first section: 
 
H1a: size has a significant positive impact on the level of dividend pay outs by the bank 
holding companies 
 
A corollary to the first hypothesis is 
 
 
H1b: probability of dividend pay outs significantly rises with the increase in size 
 
Size of bank holding companies has been a matter of argument since the early studies as is 
observed in the current literature review section too. Impact of size on the pay outs, 
specifically the dividend pay out level can be considered from various perspectives. 
 
One theory relates to standard information asymmetry, which holds that smaller banks 
may hold larger proportion of opaque assets, or there is higher level of opacity levels 
which may icentivise the managers to pay greater dividend levels to signal value in the 
market. 
 
However there is the perspective of the agency cost theory, which is based on the free cash flow 
hypothesis. The very theory holds that for larger firms due to agency cost of retained earnings 
moral hazard problem is imminent hence greater pay outs is warranted to resolve the problem. 
 
Hence it is an empirical question which can be examined by the above hypothesis. Here 
again the contradictory views of pecking order and signaling theory can be considered, 
where the pecking order theory would predict less dividends in case of greater information 
asymmetry 
problem, since the adverse selection cost of equity may be high in the market, where as 
the signaling theory would predict opposite of the same. 
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Another perspective for the banking firms is the diversification theory, where the standard 
view is that larger is the bank greater is the diversification across the assets hence less opaque 
it is which might impact the dividend pay outs negatively. Larger banks may also have greater 
reputation capital which might reduce the need for signaling via dividend pay outs. 
 
Its under these background the size hypothesis is analysed in the current thesis. Hence size 
factor can either reflect the underlying opacity degree or reflect the agency cost. However 
agency cost or the moral hazard problem between managers and outside share holders is 
also generated from the inefficient monitoring of the managers which is again based on the 
information asymmetry level (Myers and Lambrecht, 2015). 
 
Along with the dividend pay outs the hypothesis will also be tested on different types of 
dividend pay outs, and on the share repurchases as another important means of pay outs 
by banks, mainly in the after math of the financial crisis. 
 
H2a: tangibility of assets has a significant negative impact on the level of dividend pay outs 
by the bank holding companies 
Corollary to this hypothesis is: 
H2b: probability of dividend pay outs decreases significantly with the increase of 
tangibility level 
Banking firms are criticised for greater opacity as compared to the non financial or industrial 
firms. The main reason for the greater level of opacity is the non transparent assets. Which is 
also the major reason for liquidity risk for BHCs. Hence opacity level is directly reflected in 
the proportion of transparent assets of the total assets as on bank balance sheets. 
 
Hence if value signaling is practised via pay outs then BHCs might need to pay more 
dividends, or the probability of pay might rise with the rise of opaque assets. Tangibility being 
the measure of transparency for banking firms should be negatively related then to the 
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signaling of dividend pay outs which can be tested by the second hypothesis. 
 
There is a well known literature of collateral signaling (starting from Leyland and Pyle, 1977) 
which propose tangible assets as signal of quality or financial strength of firms. Hence firms 
with higher proportion of tangible assets might not need greater dividend pay outs as costly 
signaling44. 
 
However from the perspective of the pecking order theory less transparency of assets may 
give rise to more opacity and hence more requirement of retained earnings, and thus less 
dividend pay outs. In effect signaling theory and pecking order theory predictions are contrary 
to each other in this case too45. 
 
For the above hypothesis also different types of dividend pay outs and the share repurchase 
will be analysed46. 
 
H3a: spread of stock prices for the bank holding companies have a positive significant 
impact on the dividend pay out level in general 
 
Corollary for the above hypothesis is: 
 
 
H3b: probability of dividend pay outs rises with the increase of spread measures for BHCs 
 
 
Again based on the Neoclassical value signaling literature it can be argued that bank holding 
companies also do control pay outs in face of credit growth, loan risk, capital adequacy, as has 
been shown in the recent literature too (Forti and Schizer, 2015). Hence here the suggestion is 
that reducing dividends to manage such risk is also a signal for shareholder value creation. 
Hence following extra hypotheses are proposed for the current section. 
                                                          
44 However intangible assets may play the opposite role, i.e. proportion of intangible or opaque assets may be 
positively related to the pay out levels of firms, hence in the following analysis both measures are kept for a 
robustness check of the predictions of signaling model. 
45 Here again there are very few studies on baking firms related to such contradicting predictions. 
46 In the standard literature though different types of pay outs has not been theorized as different tools of 
signaling, however, as we have seen in the earlier discussion there are studies comparing cash dividends and 
share repurchases. 
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Role played by other bank specific and lifecycle control variables 
 
1. Capital adequacy has remained a major criterion for the bank holding firms to 
demonstrate solvency across time periods, and more importantly since the financial 
crisis of 2007 onwards. Standard route of capital adequacy is reducing dividends or 
increasing the retained earnings. However there are contradicting studies regarding the 
role of banks during the financial crisis regarding maintaining the capital adequacy 
ratio. On one hand the recent studies (Floyd etal, 2016, Forti and Schiozer, 2015) on 
dividend pay out dynamics of banks do observe negative impact of capital adequacy on 
pay outs, then on the other hand some theoretical studies argue violation of the same by 
excessive dividend pay outs. 
 
 
2. As explained in the variable definition section here credit growth is explained as the 
growth in the loan portfolio. Though there has been some observations in the recent 
years since the financial crisis on the pattern of bank dividends along with the 
expansion of banking credit, there is less study on the impact of credit growth on the 
probability of bank dividend pay outs.Here the expected nature of impact would be 
negative, since aligned with the value signaling theory again banks would like to 
increase buffer capital if the portfolio of risky loans have expanded over the last period. 
3. Acharya et al (2013) have observed that many US bank holding companies have 
cashed out in the financial crisis, which also means increasing the dividend pay outs 
irrespective of the rise of default risk. However such observations have been 
challenged by other studies. Here one related measure for default risk is the loan risk is 
defined in the variables section. Such measure is widely used in the relevant studies. 
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2.3 Methodology 
 
 
This section discusses relevant methods which have been used for analyzing the impact of 
opacity levels as well as other bank specific control variables (a detailed discussion on 
variables will follow) on dividend signaling, as well as dividend persistence/ partial 
adjustment of dividends. Multiple methods are deployed here for robustness study, namely, 
multivariate panel data VAR model, panel data TOBIT model, and a modified partial 
adjustment model. The following section provides some justification for choosing the very 
models. 
 
2.3.1 Multivariate VAR 
 
 
A VAR is a simple extension of univariate auto regressive model to multivariate time series. 
The model has been regularly used to analyse the dynamic behaviour of multivariate financial 
time series as well as to forecast. The current work uses this technique to one, analyse the 
dynamic relationship between opacity level and the dividend pay-out levels, two, to analyse 
the predictability of opacity level for dividend level. VAR model has been made a popular 
adoption in the financial and economics literature by scholars like Sims(1980), Luktepohl 
(1991, 1992), Watson (1994), Mills (1999), Pena et al(2001) among others.47  
Hence VAR method can be adopted as to be a more suitable method for both time series and 
panel data (where variables are treated as endogenous only. For the current purpose this is 
suitable since the main purpose of the paper is to analyse both unidirectional and granger 
causality (as explained later) among opacity and dividend signaling level. VAR methodology 
has been used in the macro econometric studies since 1980s (Granger, 1969, Cambelll and 
Shiller, 1987), and recently this method has also been used in corporate finance based 
                                                          
47 Statisticians (Sims, 1980) observe that structural equations often are inefficient in the sense that endogenous 
and exogenous variables are predetermined, and unnecessary restrictions are imposed for identification. 
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studies48.  
One typical problem with VAR modelling (Doornik and Hendry, 2008) is that if there are too 
many lags in the model structure then its difficult to interpret the results, specifically if the 
coefficient signs are alternating, again too many lags also uses up too many degrees of freedom 
(Kanas, 2013). 
The central assumption of all the VAR models developed is that the dependent and the 
independent variables are non- stationary I (1) at the level however when they are transformed to 
their first difference form they become stationary. In the current case VAR model is deployed for 
serving two specific purposes, one, to test the individual null hypothesis that the appropriate lags 
of the opacity variable is not significantly correlated with the signaling variable, and two, whether 
there is Granger causality between opacity and DPS level. 
 
Granger Causality test can be extended beyond bivariate models (Hamilton, 1994) for 
example in the current case it can be tested using Wald-Granger test that whether lagged 
opacity variables as well as the control variables together G causes DPS for the next period. 
 
 
Recent studies which have deployed VAR modelling 
 
 
There have been some important studies (Basse etal, 2013, Reddemann et al, 2010, Goddard et 
al, 2006) on the analysis of various firm specific factors’ impact on dividend policies followed 
by banking firms, and non financial firms in general. Doornik et al (2009) have proposed a 
detailed VAR based method in which forecasting can be achieved based on financial 
statements for firms in general. The authors have used Granger-causality tests along with 
VECM estimations. Goddard et al (2006) have used VAR methodology for analyzing both 
signaling and smoothing behaviors of dividend pay outs in UK. The authors have investigated 
two specific hypotheses, one the signaling hypotheses, and the other one the smoothing 
                                                          
48 Hamilton (1991) demonstrated that VAR method is basically a modification of overlapped simultaneous 
equation model. 
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hypotheses. According to the standard signaling hypothesis the dividend pay outs have 
information content and they can predict future earnings. 
 
Whereas according to the standard smoothing hypothesis the dividend pay outs are rather 
influenced by the past pay out levels and earnings levels. Certainly in the current section, as 
well as in the thesis elsewhere it will be demonstrated that there are more modified versions 
of dividend smoothing models with more specific hypotheses. However it seems that even 
from the argument of the above authors, VAR is a better model for investigating the 
predictive power of dividend pay outs, or in other words the predictive power of those firm 
specific variables which impact dividends49. 
 
For the current paper four preliminary unrestricted VAR models are used, where the first 
model analyses correlation between DPS and Size, the second model analyses correlation 
between DPS and tangibility, the third does the same for DPS and turnover, and the fourth 
does the same for DPS and spread, and for every model the same firm specific control 
variables are used. 
 
Overall some costs and benefits of using VAR methodology over other alike methods are 
summarized briefly below. 
 
1. since VAR method unlike other structural equation methods does not rely on any 
underlying theory for model specification there might be a data mining bias since the 
researchers might tend to achieve results which are congruent to their expectations.  
 
2. If there are k equations, and each with m variables and with n lags for each m variables, then 
there will be (k + nm2) parameters to be estimated. There will be loss of degree of freedom as  
                                                          
49 One critical difference between the papers mentioned and the current analysis is that here more the objective is 
not to examine the information content of bank dividends for future earnings, but to analyze the predictive power 
of the information asymmetry levels on the future pay out of dividends itself. Hence from this perspective the 
following analyses builds upon the earlier explored dividend signaling models, however we are interested in 
examining factors which cause dividend signaling. 
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too many lags specified, especially on small size samplings. It would also result in large 
standard errors and wide confidence intervals for the specified coefficients. Hence keeping 
this in mind here the rule of parsimony is followed with only one lag (Kanas,2013) 
 
3. VAR method can only analyse short term bivariate causality among the endogenous 
variables, but for analysing any long term causality more advanced models like VECM 
(vector error correction) might be more appropriate. 
Lastly a brief pros and cons of using Granger causality measure can be examined as 
below: 
 
 
1. There are multiple properties of Granger causality which makes it a good candidate for 
measuring causal effects. For example it follows symmetry properties (Barret 
and Barnett, 2009, Barret Et al, 2010) which helps preserve the causality relation 
when there is a scale transformation of variables (Geweke, 1982; Hosoya, 1991; 
Barrettet al., 2010), the main advantage is that this measure helps to infer the 
predictive power which one or more X variables have for Y. 
 
2. Barnett et al (2009) have further shown that for the Gaussian distribution following 
variables the Granger causality measure is equivalent to Shannon Entropy flow 
concept, which is another related strand in mathematical finance which is also 
deployed for investigating causal relationship.  
 
3. Generally GC measure can also be used to compare the causal interaction between 
different sets of time series.  
 
4. However there are certain limitations of GC measure too, Hu et al (2011) make the 
claim that GC measure does not capture how strongly one time series influence the 
other, though this claim has been contained by other authors like Barret and Barnett 
(2013).  
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5. Certainly GC(Granger Causality) is not a good measure for all types of stochastic 
time series, for example if the model is not a true autoregressive model with white 
noise residuals then there can be biasness in the measures of GC or inference from 
it can be erroneous.  
 
Hence in conclusion its safe to observe that GC measures causal relation quite strongly if the 
 
model is stationary multivariate autoregressive. 
 
Note on Bivariate Granger Causality test 
The general question for investigation in Granger Cusality test, or Vector Auto regression 
model, is whether a scalar y can help forecast another scalar x. if the answer is no then we can 
say that y does not Granger cause (or G cause) x.  More generally, y fails to G cause x, if for 
all s>0, man squared error (MSE) of a forecast of xt+s based on (xt, xt-1,….) is the same as the 
MSE of a forecast of xt+s that uses both (xt, xt-1,…) and (yt, yt-1,…). Hence if only the linear 
functions are used then y fails to G cause x if: 
MSE(E(xt+s given xt, xt-1,….))= MSE(E(xt+s given xt, xt-1,…..yt, yt-1…….)). 
Hence if the above equality holds then we can say that x is exogenous in the time series with 
respect to y. there is another expression of the same meaning, i.e. y is not linearly informative 
about the future x. 
In the standard framework Granger (1969) meant that if any even x is caused by another event 
y, then it should precede the even t x. However as Hamilton notes (1994) that there can be 
serious limitations to the practical implementation of the original idea for aggregate time series 
data. 
Econometric test for G causality 
For econometric test of G causality we mean whether series y Granger causes series x. To 
implement this test we assume a particular autoregressive lag length p and estimate  
Xt=ct+∑αtxt-i+∑ꞵtyt-i+ut 
We estimate the equation by OLS. We then conduct the F test of the null hypothesis: 
H0: all ꞵ’s are =0, where the alternative hypothesis being at least one ꞵ is significantly 
different from 0. One way to implement this test is to measure the RSS or the sum squared of 
residuals from the above equation: RSS1 =∑ESTIMATED ut2, and then compare the measure 
with the RSS from the univariate auto regression for Xt (with only lags of X), call it RSS0 (this 
equation is also estimated by OLS). 
If  S1 ={ (RSS0-RSS1)/p}/RSS1/(t-2p-1) > 5% critical value for F(p, t-2p-1) distribution, then 
the null hypothesis is rejected, which means that Y does G cause X series. In the current thesis 
this is the test which has been utilized for inferring whether the lagged opacity variables do G 
cause the pay out variables, mainly the dividend pay outs by banking firms. 
Hamilton (1994) further provides an asymptotic equivalent test which is measuring  
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S2= t(RSS0-RSS1)/RSS1 here we would reject the null hypothesis if S2 is greater than the 
critical values of ꭓ2(p) variable50. 
Certainly as Hamilton () points out that the result for any G causality test is sensitive to the 
choice of lag length p, and also to the methods used to deal with the potential nonstationarity 
of the series. In the current thesis lag length is chosen based on the standard literature (Kanas, 
2013). 
Lastly a brief pros and cons of using Granger causality measure can be examined as below: 
1. There are multiple properties of Granger causality (GC) which makes it a good candidate for 
measuring causal effects. For example it follows symmetry properties (Barret and Barnett, 
2013) which helps preserve the causality relation when there is a scale transformation of 
variables (Geweke, 1982; Hosoya, 1991; Barrettet al., 2010), the main advantage is that this 
measure helps to infer the predictive power which one or more X variables have for Y. 
2. Barnett et al (2009) have further shown that for the Gaussian distribution following 
variables the Granger causality measure is equivalent to Shannon Entropy flow concept, which 
is another related strand in mathematical finance which is also deployed for investigating 
causal relationship. Generally GC measure can also be used to compare the causal interaction 
between different sets of time series. 
 
4. However there are certain limitations of GC measure too, Hu et al (2011) make the claim 
that GC measure does not capture how strongly one time series influence the other, though this 
claim has been contained by other authors like Barret and Barnett (2013). 
5. Certainly GC is not a good measure for all types of stochastic time series, for example if the 
model is not a true autoregressive model with white noise residuals then there can be biasness 
in the measures of GC or inference from it can be erroneous. Hence in conclusion its safe to 
observe that GC measures causal relation quite strongly if the model is stationary multivariate 
autoregressive. 
VAR equations 
It has been discussed in the thesis that the opacity and pay out variables are the main 
explanatory and independent variables. Opacity variables used for the multivariate VAR 
equations are: tangibility, intangibility, spread, turnover and size. The payout variables used 
are : dividend per share (DPS), cash dividend value in log, value of total dividend payment in 
log including stock dividend value (later in other estimations net share repurchases value has 
also been used). Along with these main variables all VAR equations also includes exogenous 
or bank level control variables, which are based on the dividend life cycle literature as 
explained in the variable section. Below is a summary of the equations. 
 
                                                          
50 Over years there have been a variety of G causality tests proposed, for reference, please see, 
Gweke, Meese and Dent (1983).  
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𝐷𝑃𝑆𝑡 = 𝛽10 + 𝛽11𝐷𝑃𝑆𝑡−1 + 𝛽12𝑋𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑌𝑡−1
𝑛
+ 𝜀𝑡 
                                   
𝑋𝑡 = 𝛽20 + 𝛽21𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝛽22𝐷𝑃𝑆𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑌𝑡−1
𝑛
+ 𝜀𝑡 
The above is the set of equations for DPS and the opacity variables, X, where Y is the vector 
of control variables. As the standard VAR model is estimated here DPS and the X variables are 
taken as a pair every time (i.e. DPS& tangibility, or DPS& spread, or DPS& turnover, or 
DPS& intangibility) along with the fixed set of controls. Here the lag is of order 1, so the 
system is VAR (1).   
 All the other sets of equations are formulated similarly. 
𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻 𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐼𝐷𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑡 = 𝛽10 + 𝛽11𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻 𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐼𝐷𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑡−1 + 𝛽12𝑋𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑌𝑡−1
𝑛
+ 𝜀𝑡 
                                   
𝑋𝑡 = 𝛽20 + 𝛽21𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝛽22𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻 𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐼𝐷𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑌𝑡−1
𝑛
+ 𝜀𝑡 
𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐴𝐿 𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐼𝐷𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑡 = 𝛽10 + 𝛽11𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐴𝐿 𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐼𝐷𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑡−1 + 𝛽12𝑋𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑌𝑡−1
𝑛
+ 𝜀𝑡 
                                   
𝑋𝑡 = 𝛽20 + 𝛽21𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝛽22𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐴𝐿 𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐼𝐷𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑌𝑡−1
𝑛
+ 𝜀𝑡 
 
Results and discussion 
1. Results from full sample analysis: the full sample comprises of 1000 data points on 
dividend omission (as discussed in the data section of the chapter) to avoid any sample 
selection bias. Later a restricted sample with only positive values of dividend pay outs 
is also analyzed to find any significant difference between the nature of impact of 
opacity and other bank level variables on pay outs. 
 
Based on the VAR equations as written above here each opacity variables: tangibility, 
intangibility, spread, turnover and size is regressed upon pay out variables: dividend 
per share, cash dividends and total dividend pay outs. For each regression bank level 
controls are used as discussed in the data section earlier. 
The following section is composed of tables showing the directions of causality from 
opacity variables to the payout variables. P values and z scores are reported which 
shows whether the causality measures are significant at all or not. Underlying possible 
theories have been discussed earlier. 
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2.3.2 Panel Data TOBIT model 
 
 
For further robustness check for the results obtained from the panel VAR a panel data TOBIT 
model is deployed. TOBIT model can be interpreted in the similar way as a PROBIT model / 
LOGIT model with the special feature that it is a censored regression model. In the very model 
the dependent variable can be censored either from above or below, here the depended variable 
for the TOBIT model is dividend par share, and hence it is censored from below since its value 
is always greater than the threshold value of 0. 
 
However censoring may not change the sample, but a more severe form of censoring is truncation 
which limits the sample, as in this case when TOBIT is run. There are three specific models with 
opacity variables as the explanatory variables along with firm level controls which are also the life 
cycle variables. Recently (Malkawai, 2008) authors have used panel data TOBIT models for 
investigating the impact of multiple firms specific factors on pay out levels, and through this 
investigation the authors have also verified several underlying theoretical models, for example 
agency cost models, pecking order theory, signaling theory etc. 
 
In most of the cases to investigate dividend pay out policies linear models are used, namely, 
dynamic models, where the estimation techniques vary widely (as will be explored briefly 
below)51.  
 
There can be some various forms of such truncations, for example if in the current sample all 
such banking firms are included which do not pay dividends in the given time period, then the 
 
                                                          
51 However, as suggested by Long (1997) that in real life scenarios there can be truncated samples, which means 
that the information regarding explanatory variables are fully available but for the response variable the 
information is limited. 
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information about dividend pay outs on average will be limited even if the firm characteristics 
(for example in this case the information asymmetry levels) will be still measured. Hence in 
such cases TOBIT modelling might be suitable. 
Now as observed by econometricians (Long, 1997; Gujarati, 2003; Woolbridge,2003; Chuang 
et, al,2002) an OLS estimate of the above model will be biased since it will systematically 
underestimate the intercept and overestimate the slope or vice versa. Hence such studies have 
always recommended TOBIT estimation technique. 
 
Hence technically in case of studies where the dependent variable is dividend payout, the 
value of such variables can be 0 or greater, and OLS estimation technique might produce 
biased results for such cases. Studies like by Singhania and Gupta (2015) have also 
recommended TOBIT models for the analysis of dividend pay outs. 
TOBIT model can be considered as the censored normal regression model (Wooldrdge, 2002). 
There is however a clear difference between censoring and truncation (Long (1997, 188) 
provides a nice picture of truncation and censoring). Truncation occurs when the data on both 
the dependent variable and the regressors is lost, whereas censoring occurs when the data on 
dependent variable is lost but the data on regressors is intact. Hence truncation leads to a 
greater loss of data.Both are the forms of defect in sampling, since if there were absence of data 
loss the sample could have been the true representative sample of the underlying population.  
Truncated normal distribution: 
Here again the latent dependent variable theory is applicable, for example unlike the normal 
regression the value of the dependent variable y is an incomplete description of the underlying 
latent variable y*. since the sample here is a subset of the larger population, the observed value 
of the y variable can be truncated from below or above. For example if the value is truncated 
from below, then we can only observe that value of y=y* which is greater than the truncation 
point, say, π, in effect we lose the observations of y* which are equal to or less than π. 
In such case the assumption is then that the variable y, such that, y>π, follows a truncated 
normal distribution. Geometrically, then, since the distribution is truncated now, we no longer 
have the area under the curve equal to unity, hence we need to rescale the data (Greene 2003, 
757) to make the area under the left over distribution equal to unity. Hence if we consider that 
the continuous random variable, y, has a probability density function pdf f(y), and π is constant, 
then we get: 
𝑓(𝑦; 𝑦 > 𝜋) =
𝑓(𝑦)
𝑃(𝑦 > 𝜋)
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Again the probability function in the denominator can be expressed as, 𝑃(𝑦 > 𝜋) = 1 − 𝜙(𝛼) 
Where Ф(α) is the standard cumulative density function of the normal distribution, where α= 
(π-μ)/σ, with μ, and σ as the mean and standard deviation of the normal distribution as usual. 
Hence the likelihood function for the truncated normal distribution function is  
𝐿 = ∏ 𝑓(𝑦)/ 1 − 𝜙(𝛼) 
Taking natural logarithm on both sides we have 𝐿𝑛 𝐿 = ∑ 𝐿𝑛(𝑓(𝑦)) − 𝐿𝑛(1 − 𝜙(𝛼)) 
Some results from truncated distributions are as below: 
1. If the truncation is from below, then the mean of the truncated variable is greater than 
the mean of theoriginal one. If the truncation is from above, then the mean of the 
truncated variable is smaller thanthe mean of the original one. 
2. Truncation reduces the variance compared with the variance in the un-truncated 
distribution. 
 
 
Moment conditions for truncated normal distributions 
If y follows a normal distribution N(μ,σ), and the truncation point is π, then the following 
moment conditions hold: 
𝐸(𝑦; 𝑦 > 𝜋) = 𝜇 + 𝜎𝑓(𝛼), and Variance𝑉(𝑦; 𝑦 > 𝜋) = 𝜎^2(1 − 𝑔(𝛼)), where  
𝑔(𝛼) = 𝑓(𝛼){𝑓(𝛼) − 𝛼} And f (α) = Ф(α)/1-Ф(α). Again f(α) is known as the inverse Mill’s 
ratio, which is a measure of the degree of truncation, higher is the inverse Mill’s ratio greater is 
the truncation. Hence based on the moment conditions and the measure of truncation we can 
first model the truncated regression as below. 
Truncated regression model 
Our main assumption here is y follows N(μ,σ2), and we are interested in the distribution of y 
given that y>π, the truncation point. Hence we have𝐸(𝑦; 𝑦 > 𝜋) = 𝜇 + 𝜎𝑓(𝛼), where we can 
substitute the Ф(α) expression from the above section. Hence we find that the conditional mean 
is a nonlinear function of the parameters, μ, π and σ. Again it is now apparent that why OLS is 
not an efficient estimator in this case, since OLS ignores the σf(α) part, and hence there is both 
omitted variable bias and heteroscedasticity in the error term. It is in this context that TOBIT 
estimation can be used. 
Censored normal distribution 
Here the vales of y are censored from the left, observations which are equal to or below π are 
set equal to πy: 
𝑦 = 𝑦 ∗ 𝑖𝑓 𝑦 ∗> 𝜋, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑦 =πy if y*< or = π, again if the continuous variable y has the pdf f(y) 
and π is a constant, then, f(y) = [f(y)]di[F(π)]1-di, here d is the indicator variable which is = 1 if 
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y>π, i.e. the observation is uncensored, and is =0 if y=π, i.e. the observation is censored. Hence 
the density of y is same as that of y* for y>π.  
Again P(censored)=P(y*<π)=Ф((π-µ)/σ)= 1- Ф(((µ-π)/σ), where as P(uncensonsored)= Ф(((µ-
π)/σ),  hence the expected value of a censored variable is E(y)=(P(censored)*E(y given 
y=πy)+P(un-censored)*E(y given y>π)), which is again expressed as: 
E(y) = {Ф((π-µ)/σ)*πy}+{Ф((µ-π)/σ))*(µ+σf(σ)}. We can consider a special case here, for 
π=0(which is relevant for the use of TOBIT models for investigating dividend pay outs, as 
discussed later). 
Censored regression models can be grouped into two categories, the first one is censored 
regression applications model where true censoring happens as discussed above. In this 
modeling if the value y* is observed then we can have simple OLS regression, however there is 
a data problem from the fact that y* is either censored from below or above, i.e. it is not 
observed for some part of the population.  
The second type of censored regression is corner solution models, which have the 
characteristics that y takes the value 0 with positive probability but is a strictly continuous 
random variable over strictly positive values. Hence such a model is equivalent to solving a 
maximization problem, for example for some of the agents the optimal solution here would be 
y=0, the typical corner solution. In this model the problem is not with the data observability as 
in the truly censored models, but the interest lies in finding E(y) and P(y=0). Again in such 
settings OLS cannot be used as a consistent estimator (Wooldridge, 2002). 
Structure of the TOBIT model 
The structure of the TOBIT model is as below: 
𝑦 ∗= 𝑋𝛽 + 𝜀 
Where the error term is assumed to have a normal distribution, and y* is the latent variable 
which is observed for values>π, or is 0 otherwise. The observed values of y are described by 
the following measurement equation: 
𝑦 = 𝑦 ∗, 𝑖𝑓 𝑦 ∗> 𝜋, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑦 = πy if y*<π. 
In the typical form of this model we assume that π=0, or the data is censored at 0. 
Expected values for the TOBIT model 
We can now derive the expected values easily by substituting π=0 in the general moment 
conditions as stated earlier. 
1. Expected value for the latent variable, E(y*)=Xiβ 
2. Expected value of y, given y>0: E(y, s.t.y>0)=Xiβ+σf(α), where as earlier f(α) is the 
inverse Mill’s ratio. 
3. Expected value of y = Ф (
𝑋𝛽
𝜎
) {𝑋𝛽 + 𝜎𝑓(𝜎)}, which is the product of the probability of 
the data being uncensored and the expected value of y given y is uncensored. 
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Marginal effects for TOBIT model 
Just as there are three expected values there are three marginal effects for TOBIT model. 
1. Marginal effect for the latent dependent variable y*: d(E(y*))/dxk=βk, which means that 
the reported coefficients in the TOBIT regression shows how one unit change in the 
explanatory variable alters the latent dependent variable. 
2. Marginal effect on the expected value of y for uncensored observations: 
d(E(y,s.t. y>0))/dxk =βk{1-f(σ)(Xβ/σ+f(α)}, which shows how one unit change in the 
explanatory variable, x, alters the uncensored observations. 
3. Marginal effect on the expected value of y(MacDonald and Moffits decomposition): 
d(E(y))/dxk=βkФ(Xβ/σ), where the Ф(.) is the probability of un-censored data at these 
observations of X variable. Hence when this probability value tends to 1, or fewer 
censored observation the marginal effect on y will be dictated largely by β. 
OLS as an inconsistent estimator of β 
OLS provides inconsistent estimate of β for the whole sample or the un-censored sample. In 
case of the OLS regression for the uncensored sample we have𝑦 = 𝑋𝛽 + 𝜎𝑓 (
𝑋𝛽
𝜎
) + 𝜀, and 
E(ε,s.t. Xi, yi>0=0), which also implies that E(ε, s.t, Xi,yi>0,  𝑓 (
𝑋𝛽
𝜎
) )=0. Hence we have 
mistakenly omitted 𝜎𝑓 (
𝑋𝛽
𝜎
) from the regression, which will thus appear in the disturbance 
term, which means that the X’s will be correlated with the disturbance terms which will make 
the estimate inconsistent.  
Now if we consider the OLS on the full sample we have𝐸(𝑦) = Ф (
𝑋𝛽
𝜎
) {𝑋𝛽 + 𝜎𝑓(𝛼), which is 
a non linear function of X, β and σ, hence will produce inconsistent estimate since OLS 
presumes linearity. 
  
Use of TOBIT model in dividend payout investigations 
Based on the above described literature the current thesis has used TOBIT as the estimation 
technique in the very section, the main purpose has been to investigate the probabilistic impact 
of the bank level variables on the bank level pay out measures, namely, different types of 
dividend pay outs. McDonald and Mottif(1980) first discussed the application of TOBIT model 
in empirical studies. Recently authors have used TOBIT model in analyzing factors 
determining the bank dividend pay outs, for example Al-Najjar (2009), and more recently, Forti 
and Schiozer (2015) have used such estimation technique for a sample of Brazillian banking 
firms. Authors hold that the main reason for using TOBIT model(for example random effect 
TOBIT model) is that firms can either pay positive dividends or omit paying dividends, and a 
negative value of dividend pay-out is not observed, hence for the standard random effect 
TOBIT model the following equations will hold for dividend pay outs: 𝐷(𝑖, 𝑡) = 𝛼 +
𝛽𝑋(𝑖, 𝑡) + 𝜀(𝑖, 𝑡)  𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑔ℎ𝑡 ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒 > 0, 𝑜𝑟 𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒 = 0 
Where D is the dividend pay out level of the ith firm for the tth time period, and X is the vector 
for firm level values. 
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2.3.3 A general observation on dynamic panel data models applied in corporate finance 
 
 
Flannery and Hankins (2013) observe that dynamic panel data models are quite extensively 
used in corporate finance studies, specifically in the context of partial adjustment processes for 
example dividend adjustment, or capital adjustment. However use of fixed effect models with 
lagged depended variables may cause serious econometric biases in the estimations. There 
have been some methods which have been used (generally on small samples which have 
independent and normally distributed explanatory variables) to remove such biases. 
 
However the main challenge in the realm of corporate finance (Flannery and Hankins, 2013) is 
that depended variables may be clustered or censored (for example if the depended variable is 
dividend per share or pay out ratios), and, or the independent variable data may be missing 
altogether. Independent variables may also be correlated with each other, or endogenous in 
nature52. 
Nerlove (1967), Nickell (1981), also Baltagi (2008) observe that there can be severe bias of 
estimators if OLS model is used in case of dynamic panel data, and the main reason is that the 
coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is biased due to correlation between fixed effects 
and the lagged dependent variable. 
 
The severity of bias is inversely proportional to the length of the panel, however there are cases 
where even for time period greater than or equal to 30 there can remain severe bias. Again this 
biasness problem can be more related to some specific data bases, namely, COMPUSTAT, 
where median length of panel (time dimension) is 15. Generally the dynamic panel data models 
are being applied in case of corporate finance literature for corporate leverage, and other 
                                                          
52 Such properties of data have significant impact on estimators. In this brief account we will explore the various 
types of impact which the data characteristics might have on the estimators’ performances, which might also 
provide a clear guideline as to which estimation technique is appropriate given the scenarios. 
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measures of capital structure53. 
 
However there is less consensus among the authors regarding the adjustment behavior and of 
the factors affecting the leverage ratios in this case. Flannery and Hankins (2013) make the 
point that such lack of consensus is mainly caused by the econometric biases or uncertainties in 
the estimation techniques chosen in the studies. 
 
There have been some techniques evolved to correct such biases, for example, GMM 
estimation, instrumental variables estimations, long differencing estimations etc. Flannery and 
Hankins (2013) have provided first of its kind comparison among seven estimation techniques 
for dynamic panel data models, namely, OLS, standard FE, Difference GMM (Arellano and 
Bond's, 1991), System GMM (Blundell and Bond, 1998), variations of Long differencing 
estimations (Hahn et al., 2007, Huang and Ritter, 2009), and also corrected least squares 
(Kiviet, 1995, Bruno, 2005).  
In simple words, short panel bias can be detected by estimating the same dynamic model using 
OLS, FE and System GMM. In the main partial adjustment model (as will be discussed in 
details later) if the target ratio (which may be target leverage ratio, or target dividend pay outs 
etc) is a function of both observed firm specific variables and fixed effects, then there should 
be biases in the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable while running OLS or FE, since in 
case of OLS the fixed effect is completely ignored, and in case of FE the short panel bias is 
completely ignored. Relatively then System GMM is a better estimation. 
2.4 Variables and data 
 
 
Data 
 
 
To analyze how the banking firms adjust dividend pay out levels data has been extracted from 
two sources, one, balance sheet data for all listed and active BHC from COMPUSTAT, and 
                                                          
53 Important papers in this area being, Welch (2004), Fama and French (2002), Huang and Ritter (2009), Flannery 
and Rangan (2006), Oliver etal (2013), Xiang et al (2013) among others. 
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two, all listed BHC stock market data (stock price, and turnover) from CSRP. Sampling 
period is 1990-2015, hence covering the financial crisis period. We have used some selection 
criteria to ensure that we can capture the adjustment process, one, dropping the bank period 
observations which have missing data for the basic variables used, two, selecting those banks 
which have paid dividends for consecutive 4 periods to capture the adjustment process, three, 
winsorizing all variables used (standard 1% and 99% level) to remove any outlier effect. 
Variables 
 
 
Various variables which are used in the analysis are described in details below based on the 
standard literature, the paper adopts the widely used variables in the literature (Leary etal 2011, 
De Angelo etal, 2007, 2008, Healy & Palepu,2001, Forti and Schiozer, 2015) along with the 
firm specific control variables. A list of variables is discussed as below. 
 
2.4.1 Pay out variables 
 
 
First, to proxy the level of dividend signaling DPS/ dividend per share is used which is 
obtained as the ratio between the cash dividend declared in the respective quarter end and the 
common shares outstanding in the quarter end, as author (Onali,2010, Kanas, 2013) notes that 
this ratio is a better choice than various earnings ratio since they might have to negative 
values(Kanas,2013). 
 
However as explained earlier the current thesis also investigates the signaling content of other 
pay out mechanisms by bank holding companies. Such pay outs are listed below. 
 
Net share repurchases by banks: Hirtle (2004, 2014) further investigates the trend of bank 
holding companies’ share buybacks before and during the financial crisis. There is some 
evidence that the share repurchases by the bank holding companies dropped sharply during the 
early phase of the crisis, which increased later. There have been intriguing tradeoffs between 
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dividend pay outs and repurchases by large and small bank holding companies54. 
 
One key finding by the same author is that for the smaller BHCs which had higher share 
repurchases level prior to the crisis the dividend pay out level reduced later, however the drop 
in such dividend pay outs were less than by those BHCs whose pre crisis share repurchases 
were less. There is thus a suggestion that repurchases may act as a cushion against dividend 
cuts. There is no doubt that this line of investigation perceives share repurchases as signals to 
markets along with dividend pay outs (as pointed out earlier), however such investigations are 
limited in the sense that they have not investigated bank specific information content in such 
buy backs. 
 
In the current work a standard COMPUSTAT based share repurchase measure is used, which is 
(as used in Hirtle, 2014) equal to purchases of treasure stock, and net value of common stock 
retirements minus the conversions, if the later value is positive (which means that the value of 
retirements greater than conversions). In the current work all values are calculated based on 
quarterly pay outs by the BHCs. 
 
Total cash dividends and stock dividends are also added together to form a category of total 
dividends payed out, which is then divided by total assets. Such a measure is used for further 
robustness check. 
 
Finally all pay outs are added (money value term) and scaled by total assets to define the total 
pay out policy of the bank holding companies. 
 
Different pay out variables are used as dependent variables in all the dynamic models used in 
this thesis. There are two major purposes for this, one, compare and contrast the signaling 
content of dividend pay outs and buy backs, two, robustness check. 
 
 
 
                                                          
54 Udekem, 2014, has also observed the great reluctance of bank holding firms to cut back on dividends.  
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2.4.2 Opacity variables 
 
 
Tangibility: Scholars (Haris &Raviv,1991) use this measure as a straightforward measure of 
degree of opacity, greater is the tangibility of assets less is the degree of opacity and in this 
case less might be the necessity of a firm to enhance dividend signaling level. The variable 
used in the current work is the tangibility level which is obtained by the ratio of tangible assets 
on the bank balance sheet to the total asset. Another related variable has also been used later, 
which is In-tangibility, which is the ratio of intangible assets to total assets, and measures the 
opacity of the bank balance sheet. 
 
Turnover : this is a standard measure of degree of liquidity of a firm, scholars observe that 
generally greater liquidity might mean less degree of opacity hence less need for a firm to 
enhance signaling level. Here the standard measure of natural logarithm of total volume of 
shares traded in the quarter is used. 
 
Spread: there is a strong literature (Flanery etal, 1998) which argues that the bid ask spread of 
the shares traded in the market might capture the degree of opacity, hence greater is the spread 
more is the level of opacity, hence more is the necessity of a firm to enhance signaling level. 
The standard measure adopted here is the difference between the average bids and ask price in 
the end of the quarter. More recently authors (Wu, 2004) have used the measure of spread as 
the proxy for information asymmetry between insider managers and outsider investors while 
investigating the capital structure implications for firms in general. 
2.4.3 Bank specific variables for information content of signaling (control variables) 
 
 
As explained earlier for distinguishing banking firms form non-banking firms, or to make the 
investigation more banking specific, the following variables are used which may reveal 
information content of signaling (either via absolute level of pay outs or speed of adjustment of 
pay outs). The following variables are used based on the previous relevant literature for bank 
69 
 
holding companies, which were mainly focused on determinants of bank dividend pay outs, for 
example, Mayne 1980, Rozeff 1982, Barcley etal 1995, Nissim and Ziv 2001, Renneboog and 
Trojanowski 2011, Fatemi and Bildik 2012. 
 
In this section there is an additional variable reflecting default risk level of a bank holding 
company. These earlier papers however didn’t perform a systematic study of signaling content 
of different pay out types, and were limited only to absolute pay out levels, however in the 
current thesis these variables are used later for investigating signaling content of dynamic pay 
outs or partial adjustments also, which is for the first time in the relevant banking literature. 
The variables are as follows. 
 
1. Leverage: by leverage its meant the bank leverage, which has been estimated by the 
ratio of liabilities to equity capital. The expected impact on dividend pay out is 
indeterminate here, as Forti and Schiozer(2015) observes the nature of impact can 
either be positive or negative. A more detailed analysis is provided in the results 
section.  
 
2. Capital adequacy: This variable is the capital adequacy ratio, which is calculated as the 
ratio of equity capital to the risk weighted assets. Here again Forti and Schiozer (2015) 
observes that the nature of impact can be either positive or negative. Analysis section 
provides details on the nature of impact.  
 
3. Credit risk: This variable is the measure of risk of loan portfolio, two measures have 
been used, one, non-performing loans divided by the total loans, and non-performing 
loans divided by total assets. Forti and Schiozer (2015) observes that the nature of 
impact is expected to be negative, however their study is limited only to dividend pay 
outs, not other pay out types.  
Credit growth: This variable is the estimation of growth of loan portfolio. Here the 
variable is calculated following Forti and Schiozer (2015), which is, by current loan 
portfolio minus the portfolio of the previous period divided by the portfolio of the 
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previous period. The expected impact on dividend pay outs is negative here. 
 
5. Default risk measure: Since there have been claims by studies (Acharya et al, 2013) that 
high default risk banks have shifted risk from shareholders to depositors via paying out 
dividends during the financial crisis, in the current section a proxy is used for such 
default risk level , which is a dummy variable, equal to one if the equity capital to total 
asset ratio is less than 2%, which indicates very high default risk bank, and 0 otherwise. 
In the third section of the thesis default risk measures are increased.  
 
6. Crisis dummy: Two dummy variables have been used, one which is equal to 1 when the  
 
period is from 1
st
 quarter 2008 to the last quarter 2008, and 0 other wise, two, where 
the dummy is 1 when the range of periods is from 1
st
 quarter 2008 to last quarter 2010, 
and 0 other wise (Forti and Schiozer, 2015, have used the first dummy on a yearly 
basis, however here two dummies are used since there are disagreement on the duration 
of the distress period for the bank holding companies).  
 
7. On the measures of risk shifting (for this section)  
 
Onali (2014) as well as Forti and Schiozer (2015) have used either a measure of default 
risk or a measure of credit risk for testing the hypothesis that during crisis share holders 
have ‘cashed out’ via dividend pay outs, however these studies have not investigated 
the interrelation between such risk measures and other pay out types by banks. In this 
thesis both types of measures are used for different pay out types.  
Measure for risk shifting. In relation to banking literature there is a long theoretical 
strand (for example in John et al, 1991, or more recently in Acharya, 2009) which 
investigates the role of default risk in relation to dividend pay outs. Recently in 
empirical literature (Onali, 2014) investigations have been undertaken and studies 
do confirm a significant positive impact of default risk on dividend pay out levels. 
However such studies have not explored partial adjustment of dividend pay outs by 
banks as argued above(for the next section). 
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2.4.4 Bank specific life cycle variables 
 
 
Size(LnTA): Many studies have used size of firms, measured as natural log of total assets, as a 
proxy for information asymmetry level. Authors such as Atiase (1985), Balmer (1984), 
Diamond and Verrechia (1991) have found a negative association of size with information 
asymmetry, which might mean that smaller firms are more opaque hence should have the 
greater incentive to signal via costly dividends. 
 
However there are contradicting findings from most of the current studies on dividend pay out 
studies, which investigates the firm level factors which impact the dividend pay outs. One of 
the reasons for such contradictions is that there are other theoretical factors underlying, for 
example the agency cost theory which would suggest that large matured firms would rather pay 
dividends regularly and relatively largely to mitigate free cash flow problem. There are then 
implications from the pecking order theory too. In case of banks size is certainly more difficult 
to explain since larger banks might also hold relatively more opaque assets. 
 
size of a firm is poxied by the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets for the given 
quarter end, standard literature on non financial firms hold that with the increase in size there 
might be more reputation and transparency or less opacity, hence less necessity for a firm to 
enhance the level of dividend signaling. However, there are contradictions which might 
indicate with diversification and increase in size opacity level increases. Here the natural log of 
total assets is taken as the proxy for size, as a standard measure used by other scholars 
(Flannery etal,opcit).  
Earnings per share: (eps) is used as an explanatory variable for all dynamic models (in this 
study the TOBIT models), and this is in accordance with the traditional theory of dividend 
smoothing as explained in the review section, many theoretical models as explored earlier 
maintain that smoothing can also be defined as the rigidity of change in dividend pay out levels 
with respect to stochastic changes in underlying earnings. Earnings per-share is used a standard 
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profitability measure too, among the recent studies Forti and Schiozer also have used 
profitability measure as one of the information content of signaling. 
Retained Earnings to total asset ratio: Since De Angelo & DeAngelo (2006), Fama & French 
(2001), and Grullon et al (2002) it has been a standard practice to investigate the impact of 
retained earnings to total assets or total equity mix on the dividend pay outs. Since the above 
mentioned seminal works on financial life cycle theory of dividend pay outs it has been 
established that retained earnings to total assets ratio or total equity ratio can be considered as 
the proxy for maturity of a firm, since such a ratio captures the earned/contributed capital mix. 
 
Firms with low values of such ratios can be considered as to be younger firms which are in the 
capital infusion stage, and therefore it may not be possible for such firms to raise costly 
external equity or debt capital, and thus its rational for such firms to hold dividends and use 
retained earnings to invest in positive net present value projects. Whereas firms with higher 
retained earnings to total asset or total equity mix can be considered to be matured firms with 
greater cumulative earnings but relatively less investment opportunities. 
Matured firms may face Jensen’s free cash flow problem, which is a moral hazard problem 
emerging out of incomplete monitoring of the insider managers by the outsider shareholders, 
where the latter group may want the insider manager who are in control of free cash flow to 
distribute to them in forms of pay outs since such pay outs may mitigate free cash flow 
problem. Hence matured firms are more likely to pay stable and relatively higher dividends. 
 
 
 
 
Tangible common equity ratio: This ratio is commonly used as the determination of strength of 
a bank, in the sense that how much losses a bank can withstand before the shareholders equity 
is wiped out. Here this ratio is calculated by subtracting intangible assets, goodwill and 
preferred stock capital from the total equity value, and then dividing the net sum by the bank’s 
tangible assets. 
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Long term asset growth: This value is used as a proxy for investment opportunities, which is 
the growth of the long term or fixed tangible assets over the last period. There is a standard 
literature which has used growth in long term or fixed assets, or equity or sales as the 
investment opportunity for the firms (kalapur and Trombley, 1999). 
 
However there are other commonly used investment opportunity measure too, for example 
market to book value ratio of assets and equity, separately, earnings to price ratio( Adam and 
Goyal,2000), however there can be some problems with such market based measures, one, 
there can be strong collinearity among the different market to book value ratio, and two, such 
measures, also known as Tobin's Q measures may capture investor sentiment and overvaluation 
more than real investment opportunities. 
 
Leverage is also used as another life cycle variable, which following Forti and Schiozer (2015) 
has been estimated as the ratio of liabilities to equity. 
Total loans to total asset ratio is used as another life cycle variable, since greater is the value 
of this ratio higher is the default risk. 
 
Interest expense to total assets, or total earnings asset ratio, is used as another return 
measure which reflects banking efficiency to pay off interest expenses from assets. 
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Tables and results for the full sample 
Results from full sample analysis: the full sample comprises of 1000 data points on dividend 
omission (as discussed in the data section of the chapter) to avoid any sample selection bias. 
Later a restricted sample with only positive values of dividend pay outs is also analyzed to find 
any significant difference between the nature of impact of opacity and other bank level 
variables on pay outs. 
Based on the VAR equations as written above here each opacity variables: tangibility, 
intangibility, spread, turnover and size is regressed upon pay out variables: dividend per share, 
cash dividends and total dividend pay outs. For each regression bank level controls are used as 
discussed in the data section earlier. 
The following section is composed of tables showing the directions of causality from opacity 
variables to the payout variables. P values and z scores are reported which shows whether the 
causality measures are significant at all or not. Underlying possible theories have been 
discussed earlier.  
Table 1 
L1 refers to 1 period Lag. 
 
 
 
       
  
       
Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% 
Conf. 
Interval]  
       
TANGIBILITY       
tangibility       
L1. .9470712 .0054029 175.29 0.000 .9364816 .9576607 
       
DIVIDEND PER SHARE       
L1. -.0002961 .000275 -1.08 0.282 -.0008352 .0002429 
       
ceta -.00269 .001654 -1.63 0.104 -.0059318 .0005518 
dta -.0000828 .0006182 -0.13 0.893 -.0012945 .0011288 
reta .0020662 .0012952 1.60 0.111 -.0004724 .0046048 
ieta .0346117 .0142488 2.43 0.015 .0066847 .0625388 
earningspershare -1.32e-06 2.24e-06 -0.59 0.556 -5.71e-06 3.07e-06 
npata .001476 .0022708 0.65 0.516 -.0029746 .0059267 
_cons .0008657 .0002115 4.09 0.000 .0004512 .0012803 
       
DIVIDEND PER SHARE       
TANGIBILITY       
L1. -1.135062 .3361101 -3.38 0.001 -1.793826 -
.4762984 
       
DIVIDEND PER SHARE       
L1. .3422021 .0171098 20.00 0.000 .3086675 .3757367 
       
ceta .1293612 .102894 1.26 0.209 -.0723075 .3310298 
dta .048004 .038459 1.25 0.212 -.0273744 .1233823 
reta .6745603 .080575 8.37 0.000 .5166362 .8324843 
ieta 3.996966 .8864003 4.51 0.000 2.259653 5.734279 
earningspershare -.0000531 .0001393 -0.38 0.703 -.0003262 .00022 
npata -.2061343 .1412621 -1.46 0.145 -.483003 .0707344 
_cons .0507737 .0131587 3.86 0.000 .0249832 .0765642 
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Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% 
Conf. 
Interval]  
       
tangibility       
tangibility       
L1. .947546 .0053858 175.94 0.000 .93699 .9581019 
       
logdividendtotal       
L1. 1.46e-06 .0000204 0.07 0.943 -.0000385 .0000414 
       
ceta -.002764 .0016537 -1.67 0.095 -.0060052 .0004771 
dta -.0000999 .0006181 -0.16 0.872 -.0013114 .0011117 
reta .0017811 .0012704 1.40 0.161 -.0007088 .004271 
ieta .0328136 .0141622 2.32 0.021 .0050562 .0605711 
earningspershare -1.30e-06 2.24e-06 -0.58 0.561 -5.69e-06 3.09e-06 
npata .0015749 .0022743 0.69 0.489 -.0028826 .0060324 
_cons .0008413 .0002141 3.93 0.000 .0004217 .001261 
       
logdividendtotal       
tangibility       
L1. -1.789122 1.400058 -1.28 0.201 -4.533184 .9549408 
       
logdividendtotal       
L1. .9524219 .0053007 179.68 0.000 .9420328 .962811 
       
ceta .3190052 .4298852 0.74 0.458 -.5235543 1.161565 
dta -.4861006 .1606864 -3.03 0.002 -.8010402 -.1711609 
reta -.0982439 .3302441 -0.30 0.766 -.7455106 .5490227 
ieta 8.487569 3.681538 2.31 0.021 1.271888 15.70325 
earningspershare .0002345 .0005826 0.40 0.687 -.0009074 .0013763 
npata -.8240364 .5912101 -1.39 0.163 -1.982787 .3347141 
_cons .0986899 .0556584 1.77 0.076 -.0103987 .2077784 
       
       
       
Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% 
Conf. 
Interval]  
       
tangibility       
tangibility       
L1. .9477406 .0053892 175.86 0.000 .937178 .9583031 
       
logcashdividend       
L1. .0000206 .0000222 0.93 0.354 -.0000229 .0000641 
       
ceta -.0029158 .0016612 -1.76 0.079 -.0061717 .0003402 
dta -.0001086 .0006181 -0.18 0.861 -.0013201 .0011029 
reta .0017999 .0012669 1.42 0.155 -.0006831 .0042829 
ieta .0317964 .0141993 2.24 0.025 .0039662 .0596265 
earningspershare -1.32e-06 2.24e-06 -0.59 0.555 -5.71e-06 3.07e-06 
npata .0016831 .002273 0.74 0.459 -.0027718 .0061381 
_cons .0008277 .0002113 3.92 0.000 .0004136 .0012419 
       
logcashdividend       
tangibility       
L1. -3.373902 1.936094 -1.74 0.081 -7.168577 .4207729 
       
logcashdividend       
L1. .8873832 .0079795 111.21 0.000 .8717437 .9030227 
       
ceta .7462666 .5968094 1.25 0.211 -.4234584 1.915992 
dta .0412368 .2220603 0.19 0.853 -.3939934 .476467 
reta -.4343476 .45513 -0.95 0.340 -1.326386 .4576907 
ieta 5.470411 5.101221 1.07 0.284 -4.527798 15.46862 
earningspershare .0008465 .0008047 1.05 0.293 -.0007308 .0024237 
npata -.6742362 .8165862 -0.83 0.409 -2.274716 .9262433 
_cons .169064 .0759157 2.23 0.026 .0202719 .3178561 
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Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% 
Conf. 
Interval]  
       
tangibility       
tangibility       
L1. .9474518 .0053873 175.87 0.000 .936893 .9580107 
       
cashdividend       
L1. 8.46e-08 1.26e-07 0.67 0.502 -1.62e-07 3.32e-07 
       
ceta -.0028489 .0016581 -1.72 0.086 -.0060988 .0004009 
dta -.0000738 .0006193 -0.12 0.905 -.0012876 .0011401 
reta .0018052 .0012675 1.42 0.154 -.000679 .0042895 
ieta .0317409 .0142502 2.23 0.026 .003811 .0596709 
earningspershare -1.30e-06 2.24e-06 -0.58 0.560 -5.69e-06 3.09e-06 
npata .0016322 .0022718 0.72 0.472 -.0028204 .0060848 
_cons .0008506 .0002108 4.03 0.000 .0004374 .0012637 
       
cashdividend       
tangibility       
L1. 297.5414 491.835 0.60 0.545 -666.4374 1261.52 
       
cashdividend       
L1. .7653573 .0115052 66.52 0.000 .7428075 .7879072 
       
ceta 244.8411 151.3789 1.62 0.106 -51.85615 541.5383 
dta -88.98772 56.54215 -1.57 0.116 -199.8083 21.83286 
reta -92.90958 115.7159 -0.80 0.422 -319.7086 133.8895 
ieta 2664.256 1300.988 2.05 0.041 114.3665 5214.145 
earningspershare .0327543 .2045034 0.16 0.873 -.368065 .4335736 
npata -149.0544 207.4024 -0.72 0.472 -555.5557 257.4469 
_cons -14.23853 19.24593 -0.74 0.459 -51.95985 23.4828 
       
       
       
 
Causality between tangibility and dividend payout  measures 
 
Lagged value of dividend per share has an insignificant negative relation with the 
tangibility level of the banking firms, or in other words the flow of causality from 
dividend per share to tangibility is not evident. This result is confirmed from the p value 
of .282 as in the above table which is >0.05, hence at 5% level of significance the 
causality can not be found. 
However, as was expected from the discussion of signaling literature the reverse 
direction of causality is strong, or in other words the lagged tangibility measure has a 
very strong negative significant relation with the dividend per share level. The p value 
of 0.01 is a significant value at 5% level, and a coefficient of -1.13 shows the strong 
negative causality flowing from lagged tangibility to dividend pay out. 
Causality between tangibility and total dividend pay out is analyzed in the next step, 
where we again find that the direction of causality is from lagged tangibility to pay out, 
and the p value is less significant this time. However in the third step the direction and 
significance of causality between lagged tangibility and cash dividend pay out is strong 
at 10% level. 
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Table 2 
 
       
  
Coef. Std. 
Err. 
z P>z [95% 
Conf. 
Interval]  
       
intangibility       
intangibility       
L1. .8238861 .0097681 84.34 0.000 .8047411 .8430312 
       
dividendspersharepaydatequarter       
L1. -
.0002907 
.0009226 -0.32 0.753 -.0020989 .0015175 
       
ceta -
.0027918 
.0054879 -0.51 0.611 -.0135478 .0079642 
dta -
.0014356 
.0020784 -0.69 0.490 -.0055091 .002638 
reta .0002265 .0043373 0.05 0.958 -.0082744 .0087273 
ieta -
.0543358 
.0475702 -1.14 0.253 -.1475717 .0389001 
earningspershare 1.96e-06 7.53e-06 0.26 0.795 -.0000128 .0000167 
npata -
.0081069 
.0076275 -1.06 0.288 -.0230564 .0068427 
_cons .0025692 .0006288 4.09 0.000 .0013368 .0038015 
       
dividendspersharepaydatequarter       
intangibility       
L1. -
.3072824 
.1809906 -1.70 0.090 -.6620174 .0474526 
       
dividendspersharepaydatequarter       
L1. .3455226 .0170939 20.21 0.000 .3120192 .3790261 
       
ceta .1815338 .1016838 1.79 0.074 -.0177628 .3808304 
dta .0509592 .0385099 1.32 0.186 -.0245188 .1264372 
reta .6512768 .0803642 8.10 0.000 .4937659 .8087877 
ieta 3.58154 .8814201 4.06 0.000 1.853988 5.309092 
earningspershare -
.0000601 
.0001395 -0.43 0.667 -.0003335 .0002134 
npata -
.2271958 
.1413279 -1.61 0.108 -.5041934 .0498019 
_cons .0326114 .01165 2.80 0.005 .0097778 .055445 
       
 
       
  
Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% 
Conf. 
Interval]  
       
intangibility       
intangibility       
L1. .8220995 .0098518 83.45 0.000 .8027904 .8414086 
       
logdividendtotal       
L1. .0000967 .0000692 1.40 0.162 -.0000389 .0002324 
       
ceta -.0031399 .0054819 -0.57 0.567 -.0138842 .0076044 
dta -.0014554 .002077 -0.70 0.483 -.0055263 .0026154 
reta .0004011 .0042575 0.09 0.925 -.0079435 .0087456 
ieta -.0582455 .0473258 -1.23 0.218 -.1510024 .0345113 
earningspershare 1.66e-06 7.53e-06 0.22 0.825 -.0000131 .0000164 
npata -.007333 .0076347 -0.96 0.337 -.0222967 .0076308 
_cons .0023975 .000637 3.76 0.000 .0011489 .003646 
       
logdividendtotal       
intangibility       
L1. .6757091 .7622699 0.89 0.375 -.8183125 2.169731 
       
logdividendtotal       
L1. .9517455 .0053544 177.75 0.000 .941251 .96224 
       
ceta .4225727 .4241553 1.00 0.319 -.4087563 1.253902 
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dta -.4688614 .1607073 -2.92 0.004 -.7838419 -.153881 
reta -.1305281 .3294188 -0.40 0.692 -.7761771 .515121 
ieta 8.096668 3.661784 2.21 0.027 .919703 15.27363 
earningspershare .0002334 .0005827 0.40 0.689 -.0009086 .0013754 
npata -.8587262 .5907271 -1.45 0.146 -2.01653 .2990777 
_cons .0558413 .049289 1.13 0.257 -.0407632 .1524459 
       
       
       
 
 
       
  
Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% 
Conf. 
Interval]  
       
intangibility       
intangibility       
L1. .8242357 .0097748 84.32 0.000 .8050775 .8433939 
       
cashdividend       
L1. -1.43e-07 4.24e-07 -0.34 0.736 -9.75e-07 6.88e-07 
       
ceta -.002738 .005497 -0.50 0.618 -.0135119 .0080358 
dta -.0014971 .0020816 -0.72 0.472 -.0055769 .0025827 
reta -.0001015 .0042488 -0.02 0.981 -.008429 .0082261 
ieta -.0539506 .0476613 -1.13 0.258 -.147365 .0394639 
earningspershare 1.99e-06 7.53e-06 0.26 0.791 -.0000128 .0000168 
npata -.0081217 .0076284 -1.06 0.287 -.0230732 .0068297 
_cons .0025445 .0006279 4.05 0.000 .0013138 .0037752 
       
cashdividend       
intangibility       
L1. 346.612 265.4415 1.31 0.192 -173.6437 866.8677 
       
cashdividend       
L1. .7646239 .0115204 66.37 0.000 .7420443 .7872034 
       
ceta 235.7535 149.2747 1.58 0.114 -56.81948 528.3265 
dta -87.22009 56.52652 -1.54 0.123 -198.01 23.56986 
reta -87.3013 115.3799 -0.76 0.449 -313.4417 138.8391 
ieta 2828.95 1294.279 2.19 0.029 292.2097 5365.69 
earningspershare .0365929 .204461 0.18 0.858 -.3641432 .4373291 
npata -142.6678 207.1557 -0.69 0.491 -548.6855 263.35 
_cons -13.16021 17.05169 -0.77 0.440 -46.58091 20.26049 
       
       
             Causality between intangibility and dividend payout measures 
 
The above table show the causal relation between the intangibility and the dividend pay 
out measures for the whole sample. Logically intangibility can be perceived as to be an 
opposite measure of tangibility, but certainly with qualifications, for example 
intangibility can also measure intangible asset values for example human capital, where 
a simple correlation with the opacity level may not be found. More specifically in the 
banking sector the meaning of the variable can be more complex (Mavridis,2004, Joshi 
et al, 2010 among many other authors observe that intangible assets in banking sector 
may also reflect intellectual capital and agency conflict level, hence there can be a 
relationship between opacity and intangible assets in banking since such assets are 
opaque and difficult to value, however a direct comparison with non baking firms is not 
logical). 
The first table shows that the direction of causality (weak causality since the p value for 
the impact of lagged intangibility on the dividend per share is 0.09 which is significant 
only at 10% level)is from lagged intangibility to dividend per share measure. The 
opposite causality measurement is very weak or non existent. 
The second table shows that the causality from lagged intangibility to total dividend pay 
out is positive but not significant. The reverse causality is also nonexistent.  
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The third table shows that the causality from lagged intangibility measure to cash 
dividend is positive but not significant, and the reverse causality is nonexistent.  
   
Table3 
 
       
  
Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval]  
       
size       
size       
L1. .9859407 .0027175 362.82 0.000 .9806146 .9912669 
       
dividendspersharepaydatequarter       
L1. .0460239 .0238063 1.93 0.053 -.0006357 .0926834 
       
ceta -.1252164 .1391923 -0.90 0.368 -.3980283 .1475955 
dta .129138 .053823 2.40 0.016 .0236468 .2346293 
reta .14721 .1102758 1.33 0.182 -.0689265 .3633466 
ieta -4.237859 1.217528 -3.48 0.001 -6.62417 -1.851547 
earningspershare .000081 .0001908 0.42 0.671 -.000293 .000455 
npata -.1264819 .1935051 -0.65 0.513 -.5057449 .2527811 
_cons .1327056 .0249759 5.31 0.000 .0837538 .1816574 
       
dividendspersharepaydatequarter       
size       
L1. .0158668 .0019688 8.06 0.000 .012008 .0197256 
       
dividendspersharepaydatequarter       
L1. .3199521 .0172477 18.55 0.000 .2861472 .3537571 
       
ceta .1478084 .1008452 1.47 0.143 -.0498445 .3454613 
dta -.012161 .0389949 -0.31 0.755 -.0885897 .0642676 
reta .7022159 .0798951 8.79 0.000 .5456244 .8588073 
ieta 4.653278 .8821022 5.28 0.000 2.924389 6.382166 
earningspershare -.0000586 .0001382 -0.42 0.672 -.0003295 .0002124 
npata -.1738422 .1401949 -1.24 0.215 -.4486192 .1009347 
_cons -.0856489 .0180951 -4.73 0.000 -.1211145 -.0501832 
       
       
 
 
 
       
  
Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% 
Conf. 
Interval]  
       
size       
size       
L1. .9837558 .002819 348.97 0.000 .9782306 .989281 
       
logdividendtotal       
L1. .0063554 .0018368 3.46 0.001 .0027554 .0099553 
       
ceta -.1189578 .1389003 -0.86 0.392 -.3911973 .1532818 
dta .1428644 .0539283 2.65 0.008 .037167 .2485619 
reta .217847 .1078117 2.02 0.043 .0065399 .4291541 
ieta -4.234773 1.208774 -3.50 0.000 -6.603926 -1.86562 
earningspershare .0000575 .0001907 0.30 0.763 -.0003162 .0004312 
npata -.1048219 .1934173 -0.54 0.588 -.483913 .2742691 
_cons .1384118 .0249944 5.54 0.000 .0894236 .1874 
       
logdividendtotal       
size       
L1. .0252431 .0086046 2.93 0.003 .0083784 .0421078 
       
logdividendtotal       
L1. .9470094 .0056064 168.92 0.000 .9360212 .9579977 
       
ceta .3488641 .4239685 0.82 0.411 -.4820989 1.179827 
dta -.5853588 .1646065 -3.56 0.000 -.9079816 -.262736 
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reta -.1134936 .3290762 -0.34 0.730 -.7584712 .5314839 
ieta 9.45259 3.689567 2.56 0.010 2.221171 16.68401 
earningspershare .0002454 .000582 0.42 0.673 -.0008953 .001386 
npata -.7991331 .5903722 -1.35 0.176 -1.956241 .3579752 
_cons -.1092192 .0762911 -1.43 0.152 -.2587471 .0403086 
       
       
       
       
       
  
Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% 
Conf. 
Interval]  
       
size       
size       
L1. .9865218 .0026945 366.13 0.000 .9812408 .9918029 
       
cashdividend       
L1. .0000123 .0000108 1.14 0.255 -8.92e-06 .0000336 
       
ceta -.1243607 .1394389 -0.89 0.372 -.3976558 .1489345 
dta .1336798 .0540802 2.47 0.013 .0276847 .239675 
reta .1965857 .1077877 1.82 0.068 -.0146742 .4078457 
ieta -4.118018 1.218819 -3.38 0.001 -6.506859 -1.729177 
earningspershare .0000765 .0001909 0.40 0.689 -.0002977 .0004506 
npata -.1297482 .1936141 -0.67 0.503 -.5092248 .2497283 
_cons .1310832 .0250539 5.23 0.000 .0819784 .1801879 
       
cashdividend       
size       
L1. 7.993753 2.883523 2.77 0.006 2.342152 13.64535 
       
cashdividend       
L1. .7609371 .0116082 65.55 0.000 .7381854 .7836889 
       
ceta 210.4655 149.2225 1.41 0.158 -82.00524 502.9363 
dta -126.4063 57.87468 -2.18 0.029 -239.8386 -12.97401 
reta -76.39794 115.3506 -0.66 0.508 -302.4809 149.685 
ieta 3251.73 1304.337 2.49 0.013 695.2771 5808.183 
earningspershare .0350769 .2042721 0.17 0.864 -.365289 .4354427 
npata -116.6078 207.1989 -0.56 0.574 -522.7102 289.4946 
_cons -66.68294 26.8118 -2.49 0.013 -119.2331 -14.13278 
       
 
 
 
Causality results between size and payout measures 
 
The relation between size and dividend pay out measures have been discussed widely in 
the literature. Here we test both directions of causality via the VAR equations. The 
above table shows that the causality flowing from the lagged size variable to dividend 
pay outs (dividend per share, cash dividend and total dividend pay out) is very 
significant, as reflected by the p values <0.05 in all cases.  
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Table 4 
 
       
  
Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval]  
       
turnover       
turnover       
L1. .9478423 .0053721 176.44 0.000 .9373132 .9583714 
       
dividendspersharepaydatequarter       
L1. .0409835 .0686693 0.60 0.551 -.0936058 .1755728 
       
ceta 1.187053 .4228942 2.81 0.005 .3581952 2.01591 
dta .5029995 .1590912 3.16 0.002 .1911865 .8148125 
reta -.4558017 .3303922 -1.38 0.168 -1.103359 .191755 
ieta -9.360384 3.63659 -2.57 0.010 -16.48797 -2.2328 
earningspershare -.000218 .0005601 -0.39 0.697 -.0013158 .0008798 
npata -.5339975 .5676676 -0.94 0.347 -1.646606 .5786105 
_cons .659921 .0816087 8.09 0.000 .4999709 .819871 
       
dividendspersharepaydatequarter       
turnover       
L1. .0019516 .0013382 1.46 0.145 -.0006713 .0045744 
       
dividendspersharepaydatequarter       
L1. .345448 .0171058 20.19 0.000 .3119212 .3789749 
       
ceta .1456086 .1053449 1.38 0.167 -.0608637 .3520808 
dta .040247 .0396304 1.02 0.310 -.0374271 .1179211 
reta .6764617 .0823023 8.22 0.000 .5151523 .8377712 
ieta 3.940006 .9058916 4.35 0.000 2.164491 5.715521 
earningspershare -.0000595 .0001395 -0.43 0.670 -.0003329 .000214 
npata -.218966 .1414087 -1.55 0.122 -.4961219 .0581899 
_cons .0038238 .0203291 0.19 0.851 -.0360205 .0436681 
       
       
 
 
       
  
Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% 
Conf. 
Interval]  
       
turnover       
turnover       
L1. .9434698 .0055344 170.47 0.000 .9326225 .954317 
       
logdividendtotal       
L1. .0171535 .0052615 3.26 0.001 .0068411 .0274658 
       
ceta 1.25118 .4223125 2.96 0.003 .423463 2.078897 
dta .5404523 .1592176 3.39 0.001 .2283917 .852513 
reta -.3901271 .3225257 -1.21 0.226 -1.022266 .2420116 
ieta -10.15577 3.620443 -2.81 0.005 -17.25171 -3.059831 
earningspershare -.0002711 .0005594 -0.48 0.628 -.0013676 .0008254 
npata -.4412769 .56733 -0.78 0.437 -1.553223 .6706694 
_cons .684218 .0818368 8.36 0.000 .5238208 .8446151 
       
logdividendtotal       
turnover       
L1. .0081932 .0057625 1.42 0.155 -.0031011 .0194875 
       
logdividendtotal       
L1. .950443 .0054784 173.49 0.000 .9397056 .9611804 
       
ceta .2440936 .4397173 0.56 0.579 -.6177364 1.105924 
dta -.5350511 .1657794 -3.23 0.001 -.8599727 -.2101294 
reta -.0356519 .335818 -0.11 0.915 -.693843 .6225393 
ieta 9.251299 3.769652 2.45 0.014 1.862916 16.63968 
earningspershare .0002261 .0005825 0.39 0.698 -.0009156 .0013678 
npata -.8418251 .5907114 -1.43 0.154 -1.999598 .315948 
_cons -.0359099 .0852095 -0.42 0.673 -.2029175 .1310977 
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Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% 
Conf. 
Interval]  
       
turnover       
turnover       
L1. .944555 .0056414 167.43 0.000 .9334981 .9556119 
       
logcashdividend       
L1. .0115352 .0058383 1.98 0.048 .0000922 .0229781 
       
ceta 1.176336 .4225138 2.78 0.005 .3482246 2.004448 
dta .5239922 .1592992 3.29 0.001 .2117715 .8362129 
reta -.441368 .3230553 -1.37 0.172 -1.074545 .1918086 
ieta -10.19342 3.651376 -2.79 0.005 -17.34999 -3.036856 
earningspershare -.0002313 .0005598 -0.41 0.679 -.0013285 .0008659 
npata -.4906957 .5676773 -0.86 0.387 -1.603323 .6219313 
_cons .696072 .0836616 8.32 0.000 .5320984 .8600457 
       
logcashdividend       
turnover       
L1. .0436217 .0080781 5.40 0.000 .027789 .0594545 
       
logcashdividend       
L1. .8738404 .0083601 104.52 0.000 .8574549 .890226 
       
ceta .1167936 .6050113 0.19 0.847 -1.069007 1.302594 
dta -.2460329 .2281058 -1.08 0.281 -.693112 .2010462 
reta .0348056 .4625934 0.08 0.940 -.8718609 .9414721 
ieta 11.80683 5.228526 2.26 0.024 1.559107 22.05455 
earningspershare .0008114 .0008016 1.01 0.311 -.0007598 .0023825 
npata -.6616901 .8128757 -0.81 0.416 -2.254897 .931517 
_cons -.4390559 .1197977 -3.66 0.000 -.6738552 -.2042567 
       
       
Causality results between turnover and payout measures 
 
 The above table provides results for the causality results between payout measures and 
turnover of the full sample of BHCs. Overall there is insignificant causality flowing 
from lagged turnover and the pay out measures, except in the case of cash dividends, 
where the lagged turnover measure is rather positively associated with the cash 
dividend level, where the p value is 0.06, hence the significance is at the 10% level. 
Hence overall a weak causality running from turnover to dividend payouts may not be 
explained by the information asymmetry or signaling hypothesis, but as we have 
already found there are other underlying theories which may be better candidates for 
such results, for example the lifecycle hypothesis. Higher turnover implies higher 
maturity stage of the firms since their stocks are more reputed and undergo relatively 
more transactions, hence these firms may be in a better position to pay out dividends. 
For matured firms free cash flow hypothesis also plays a driving role for more dividend 
pays. 
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Table 5 
 
       
  
Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval]  
       
spread       
spread       
L1. .2977447 .016362 18.20 0.000 .2656757 .3298137 
       
dividendspersharepaydatequarter       
L1. 1.821884 .2373675 7.68 0.000 1.356652 2.287115 
       
ceta -1.784692 1.386998 -1.29 0.198 -4.503159 .9337738 
dta .5506761 .524669 1.05 0.294 -.4776563 1.579008 
reta 3.908342 1.098445 3.56 0.000 1.75543 6.061254 
ieta -5.557419 12.02194 -0.46 0.644 -29.11999 18.00515 
earningspershare .0005825 .0019036 0.31 0.760 -.0031485 .0043135 
npata -3.003823 1.929557 -1.56 0.120 -6.785686 .7780403 
_cons 1.218086 .157978 7.71 0.000 .9084545 1.527717 
       
dividendspersharepaydatequarter       
spread       
L1. .0084709 .0011915 7.11 0.000 .0061356 .0108063 
       
dividendspersharepaydatequarter       
L1. .3230185 .0172855 18.69 0.000 .2891395 .3568975 
       
ceta .2102917 .1010036 2.08 0.037 .0123283 .4082552 
dta .047826 .0382073 1.25 0.211 -.027059 .1227109 
reta .6118652 .0799907 7.65 0.000 .4550864 .7686441 
ieta 3.87631 .8754584 4.43 0.000 2.160443 5.592177 
earningspershare -.0000931 .0001386 -0.67 0.502 -.0003648 .0001786 
npata -.2748207 .1405137 -1.96 0.050 -.5502225 .0005811 
_cons .0131273 .0115042 1.14 0.254 -.0094206 .0356752 
       
       
       
 
 
Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% 
Conf. 
Interval]  
       
spread       
spread       
L1. .3208651 .0162014 19.80 0.000 .289111 .3526193 
       
logdividendtotal       
L1. .0287646 .0174806 1.65 0.100 -.0054968 .063026 
       
ceta -1.222697 1.396622 -0.88 0.381 -3.960026 1.514632 
dta .6577078 .5288495 1.24 0.214 -.3788181 1.694234 
reta 5.623001 1.091744 5.15 0.000 3.483222 7.762779 
ieta 4.170725 12.05047 0.35 0.729 -19.44776 27.78921 
earningspershare .000265 .0019198 0.14 0.890 -.0034977 .0040276 
npata -3.511133 1.947393 -1.80 0.071 -7.327953 .3056879 
_cons 1.195109 .1623564 7.36 0.000 .8768964 1.513322 
       
logdividendtotal       
spread       
L1. .002545 .0049197 0.52 0.605 -.0070974 .0121874 
       
logdividendtotal       
L1. .9522777 .0053081 179.40 0.000 .941874 .9626814 
       
ceta .4158358 .4240946 0.98 0.327 -.4153743 1.247046 
dta -.4783384 .160589 -2.98 0.003 -.7930871 -.1635897 
reta -.1480538 .331516 -0.45 0.655 -.7978132 .5017055 
ieta 7.990681 3.659214 2.18 0.029 .8187537 15.16261 
earningspershare .0002169 .0005829 0.37 0.710 -.0009256 .0013595 
npata -.8703663 .5913402 -1.47 0.141 -2.029372 .2886392 
_cons .0591045 .0493007 1.20 0.231 -.0375231 .1557321 
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Causality results between spread and payout measures 
 
The above table provides results for causality between spread and payout variables. 
Interestingly there is a strong positive causality flowing from both lagged spread 
measure to dividend per share measures and the in the opposite way (p values 0.00 in 
both the cases, hence significant impact even at 1% level). The costly signaling 
hypothesis is validated through such results (as argued in the lit- review section too). 
However the results are weak for the other forms of payout measures. 
 
Tables and results for the restricted sample 
 
 
Table 6       
  
Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval]  
       
dividendspersharepaydatequarter       
dividendspersharepaydatequarter       
L1. .7503578 .0103383 72.58 0.000 .730095 .7706205 
       
size       
L1. .00465 .0009964 4.67 0.000 .002697 .006603 
       
ceta -.0004065 .0484303 -0.01 0.993 -.0953282 .0945151 
dta -.0005966 .0184324 -0.03 0.974 -.0367234 .0355301 
reta .1996382 .0454444 4.39 0.000 .1105688 .2887077 
ieta .4055088 .4161377 0.97 0.330 -.4101062 1.221124 
earningspershare -.0000167 .0000566 -0.29 0.768 -.0001277 .0000943 
npata -.0393696 .0779257 -0.51 0.613 -.1921012 .1133621 
_cons -.0045015 .0092585 -0.49 0.627 -.0226478 .0136448 
       
size       
dividendspersharepaydatequarter       
Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% 
Conf. 
Interval]  
       
spread       
spread       
L1. .3219875 .0161887 19.89 0.000 .2902582 .3537167 
       
cashdividend       
L1. .0000834 .0001079 0.77 0.440 -.0001282 .0002949 
       
ceta -1.235258 1.400502 -0.88 0.378 -3.980192 1.509675 
dta .6776002 .5301269 1.28 0.201 -.3614295 1.71663 
reta 5.507893 1.089206 5.06 0.000 3.373087 7.642698 
ieta 3.657557 12.13507 0.30 0.763 -20.12675 27.44186 
earningspershare .0003429 .0019197 0.18 0.858 -.0034196 .0041054 
npata -3.65565 1.945667 -1.88 0.060 -7.469088 .1577872 
_cons 1.252155 .1594116 7.85 0.000 .9397141 1.564596 
       
cashdividend       
spread       
L1. .6034122 1.725495 0.35 0.727 -2.778497 3.985321 
       
cashdividend       
L1. .7654796 .011503 66.55 0.000 .7429342 .7880251 
       
ceta 230.7046 149.2745 1.55 0.122 -61.86802 523.2772 
dta -91.2051 56.50432 -1.61 0.107 -201.9515 19.54134 
reta -92.17187 116.0946 -0.79 0.427 -319.7131 135.3693 
ieta 2759.383 1293.434 2.13 0.033 224.2993 5294.466 
earningspershare .0316746 .2046127 0.15 0.877 -.3693589 .4327081 
npata -146.4624 207.3817 -0.71 0.480 -552.9229 259.9982 
_cons -9.573495 16.99111 -0.56 0.573 -42.87545 23.72846 
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L1. -.0239917 .0178348 -1.35 0.179 -.0589472 .0109638 
       
size       
L1. .9955078 .001719 579.12 0.000 .9921387 .998877 
       
ceta .0299841 .0835477 0.36 0.720 -.1337664 .1937347 
dta .0205419 .0317979 0.65 0.518 -.0417808 .0828646 
reta -.0690515 .0783967 -0.88 0.378 -.2227063 .0846033 
ieta .6847486 .7178844 0.95 0.340 -.722279 2.091776 
earningspershare .0000452 .0000977 0.46 0.643 -.0001463 .0002367 
npata -.0739249 .1344306 -0.55 0.582 -.3374041 .1895544 
_cons .0575005 .015972 3.60 0.000 .026196 .088805 
       
       
 
The above table for the restricted sample shows a very significant positive causality 
flowing from the lagged size measure to the dividend per share of the banking firms. 
The nature and significance of the causality is preserved as in the full sample results. 
 
Table 7 
 
       
  
Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval]  
       
dividendspersharepaydatequarter       
dividendspersharepaydatequarter       
L1. .7596933 .0101368 74.94 0.000 .7398256 .779561 
       
tangibility       
L1. -.3329096 .1682913 -1.98 0.048 -.6627546 -.0030646 
       
ceta .0077427 .0488426 0.16 0.874 -.087987 .1034724 
dta .0116079 .0182685 0.64 0.525 -.0241978 .0474136 
reta .1690804 .0451614 3.74 0.000 .0805657 .2575951 
ieta .2874302 .4178764 0.69 0.492 -.5315925 1.106453 
earningspershare -.0000124 .0000568 -0.22 0.828 -.0001238 .000099 
npata -.0665541 .0779285 -0.85 0.393 -.2192913 .086183 
_cons .0350961 .0067512 5.20 0.000 .021864 .0483283 
       
tangibility       
dividendspersharepaydatequarter       
L1. -.0002846 .0003636 -0.78 0.434 -.0009972 .000428 
       
tangibility       
L1. .9420907 .0060361 156.08 0.000 .9302601 .9539212 
       
ceta -.0019867 .0017518 -1.13 0.257 -.0054203 .0014468 
dta -.0000763 .0006552 -0.12 0.907 -.0013605 .001208 
reta .0040805 .0016198 2.52 0.012 .0009057 .0072552 
ieta .0305882 .014988 2.04 0.041 .0012122 .0599642 
earningspershare -1.08e-06 2.04e-06 -0.53 0.596 -5.08e-06 2.91e-06 
npata .0029665 .0027951 1.06 0.289 -.0025118 .0084447 
_cons .0007779 .0002421 3.21 0.001 .0003033 .0012525 
       
       
 
The above table reports the causality results between the tangibility and dividend per 
share measures of the restricted sample. There is a significant (p value 0.048<0.05) 
relation between the lagged tangibility and dividend per share measure, which has a 
negative sign, which is again according to the costly signaling literature.  
The nature and significance of the causality has been more significant in the restricted 
sample case this time. 
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Table 8 
 
       
  
Coef. Std. 
Err. 
z P>z [95% 
Conf. 
Interval]  
       
dividendspersharepaydatequarter       
dividendspersharepaydatequarter       
L1. .7621036 .0100614 75.75 0.000 .7423836 .7818236 
       
intangibility       
L1. -
.0766211 
.0915243 -0.84 0.402 -.2560055 .1027633 
       
ceta .0192938 .0484531 0.40 0.690 -.0756725 .1142602 
dta .0143058 .0182183 0.79 0.432 -.0214014 .050013 
reta .1536558 .0445971 3.45 0.001 .0662471 .2410646 
ieta .1752697 .4156978 0.42 0.673 -.639483 .9900224 
earningspershare -.000015 .0000569 -0.26 0.792 -.0001265 .0000965 
npata -.073957 .0779731 -0.95 0.343 -.2267815 .0788675 
_cons .029841 .0060851 4.90 0.000 .0179145 .0417675 
       
intangibility       
dividendspersharepaydatequarter       
L1. .0003649 .0012098 0.30 0.763 -.0020063 .0027361 
       
intangibility       
L1. .8122969 .0110052 73.81 0.000 .7907272 .8338667 
       
ceta -
.0052122 
.0058261 -0.89 0.371 -.0166312 .0062069 
dta -
.0008065 
.0021906 -0.37 0.713 -.0051 .003487 
reta -
.0017042 
.0053625 -0.32 0.751 -.0122145 .0088061 
ieta -
.0204957 
.0499847 -0.41 0.682 -.118464 .0774726 
earningspershare 1.52e-06 6.84e-06 0.22 0.824 -.0000119 .0000149 
npata -
.0184884 
.0093757 -1.97 0.049 -.0368645 -
.0001124 
_cons .0025829 .0007317 3.53 0.000 .0011488 .004017 
       
The above table reports the causality results between the intangibility measure and the 
dividend per share values of the restricted sample. There is a strong positive causality 
flowing from lagged intangibility value (p value of 0.00) to the pay out value, which is 
again strongly supported by the costly signaling literature. 
 
 
Table 9 
       
  
Coef. Std. 
Err. 
z P>z [95% 
Conf. 
Interval]  
       
dividendspersharepaydatequarter       
dividendspersharepaydatequarter       
L1. .7596881 .0104181 72.92 0.000 .739269 .7801072 
       
spread       
L1. .0005582 .0005884 0.95 0.343 -.0005952 .0017115 
       
ceta .0226576 .0484373 0.47 0.640 -.0722778 .1175931 
dta .0140424 .0182253 0.77 0.441 -.0216784 .0497633 
reta .1539862 .044587 3.45 0.001 .0665972 .2413751 
ieta .2078907 .4156465 0.50 0.617 -.6067614 1.022543 
earningspershare -
.0000168 
.0000569 -0.30 0.768 -.0001284 .0000947 
npata -
.0746227 
.0779843 -0.96 0.339 -.2274691 .0782238 
_cons .0278544 .0060116 4.63 0.000 .0160719 .039637 
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spread       
dividendspersharepaydatequarter       
L1. 3.613306 .3367066 10.73 0.000 2.953373 4.273239 
       
spread       
L1. .2609465 .0190179 13.72 0.000 .2236721 .2982209 
       
ceta -
2.177321 
1.565463 -1.39 0.164 -5.245572 .8909298 
dta 1.083368 .5890285 1.84 0.066 -.0711069 2.237843 
reta 1.141773 1.441023 0.79 0.428 -1.68258 3.966126 
ieta -
19.15492 
13.43342 -1.43 0.154 -45.48394 7.174103 
earningspershare .0009385 .0018397 0.51 0.610 -.0026673 .0045443 
npata -
2.543941 
2.520402 -1.01 0.313 -7.483837 2.395956 
_cons 1.153978 .1942909 5.94 0.000 .7731752 1.534781 
       
       
 
The above table reports the causality results between spread and pay outs for the 
restricted sample. The nature and significance of the results have not changed 
significantly from the full sample case. 
 
Table 10       
  
Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval]  
       
dividendspersharepaydatequarter       
dividendspersharepaydatequarter       
L1. .7620466 .0100819 75.59 0.000 .7422865 .7818067 
       
turnover       
L1. .0002073 .0006341 0.33 0.744 -.0010354 .00145 
       
ceta .0161277 .0506825 0.32 0.750 -.0832082 .1154636 
dta .0133368 .0187284 0.71 0.476 -.0233702 .0500438 
reta .1585233 .0462424 3.43 0.001 .0678898 .2491567 
ieta .2202649 .4249157 0.52 0.604 -.6125545 1.053084 
earningspershare -.0000145 .0000569 -0.26 0.799 -.000126 .000097 
npata -.0697191 .0782062 -0.89 0.373 -.2230005 .0835622 
_cons .0261251 .0099502 2.63 0.009 .0066231 .0456272 
       
turnover       
dividendspersharepaydatequarter       
L1. .122127 .0832079 1.47 0.142 -.0409575 .2852115 
       
turnover       
L1. .9668988 .005233 184.77 0.000 .9566424 .9771552 
       
ceta 1.312056 .418294 3.14 0.002 .4922146 2.131897 
dta .2244102 .1545698 1.45 0.147 -.078541 .5273613 
reta -.9314287 .3816489 -2.44 0.015 -1.679447 -.1834105 
ieta -.4820352 3.506924 -0.14 0.891 -7.355479 6.391409 
earningspershare -.0002434 .0004694 -0.52 0.604 -.0011634 .0006766 
npata -.7792489 .6454533 -1.21 0.227 -2.044314 .4858164 
_cons .3822106 .0821212 4.65 0.000 .221256 .5431652 
       
 
 
The above table shows the causality results between the turnover and pay out variables 
for the restricted sample. Here again the nature and significance of the relation have not 
changed significantly from the full sample case. 
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Granger Causality results 
Note on Bivariate Granger Causality test 
The general question for investigation in Granger Cusality test, or Vector Auto regression 
model, is whether a scalar y can help forecast another scalar x. if the answer is no then we can 
say that y does not Granger cause (or G cause) x.  More generally, y fails to G cause x, if for all 
s>0, man squared error (MSE) of a forecast of xt+s based on (xt, xt-1,….) is the same as the MSE 
of a forecast of xt+s that uses both (xt, xt-1,…) and (yt, yt-1,…). Hence if only the linear functions 
are used then y fails to G cause x if: 
MSE(E(xt+s given xt, xt-1,….))= MSE(E(xt+s given xt, xt-1,…..yt, yt-1…….)). 
Hence if the above equality holds then we can say that x is exogenous in the time series with 
respect to y. there is another expression of the same meaning, i.e. y is not linearly informative 
about the future x. 
In the standard framework Granger (1969) meant that if any even x is caused by another event 
y, then it should precede the even t x. However as Hamilton notes (1994) that there can be 
serious limitations to the practical implementation of the original idea for aggregate time series 
data. 
Econometric test for G causality 
For econometric test of G causality we mean whether series y Granger causes series x. To 
implement this test we assume a particular autoregressive lag length p and estimate  
Xt=ct+∑αtxt-i+∑ꞵtyt-i+ut 
We estimate the equation by OLS. We then conduct the F test of the null hypothesis: 
H0: all ꞵ’s are =0, where the alternative hypothesis being at least one ꞵ is significantly different 
from 0. One way to implement this test is to measure the RSS or the sum squared of residuals 
from the above equation: RSS1 =∑ESTIMATED ut2, and then compare the measure with the 
RSS from the univariate auto regression for Xt (with only lags of X), call it RSS0 (this equation 
is also estimated by OLS). 
If  S1 ={ (RSS0-RSS1)/p}/RSS1/(t-2p-1) > 5% critical value for F(p, t-2p-1) distribution, then 
the null hypothesis is rejected, which means that Y does G cause X series. In the current thesis 
this is the test which has been utilized for inferring whether the lagged opacity variables do G 
cause the pay out variables, mainly the dividend pay outs by banking firms. 
Hamilton (1994) further provides an asymptotic equivalent test which is measuring  
S2= t(RSS0-RSS1)/RSS1 here we would reject the null hypothesis if S2 is greater than the 
critical values of ꭓ2(p) variable55. 
Certainly as Hamilton () points out that the result for any G causality test is sensitive to the 
choice of lag length p, and also to the methods used to deal with the potential nonstationarity of 
                                                          
55 Over years there have been a variety of G causality tests proposed, for reference, please see, 
Gweke, Meese and Dent (1983).  
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the series. In the current thesis lag length is chosen based on the standard literature (Kanas, 
2013). 
Lastly a brief pros and cons of using Granger causality measure can be examined as below: 
1. There are multiple properties of Granger causality (GC) which makes it a good candidate for 
measuring causal effects. For example it follows symmetry properties (Barret and Barnett, 
2013) which helps preserve the causality relation when there is a scale transformation of 
variables (Geweke, 1982; Hosoya, 1991; Barrettet al., 2010), the main advantage is that this 
measure helps to infer the predictive power which one or more X variables have for Y. 
 
 
Vector autoregression 
 
Granger causality 
Wald tests 
    
     
Equation           
Excluded 
chi2 df Prob > chi2  
     
spread  
dividendspersha~r 
75.211 1 0.000  
spread                
ALL 
75.211 1 0.000  
     
dividendspersha~r             
spread 
52.628 1 0.000  
dividendspersha~r                
ALL 
52.628 1 0.000  
     
     
 
 
Granger causality 
Wald 
tests     
      
Equation Excluded chi2 df Prob > 
chi2 
 
      
tangibility dividendspersha~r .35817 1 0.550  
tangibility ALL .35817 1 0.550  
      
dividendspersha~r tangibility 7.2982 1 0.007  
dividendspersha~r ALL 7.2982 1 0.007  
      
 
 
Granger causality 
Wald tests 
    
     
Equation           
Excluded 
chi2 df Prob > chi2  
     
intangibility  
dividendspersha~r 
.23458 1 0.628  
intangibility                .23458 1 0.628  
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ALL 
     
dividendspersha~r      
intangibility 
3.7188 1 0.054  
dividendspersha~r                
ALL 
3.7188 1 0.054  
     
 
Granger causality 
Wald tests 
    
     
Equation           
Excluded 
chi2 df Prob > chi2  
     
turnover  
dividendspersha~r 
.15774 1 0.691  
turnover                
ALL 
.15774 1 0.691  
     
dividendspersha~r           
turnover 
.03817 1 0.845  
dividendspersha~r                
ALL 
.03817 1 0.845  
     
Granger causality 
Wald tests 
    
     
Equation           
Excluded 
chi2 df Prob > chi2  
     
size  
dividendspersha~r 
3.1617 1 0.075  
size                
ALL 
3.1617 1 0.075  
     
dividendspersha~r               
size 
45.948 1 0.000  
dividendspersha~r                
ALL 
45.948 1 0.000  
     
 
Summary of observations based on both the full sample and restricted sample analysis 
Bank specific characteristics are based on life cycle theory of firms (De Angelo and De 
Angelo, 2006) and standard literature on factors determining bank dividend pay outs, for 
example, by Rozef (1982), Brclay et al (1995), Diickens et al (2002) and others. 
 
In the above table the three bank specific opacity variables are tangibility, spread and turnover 
measures as have been defined in the variables section. The lagged value of dividend pay out is 
found to be positively and significantly associated with the current dividend pay out level, and 
this result is consistent all through the regression models. This observation is critical since later 
when the dividend smoothing estimations are done lagged pay outs play a critical role for 
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determining the speed of smoothing. Size is found to be positively associated with the dividend 
pay out levels. 
 
There can be several explanation of the positive association of size with dividend pay outs. 
From the perspective of the life cycle theory as well as the agency conflict theory (Jensen, 
1986) size can be considered as to be a proxy for maturity of firms, also for banks, hence such 
firms are expected to retain greater cash flow as relative to the younger firms, this can also be 
due to less investment opportunity present for such firms. 
 
Hence such firms do face free cash flow problem, which is another form of agency conflict, 
which can be mitigated if the insider managers decide to pay out greater dividends. However 
there can be alternative explanation for banking firms, as mentioned earlier opacity level can 
also be related to size, where there are contradicting views, for example standard theoretical 
view is that greater size reflects greater diversification, more reputation hence less opaque. 
 
92 
 
 
However size can also reflect larger volume of opaque assets, or illiquid loans, which may 
increase the information asymmetry problem, and make banks more complex, such 
happenings can also make managers of larger banks pay out more dividends to signal 
quality. 
 
There is another different view point altogether from the perspective of recent studies by 
Acharya et al (2011, 2014) where the authors have observed that large banks during the crisis 
periods have kept on paying smooth and large dividends in spite of the regulatory pressure of 
building up capital, which may signal risk shifting. Later risk shifting via dividend pay outs 
have been observed by multiple studies (Kanas, 2013, Duran and Vivas, 2015), however there 
is no clear consensus regarding the same. Later in the current thesis there will be more detailed 
investigation on dividend smoothing and risk shifting. 
 
Tangibility measure has a significant negative causal relationship with the dividend pay 
out level as in the table. Such negative association can be supported by the signaling 
hypothesis, rather than alternative theories like pecking order (as has been explored in the 
introductory section of the thesis, i.e. both theories have completely opposing predictions 
regarding the impact of opacity on the dividend pay outs. 
 
The standard signaling theory, for example, as in Miller and Rocks (1985), suggests that at 
the separating equilibrium level greater opacity simply would mean greater dividend signaling 
to solve the adverse selection problem. 
 
Hence from this view point there should be a negative association between tangibility and 
dividend pay out. However the pecking order theory suggests that greater is the opacity level, 
greater will be the cost of external capital hence greater will be the underinvestment problem, 
hence managers are better off holding back or cutting back dividends for investing in more 
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positive NPV projects. Such contradictory views however are not empirically investigated 
commonly. In the present case the signaling theory finds strong support.). 
 
The impact of SPREAD, as defined in the variable section is not unambiguous. The 
standard theory of signaling holds that greater is the bid ask spread more opaque is the stock 
traded which should also further mean greater need for dividend pay outs to mitigate the 
adverse selection of equity capital. 
 
It is well known that equity capital suffers from adverse selection problem (since Myers and 
Muzluf, 1984) which increase the equity cost of capital, and one effective way to reduce such 
cost is via costly dividend signaling. The result in the very table do show that there is a 
significant positive causal relationship flowing from spread to dividend pay out level which 
supports the signaling version again. 
 
However there is intense debate among academics as to which component of bid ask spread 
measure should be used in reflecting opacity. The above measure is a standard bid ask spread 
measure, which can further be dissociated. However one critical point here is that such 
decomposition is required to measure the adverse selection between the shareholders 
themselves, namely, between the less informed and the better informed traders, such that there 
can be some adverse selection premium demanded by the less informed traders. In the current 
context the opacity mainly reflects the adverse selection between the insider managers and all of 
the outsider shareholders. Hence a general measure of spread is used. 
 
There is a strong branch of literature (Barclay and Dunbar (1991), Skinner (1992), Lee et al. 
(1993), Neal and Wheatley(1998) among others) which has associated turnover with the adverse 
selection problem. 
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Hence the association between turnover and the dividend pay out can also be explained from the 
signaling theory perspective, and the above results do show a significant positive association 
between the variables. 
 
Among the other bank specific control variables, the association between retained earnings to 
total asset mix and the dividend pay outs is again explained based on the signaling and 
agency theory. Greater retained earnings do mean less investment opportunities, or greater 
free cash flow problem, and therefore more dividend is paid to mitigate the agency cost. 
 
The causality of the common equity to total asset ratio and the dividend pay outs is negative 
and significant at 10% level, this is consistent with the regulatory implications, mainly during 
the crisis period, where there was strong suggestions of capital build up. There have been early 
theoretical studies (for example by Stiglitz and Hellman, 2000) on the skin in the game theory, 
where the models have been constructed for estimating the level of equity capital which banks 
themselves should hold. 
 
The above results show that there is a negative causality between pay outs and holding capital, 
which can be directly influenced by the deterioration of franchise values of banks during crisis. 
Debt to total asset ratio do have a negative causality with the dividend pay out but not 
significant. Myers (1984) in an alternative pecking order theory has suggested that there can be 
complex relationship between debt and dividend pay outs, and also that dividend are rigid over 
time, which further indicates some smoothing behaviour. 
 
Here the results show that the causality between dividends and debt may not be significant, 
however the negative nature is according to established theories like pecking order. The 
traditional studies of bank dividend pay outs determinants have ignored the cost of funding 
factor, which is reflected in variables like interest expense to total asset ratio, however recently 
 
there have been some studies including such variables, for example Forti and Sciozer (2015) 
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have used interest expenses as one of the bank level control variable. However the association 
found in the very study has been negative significant, which is according to the cost of funding 
hypothesis formulated by Kuoku (2012) who argues that greater is the funding cost greeter is 
the cost of paying dividends, hence greater expense should be negatively associated with the 
pay outs. 
 
However in the above results its striking that this variable is positively associated with the 
dividend pay out level. Later in further investigations this association is explained. However it 
can be possible that such positive association means that even if the cost of funding was greater 
for banks the high dividend pay outs was kept over the sample period, which is in line with the 
dividend rigidity theory. 
 
Overall the measure of G causality has significant for all the opacity measures, which in other 
words mean that there is a clear evidence of short term causality running from the opacity 
variables to the DPS or dividend pay outs, but not in the opposite direction. In terms of G 
causality this also indicates that relative to the other control variables the opacity variables have 
significant predictive power for future dividend pay outs. 
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RESULTS FROM TOBIT MODEL 
(table in the appendix 3) 
Table above  of this section provides results for the TOBIT model, where the dependent 
variables are dividend per share, total cash dividend pay out in log terms, and the money 
value of share repurchases (as described in the variables section). The reason for including 
different types of pay outs is that the general literature on dividend signaling or pay out 
signaling holds that impact of firm specific factors on the level of signaling may be 
different for different types of signaling. 
 
The probabilistic impacts of the bank specific characteristics on the dividend per share level is 
in line with recent studies like Forti and Schiozer (2015). However in the above table the main 
signaling hypothesis is investigated, which following the seminal theoretical models like of 
Miller and Rocks (1985), hypotheses’ that greater information asymmetry level will generate 
greater dividend pay outs for solving or mitigating the adverse selection of equity capital. Again 
as observed in the last table the results are in contradiction to the prediction of the pecking order 
theory, which predicts the opposite of the signaling theory. 
 
Here the first four columns provide the results for the probabilistic impacts of the explanatory 
and control variables on the dividend per share levels. The first impact is of the size variable, 
which is one period lagged value relative to the dividend pay out, and the positive significant 
impact shows that greater is the size of the bank higher is the probability of paying out. Since 
the coefficients are of a probabilistic estimation they can not be interpreted in the same way as 
that for the linear model estimations, but the significant p values (which is indicated by the *) 
can reveal information about the greater or lower probability of pay outs. 
 
The impact of size is according to the earlier table, which can be explained by either agency 
theory, or signaling theory. There can be either free cash flow problem faced by large banks 
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(which is a critical issue in the financial crisis period, since that is argued to generate excessive 
risk taking), or the larger size can also show greater opacity in case of banks due to larger 
opaque assets, which is a different argument than the non banking firms, where the standard 
diversification or the reputation capital argument would predict that greater size represents less 
opacity instead. 
The second main explanatory variable is the one period lagged tangibility value which is found 
to have significant negative probabilistic impact on the dividend per share level. This is again in 
accordance with the earlier causality model which supports the standard signaling hypothesis 
rather than the alternative hypothesis of pecking order theory. 
 
Aivazian et al (2006) in a comprehensive econometric study have shown that firms which have 
better bond ratings are also those which have greater transparency in asset quality, and such 
firms also do smooth their pay outs. Hence this analysis will be critical in later section where 
investigation is based in the pay out smoothing of the banks in the sample. In this section the 
result is in harmony with the prediction of signaling theory. 
 
The crisis dummy, which has been explained in the variable section, interestingly has a 
significant negative probabilistic impact on the dividend per share level. This finding is 
accordance with the results of Forti and Schiozer (2015), and hence similar to their finding the 
above results show that banks in the sample have at an average reduced dividend pay outs due 
to the impact of crisis, which can again be supported by the regulatory pressure of cutting back 
dividends and raising more capital. 
 
Such negative impact of crisis is further investigated in details in the subsequent sections, 
where dividend smoothing, and later on possibility of risk shifting via dividend pay outs and 
smoothing is investigated, since there has been some recent claims by Achraya et al (2014) 
that crisis period may have produced risk shifting incentives to the larger banks in specific, 
who have maintained large dividend pay outs. The current analysis investigates whether such 
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behaviour can be observed in general or not. As of now the above results do not support the 
view of risk shifting via dividend pay outs, rather supports the signaling view developed by 
Forti and Schiozer(2015), and Kuoku (2012). However one way the current analysis extends 
the above mentioned study is by investigating the impact of bank specific variables on other 
types of pay outs, specifically share repurchases which may throw some interesting insights. 
 
In the above table the probabilistic impacts of the turnover lag and the spread lag remains 
positive and significant, which is consistent with the last VAR results which further provides 
support to the signaling story to mitigate adverse selection problem. 
 
Among the bank specific control variables retained earnings, and one measure of default risk, 
namely non per performing assets to total asset ratio are found to have significant probabilistic 
impacts on the dividend per share levels. 
 
The nature of impact of retained earnings is in line with the free cash flow theory (Jensen, 1986) 
and is also according to the general studies like by De Angelo et al (2006), where the banks 
with greater retained cash flow have found optimal to distribute larger dividends, which can 
also be considered as a signal for mitigating agency conflict. 
 
The negative significant impact of the default risk measure on dividend pay outs is again in line 
with the recent study by Forti and Schiozer (2015), where banks with greater default risk level 
have found it optimal to cut back dividends, which may also be supported by the regulatory 
pressure of capital building or skin in the game approach. 
 
Again this results are in line with recent studies and contradictory to the claim of Acharya et al 
(2014) that dividend s are used to expropriate the debt holders. 
 
Overall the impacts on the dividend pay outs reveal the signaling behaviour of the banks to the 
debt holders in general. In the above table (TOBIT outputs) results the impact of the bank 
specific variables along with the opacity levels support the results for the dividend pay out per 
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share level (which is the total dividend comprising stock, and cash dividend divided by the no 
of shares out standing). There is a strong evidence that both industrial firms and banks have 
increased dividend pay outs over years till the last financial crisis (Floyd et al, 2015). However 
the empirical studies argue that the reasons for increase in the pay out decisions are different in 
both cases. For the industrial firms the increase in dividend pay outs are also simultaneous with 
the increase in share repurchases, which is also evident in banks, as also in the current thesis. 
 
However standard literature suggests that for the non banking industrial firms it is the free cash 
flow problem which stands out as the main reason for increasing dividend pays among the large 
firms (De Angelo et al, 2008). Again dividend increase in these firms are also consistent with 
the managerial reluctance to cut back dividends, which is again consistent with the dividend 
smoothing literature of Lintner (1956) to Brav et al (2005). However as Floyd et al (2015) 
observes the nature of signaling for banks dividend is fundamentally different from the 
industrial firms’. 
 
The authors are in view that banks dividend signaling is more to convey future financial 
strength of the banks. This can be compared to the concept of value signaling as in the original 
signaling literature (for example in Miller and Rocks, 1985). The above results do support the 
original signaling theory as relative to the pecking order theory, or agency cost theory, though 
it is also clarified from the above results that the life cycle control variables also do have 
significant impacts on dividend pay outs. 
 
The last four columns of the table above provides results for the impact of bank speciifc 
caharacterisctics on the share repurchases. Grullon et al (2002) have proposed the substitution 
hypothesis. According to this widely cited study there has been an increasing tendency to use 
funds otherwise used for dividends for share repurchases. This trend is increasing for the USA 
based firms in general. 
Even more recent studies, for example, Andriosopolous et al (2013) have found that share 
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repurchases have increased over the last 30 years along with the reluctance to cut back 
dividends. There are interesting theoretical as well as empirical observations on the 
substitutability between the dividend payments and the share repurchases. 
 
Most of the early theoretical models, for example, by Bhatttacharya (1979) or Miller and Rocks 
(1985) have argued that these two pay out forms are perfect substitutes, since the source of 
transaction costs in these models are not associated with the choice between these pay outs. In 
Bhattacharya (1979) the source of cost associated with signaling is raising new capital, once a 
stable dividend pay out is committed by the manager. 
 
However there is arguments on whether share repurchases can constitute signaling equilibrium, 
which separates good firms with future financial prospects from the bad firms with less 
financial prospects. Studies on substitution hypothesis have mentioned that since dividends 
attract institutional investors more than the share repurchases, undervalued firms signal via 
dividend pay outs rather than buy backs and that may create separating equilibrium. 
 
Hence according to these studies there is no perfect substitutability between share repurchases 
and dividends. However its is also important to explain why then there is a simultaneous rise in 
buy backs along with dividend pay outs by industrial firms as well as banks. In the current 
thesis a comparative study of signaling content of these pay outs by banking firms is presented. 
Share repurchases by bank holding companies have increased drastically over the last few 
decade, and importantly over the last financial crisis (Floyd et al, 2015). Rather authors (Floyd 
et al, 2015) have been surprised by observing dividend rigidity among banks along with the rise 
in repurchases, since repurchases have greater flexibility, tax advantages and related benefits 
(Guay and Harford, 2008, Skinner, 2008). 
There is some disagreement among the authors on whether share repurchases can be considered 
as costly signaling, since there is no ongoing commitment for share buy backs (Floyd et al, 
2015) there is a view that they cannot be consistently used as signals. 
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However as shown in the current thesis, as well as recent studies, there is a persistency among 
the banks to maintain share repurchases along with dividend pay outs over considerable period 
of time. Hence it can be argued that share repurchases also do act as signals, and convey some 
important information to the information sensitive investors. 
 
Baker and Wurgler (2012) have argued that changes in dividend per share is easy to observe, 
however it is difficult to gauge the magnitude of share repurchases56.  
 
In the current study the finding on bank share repurchases is compatible to the findings of Floyd 
et al (2015) which is that there has been a consistent and adjacent increase of share repurchases 
along with the rigidity of dividend pay outs by banks. However in the above mentioned study 
there is no investigation of information content of share repurchases along with that of the 
dividend pay outs by banks. The above table provides some of the information content of share 
repurchases which is supplemented by later results. 
 
The lag value of size has the similar positive and significant impact on repurchases as on 
the dividend pay outs, which means that greater is the lag value of bank size higher is the 
probability of the banks to repurchase. Such result is consistent with the studies of Jgannath 
and Stephens (2002), and Andriosopoluous et al (2013) who have observed that the 
buyback programs are completed mostly by the larger firms. The last paper has also found 
that share buyback is positively associated with information disclosure for the firms in 
general. 
 
In keeping with the finding that information disclosure and buy backs are positively associated 
the above results show that share buy backs are also impacted in the similar way by opacity 
levels (tangibility, spread and turnover measures) as the pay outs. These results suggest that buy 
                                                          
56 There can be other difficulties in share repurchases, for example as observed by Ikenberry and Vermaelen 
(1995) that per share amount of repurchases is not reported, amounts paid out are not tied to specific periods, 
and in some cases after the repurchases are announced the action is carried out over few years’ time. 
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backs can also be used by banks to signal financial strength of banks (Floyd et al, 2015), or as 
according to the signaling theory, mitigate adverse selection problems. 
 
Specifically the study by Floyd et al (2015) finds that any pay out strategy by banks, whether 
dividend pay outs or buy backs can be related to signaling of future financial strength. The 
above results supports the view. However more bank specific results are reported in later tables. 
 
Among the other bank specific control variables retained earnings has a strong negative 
probabilistic impact on the buy backs, which is expected since one reason for buy backs is to 
build up own capital by banks. The impact of profitability, as reflected in the EPS measure is 
also as expected in theory, i.e. less profitable firms go for more share buy backs. This also 
relates to the standard literature that undervalued firms prefer to go for buy backs more than the 
overvalued firms which may impact their equity prices positively. 
 
Another striking result is the impact of lag nonperforming asset ratio on buy backs which is 
significantly positive, as compared to significantly negative on dividend pay outs. However this 
is also supported by the argument that if the default risk level increases for banks then there is 
incentive for the managers to cut back dividends and increase own capital, which can be again 
accomplished through increasing buy backs. 
 
Overall the last two tables do suggest that there is enough evidence at the firm level to suggest 
that both pay outs and share buy backs can be used as signals for financial strength, or 
mitigation of adverse selection. However there are important differences between the respective 
signals too. 
 
The first two tables in the current section has demonstrated that dividend pay outs as well as 
share repurchases by banks can be considered as costly signaling, which is based on general 
value signaling concept of the signaling theory (Bhattacharya, 1977, Miller and Rocks, 1985 
and others). 
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However it is extremely critical to recognize that banking firms are different than the non-
banking firms, and such differences are based on the specific features of banking which is 
absent among the industrial firms. There is a strong and sound literature which posits banks 
differently than non-banks (Berger et al, 1995, Calomiris and Wilson, 2004,Diamond and 
Dygvig , 1983, Kashayap et al, 2002, Laven, 2013). The main differences emerge from the fact 
that banks create liquidity by taking more liquid deposits as relative to the opaque and illiquid 
assets created as loans, hence they are highly leveraged and rely heavily on depositors for short 
term financing. 
 
For high opacity it is very hard for the outsider investors to assess the quality and value of 
assets. Hence as recent studies like Forti and Schiozer (2015) suggest that banks do have 
responsibilities towards information sensitive creditors for maintaining confidence, where the 
dividends can act as costly signals for solvency. Again if the confidence of the creditors break 
down then the funding model of banking will also collapse which may lead to runs and various 
other costs of distress. 
 
Hence dividend signaling by banks also reveals inherent fragility of banks (Floyd et al, 2015, 
Acharya et al, 2011). It is also true that banks are a more homogenous group than industrial firms, 
hence are vulnerable to more common shocks, such features also make dividends worthy 
 
signals to market in general.  
 
 
Keeping these distinctions of banking firms in mind it is critical that information content of 
bank pay outs is investigated in more specificity, which is attempted in the table 3 of this 
section. Specifically probabilistic impact of bank specific levels of leverage, credit growth, 
capital adequacy, loan risk, are studied on the dividend pay outs and share repurchases. This 
analysis is an extension of standard analysis as posed by Forti and Schiozer (2015). 
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The following table provides results for further information content of signals, namely, dividend per share, share repurchase, 
cash dividends, and total dividend pay outs including cash and stock (as described in the data and variables section). The bank 
specific explanatory, or information content, variables are (following Forti and Schiozer, 2015), leverage, credit growth, capital 
adequacy ratio, and loan or credit risk (as described in data and variables section). Size dummy is a control for large banks 
(Forti and Schiozer, 2015, Oliviera, et al 2014). The estimation technique is TOBIT regression as explained earlier. Significance 
levels of the variables are represented by ***, **, and*. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)   
Cash Total   
DPS Share repurchase   
dividend dividend      
No. of observations 3943 3943 3943 3943 
 
SIZE DUMMY 
0.073*** 1.90*** 1.23*** 1.18***    
LEVERAGE LAG -0.012** -0.02** -0.005* -.0001 
 
CISIS -0.03*** -.324** - -.247**  
0.270**      
 
CREDIT GRTH -0.014* 0.041** -0.016* 0.007 
 
LOAN RISK -0.02** 0.130** -.022* -0.004 
 
CAPITAL ADQCY -0.008* -7.02*** -.170 -0.245 
 
EPS LAG 0.001 -.309*** 0.0013 0.001 
 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Time dummy yes yes yes yes 
 
     
 
 
 
Table above of the current section provides results for the significance and nature of 
probabilistic impact of further bank characteristics on pay outs and buy backs, these bank 
characteristics reflect the financial strength or the solvency of the banks. Capital adequacy ratio 
is found to have a negative significant impact on the payouts for all the measures of pay outs. 
This is in line with the results by Forti and Schiozer (2015), and recent theoretical models for 
example by Kouku (2012). Such impact shows that banks which are highly capitalized have less 
necessity to signal via dividends, as well as they have less need to buy back for building up 
further capital. 
 
Which also means that capital constrained banks need to signal to the creditors about future 
ability to generate cash, which can be accomplished by paying out dividends, since according 
to signaling theory only those banks will be able to remain committed to dividends which have 
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higher cash flows in future. In the later sections the impact of capital adequacy on smoothing or 
adjustment speed is also investigated such that the signaling theory over time is supported. 
 
Loan risk has significant negative probabilistic impact on the dividend pay outs, which is again 
in line with the recent studies, and which means that greater is the risk of loan portfolio lower is 
the probability of paying dividends. This result is again in line with the regulatory need to build 
up capital if the probability of default is higher. The same result also mean that the lower risk of 
loan probability can be signaled by larger dividend pay outs. This result is compatible with the 
banking literature in general. However here it is also found that the loan risk level has a 
positive impact on the share repurchases, which means that banks have used share repurchases 
as an efficient tool to build up capital cushion. 
 
The consistent negative impact of the crisis dummy on all pay out forms across all the above 
tables refutes the cash out hypothesis, which holds that for high distressed banks there is a clear 
risk shifting via dividend pay outs which transfers cash or wealth from the depositors to the 
shareholder groups, as developed by Acharya et al (2014). One possible explanation can be that in 
Acharya et al (2014) mainly large too big to fail banks which were severely distressed were 
considered, however as the current analysis shows that such cash out behavior may not be true 
for banks in general. 
 
Dickens et al (2002), Forti and Schiozer (2015) among others have used credit growth for banks as 
the proxy for investment opportunities. Consistent with their findings the current results also show a 
negative significant impact of investment opportunities on pay outs. However there is certainly 
differences between the investment opportunities to a bank than to an industrial firm, for banks 
investments mainly refer to the loans made, however there can be investments in securities also, 
which can be accomplished by holding back dividends. Supporting the argument it is also found that 
the credit growth has a significant positive impact on the share repurchases. 
 
The positive significant impact of size is consistent with the earlier tables, and this is also supported 
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by the standard studies, as by Mayne (1980), Dickens et al (2002), Martins and Novaes (2012) 
among others who have also investigated on the US firms. Again this finding can be supported by 
signaling or agency theory as explained earlier. Size also do have positive and significant impact on 
the share repurchases, which indicates that it is the larger banks which go for the share repurchases 
more, and this result is also consistent with the banking literature. Some more TOBIT outputs with 
dummy variables has been reported in the appendix. 
2.5.1 Pay outs during the crisis period: structural shifts results 
 
 
The below tables provides some insightful results on the structural shifts of the dividend pay 
outs and share repurchases of the bank holding companies from a subsample of the whole data 
set. 
 
VARIABLE  OBS MEAN STD.ERROR STD.DEV 
Dividends per  3943 0.1356 .1727 .130 
share for total      
sample      
Dividends per  3943 0.1355 .173 .130 
share before      
crisis      
H0: MEAN (dividends full sample) - MEAN (dividends before crisis) = 0  
Ha: difference of means < 0    
Pr(T<t) = 0.5000 t = 0.000    
 
 
 
 
VARIABLE  OBS MEAN STD.ERROR STD.DEV 
Dividends per  3943 0.1356 .0027 .1727 
share for full      
sample      
Dividends per  3943 5.0376 0.0642 4.035 
share during the      
crisis      
H0: MEAN (dividends full sample) - MEAN (dividends during crisis) = 0  
Ha: difference of means < 0    
Pr(T<t) = 0.0000 t = -76.2090    
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VARIABLE  OBS MEAN STD.ERROR STD.DEV 
Dividends per  3943 0.1356 .0027 .1727 
share before      
crisis      
Dividends per  3943 5.0376 0.0642 4.035 
share during the     
crisis      
H0: MEAN (dividends full sample) - MEAN (dividends during crisis) = 0  
Ha: difference of means < 0    
Pr(T<t) = 0.0000 t = -76.20    
 
 
 
VARIABLE OBS MEAN STD.ERROR STD.DEV 
Share 3505 5.8027 .0640 3.792 
repurchases for     
the total sample     
Share repurchase 438 5.7635 0.151 3.173 
during the crisis     
H0: MEAN (share repurchase full sample) - MEAN (share repurchases during crisis) = 0 
Ha: difference of means < 0 
 
Pr(T<t) = 0.581  t = 0.2073 
 
 
 
 
VARIABLE OBS MEAN STD.ERROR STD.DEV 
SOA before crisis 2316 0.2777 0.0037 0.1814 
SOA during 821 0.3054 0.0070 0.2028 
crisis     
H0: MEAN (SOA before) - MEAN (SOA during crisis) = 0 
 
Ha: difference of means < 0 
 
Pr(T<t) = 0.0001  t = -3.7027 
 
 
 
 
Already there has been a good amount of attention in the banking literature on the changes in 
the patterns of pay outs by the baking firms during the crisis period, as mentioned earlier in the 
current thesis. The current thesis findings are captured in the above two tables, as regards to the 
dividend pay outs (in per share terms) and the volume of total share repurchases, during crisis, 
before crisis and or the whole sample period. 
 
The first table shows that dividend pay outs have been very persistent for the whole period, 
since the same no of bank holding companies have maintained dividend pay outs before and 
during the crisis as also for the whole period of the sample. However there are significant 
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differences between the mean dividend level before and during the crisis period, where the latter 
has been significantly higher. 
 
The significant difference can be explained from the perspective of signaling via dividends, 
since the banks would like to maintain reputation via increasing dividends to signal future 
profitability during the crisis period. 
Certainly there are alternative or opposing views, and one of them being the risk transferring or 
risk shifting via dividends. The very possibility is studied in later parts of the current thesis. 
 
In case of share repurchases though the finding is quite striking. Since the second table above 
shows that there have been a significant increase in repurchases volume during the crisis as 
compared to before and over all sample period, but along with this its also true that no of bank 
holding companies doing share repurchases have significantly dropped during the crisis. Which 
also means that those banking firms which have done repurchase in the crisis period have 
drastically increased the volume of repurchases. 
 
Till now there is less understanding in the current literature as to why share repurchase may be 
worth while for firms value, and how the trend of repurchases compare vis a vi that of dividend 
pay outs. There is a strand of literature as mentioned else where in the thesis, the so called 
substitution hypothesis which maintains that since share repurchases are not required to be 
committed to by the managers, unlike dividends, they are not costly signals, hence are not 
perfect substitutes of dividends. 
 
However the above structural shift results do raise doubt on such theoretical propositions, which 
further calls for the detailed analysis of share repurchases by banks. As already shown in the 
current section that there are strong signaling content of this type of pay out further analysis is 
called for, which is carried out in subsequent sections/ chapters. 
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2.6 Conclusion 
 
 
The following paragraphs summarise the main findings and contributions for the 
current section. 
 
2.6.1Problems with bank dividend signaling studies 
 
 
As the first section of this thesis has observed there are both theoretical as well as empirical 
studies on the dividend signaling theory for the industrial firms, but rare studies on the banking 
firms. The studies on the banking firms have either been motivated by the similar empirical 
studies on non financial firms, or there have been some more bank specific studies quite 
recently (Forti and Schiozer, 2015, Floyd etal, 2015, Onali 2013, Olivier etal, 2015, Hong etal, 
2016 and others). 
 
There are only a few theoretical models on dividend signaling by banks (Kuakwo, 2012) which 
too have been an extension or application of the standard Neoclassical models only. Hence there 
are gaps in the theoretical literature, for example in case of banks what do the dividends signal? 
Since there are many agents and principal groups involved in banking (for example 
shareholders, creditors, borrowers, regulators, society at large) signaling studies should be 
investigated from different bank specific variables. 
 
Hence the current section has investigated the impact and causality between bank dividend 
pay outs and various bank specific explanatory factors, for example, opacity levels, default 
risk levels, capital adequacy levels, loan risk levels, along with standard life cycle control 
variables which capture the impact of agency cost on the signaling level. 
 
The expectation from the results obtained is that further comprehensive signaling model can be 
based on the empirical results obtained here. Hence an inductive method of model building is 
used in the section rather than simple extension of earlier general econometric studies. 
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2.6.2 Competing underlying theories 
 
 
The current section has also discussed the underlying theories based on which dividend 
signaling should be investigated, since unlike industrial firms there are more complex 
incentives for pay out decisions in general. The first such theory is obviously the adverse 
selection theory, which as per the standard Neoclassical literature, generates dividend 
signaling. However this does not mean, as seen in the analysis, that only information 
asymmetry measures have impact on signaling levels/ pay out levels. Causal relation between 
opacity variables and pay out levels do support value signaling theory, but there are many 
other bank specific variables which are critical in this respect. 
 
For banking the phenomena of moral hazards, or risk shifting, or cash outs can occur. There is 
a strong case to investigate whether such factors do impact the pay out levels, since if they do 
then it may be in conflict with the standard value signaling theory. The current study has 
investigated on the very line and have not found any significant evidence of such issues57. 
 
As observed, other competing theories of pay outs are pecking order theory and agency cost 
theories. The current section has incorporated possible impacts from such theories also, and 
has found agency cost impacting the dividend pay out levels, but no evidence of pecking 
order theory is found58. 
 
2.6.3 Different types of pay outs 
 
 
In most of the standard studies dividend per share, or different pay out ratios are used as the 
main dependent variables. However in the current study different dependent variables are used 
for robustness check, as well as to test whether signaling can be done through other pay outs 
also, namely, stock repurchases, stock dividends, cash dividends, total dividends, and total pay 
outs. Some recent studies have started using such comprehensive measures, mainly for 
                                                          
57 However in the last chapter some more detailed analysis is presented which may indicate some possible 
channels through which some specific type of risk shifting take place. 
58 Hence overall agency theory, signaling theory and life cycle theory holds in the current analysis. 
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banking firms. More specifically there is a substitution hypothesis in the banking literature 
which suggests that repurchases can also act as signals. However where the earlier studies 
have not found any substantial evidence for this, the current section demonstrates that share 
repurchases by banks do act as significant signals.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
Investigation of factors determining bank specific smoothing and the signaling 
content of smoothing 
 
3.1 Abstract 
 
 
Dynamic behavior of dividends, or dividend smoothing, has been investigated for non-
financial firms on cross country basis. There is significant evidence for opacity levels, and 
life cycle factors as determinants of dividend target levels as well as impacting the speed of 
adjustments at from level. However there is relatively very rare investigation on banking 
firms. In the current paper authors provide first of its kind evidence for impact of bank 
specific opacity measures (along with bank specific lifecycle or control variables) on both the 
bank specific targets as well as specific speeds of adjustment. 
 
In the earlier signaling or smoothing studies such firm level heterogeneity is missing in most 
of the cases. Another contribution of the paper is that it provides first evidence for partial 
adjustment of a more comprehensive pay out policy for banks, including cash dividends, 
stock dividends and share repurchases. The current paper uses a modified three step partial 
adjustment model and investigates all listed banking firms as in COMPUSTAT and CRSP 
data bases, for the period 1990-201559. 
 
Main results from the partial adjustment model, and various subsample analysis lends 
support to underlying theories, namely, signaling based on information asymmetry 
hypothesis, and agency cost theory. Specifically banks with higher opacity, and, or greater 
agency costs sets higher pay out targets, and also adjust dividends relatively slowly60.   
 
                                                          
59 Modified here means a three step partial adjustment model rather than one step model where only average 
speed of adjustment can be measured. 
60 This slowness in the adjustment process can be related to dynamic signaling, for example as in studies by 
Leary et al (2011). 
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3.2 Dividend smoothing literature 
 
 
3.2.1 Introduction 
 
 
The current section builds upon the dividend, and other pay outs, namely, share repurchases 
and various forms of dividend payout signaling and information content of such signaling by 
banking firms as developed in the last section. The current section investigates the dynamic 
dividend and pay out behaviors of banking firms in general. Specifically what is the nature 
and significance of impact of bank specific opacity levels on the partial adjustment of such 
pay outs, and also what are the information content of such dynamic adjustments in the line of 
the last section. 
 
Dynamic dividend behavior is no a new academic area, since Lintner (1956) to more recent 
investigations by Flaannery and Rangan (2006, 2008) there are umpteen numbers of 
empirical or econometric analysis on so called smoothing of dividends (or alternatively of 
closely related area of capital structure smoothing). 61 
 
The definition of smoothing is clarified by Leary et al (2011) which is that greater 
smoothing means slower adjustment of pay outs towards the target. Hence the main 
purpose of such empirical analyses has been to measure the speed of adjustments. 
However the traditional models of dividend smoothing, or smoothing in general have not 
been able to estimate heterogynous or firm specific adjustment speeds which may vary 
over time also. Most of the studies estimate average speeds of smoothing across 
industries, which has little information about the firm specific dynamic behaviors. 
Another obvious gap in the literature is that there is rare analysis of factors determining 
heterogynous bank behaviors in this regard. Again as explained in the last section there 
                                                          
61 The basic idea as captured well in Leary et al (2011) is that every firm has some target pay out levels which 
managers try to adjust to every period based on certain constraints, such targets are again based on some 
idiosyncratic characteristics of firms, which cover most of the life cycle variables as explained earlier. 
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are many bank specific characteristics which are different from the non-financial 
characteristics, which also make dividend signaling by banks different than the non-
banking firms62. 
 
Based on these gaps, the current section builds upon the very recent works of Oliver et al (), 
and Xiang et al (2015)63, and constructs a modified partial adjustment model which for the 
first time is employed in investigating the bank specific adjustments of pay outs which 
varies over time. A comprehensive analysis of impact of different bank specific 
characteristics along with opacity levels on speed of adjustments is provided in the current 
section. 
 
Though the analysis presented in the current section is econometric, there are obvious 
theoretical bases upon which the rationale of the analysis is established. Hence briefly 
a theoretical background of dividend smoothing in general is provided below. 
 
3.2.2 General theoretical studies on dividend smoothing 
 
 
Though the empirical patterns of dividends across firms is well documented there are 
challenges in theorizing dividend pay outs, mainly, dynamic dividend behaviors based on 
corporate decision making. The common approach has been to model dividends as residual 
after investment (Feldstien and Green 1983, John and Kalay 1985, Lambrecht and Myres 
2015), however the empirical studies again have shown that dividends are smoothed relative 
to stochastic earnings, cash flows, and share prices, and dividends are also smoothed across 
time (Fama and Baibak, 1968, Allen and Michaely 2002, Leary and Michaely 2011). 
Empirical studies have also shown that: 1) dividends generate positive abnormal returns 
(Aharnoy and Swary (1980) 2) firms raise new capital while paying out dividends (Loderer 
and Mauer 1992) 3) recipients of dividends also reinvest a larger portion 4) and obviously 
dividend pay outs are influenced by the firm specific investment opportunity sets (Smith and 
                                                          
62 Such variables appear in the analysis as control variables as earlier. 
63 Working paper on the capital adjustments by the Chinese BHCs. 
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Watts 1992). Hence as has been investigated in the first section too, if all these observations 
are combined it is clarified that dividends have information contents.64 Recently it has been 
theorised that on a dynamic setting dividends can be used as signals which can solve adverse 
selection and or moral hazard problems. Such studies do establish that dividend smoothing 
can also be treated as signaling, which is critical for the current investigation since in the 
current thesis not only heterogynous speeds of adjustments will be estimated but also the 
information content of such adjustments will be analyzed65.  
Till now the incentives behind dividend smoothing is not fully understood by theoreticians, 
but decades of study has generated some probable incentives for managers to practice 
smoothing, 1) smoothing of dividends may improve credit rating (Aivazian et al, 2006), 2) 
dividend smoothing may attract large institutional investors (Aleen et al, 2000) 3) dividend 
smoothing may create firm specific investor clientele (Baker et al, 2007), 4) dividend 
smoothing may also mitigate signaling costs (Guttman et al, 2010), 5) dividend smoothing 
may also reduce the managerial consequences of bad performance (Fundenberg and Tirole , 
1995), and 5) may also optimize managerial rent seeking (Lambrecht and Myers, 2015)66. 
Hence one common factor which runs through all such studies is the agency conflict problem 
between insider manager and the outsider shareholder, which is again based on adverse selection 
and or moral hazard. There is little doubt that such agency related problems is much more 
complex in case of banking, since there are many combination of principals and agents involved, 
however till now there is no specific theoretical model on bank dividend smoothing. 
 
Empirical studies have also emphasized the same point, for example Lakin et al (2014) have 
found it difficult to establish that there is a positive association between firm value and 
smoothing. However Leary and Michaely (2011) have comprehensively shown that 
                                                          
64 An early study, Bergheim and Wantz (1995) concluded that dividends are Spencian signal of firm value. More 
recent studies, for example, by Leary and Roberts (2014) have shown that determinants of dividends are far more 
complex than in the typical empirical studies. 
65 Here lies the importance of various bank specific variables along with the main opacity variables. 
66 Managerial rent seeking an also be viewed as risk shifting, since this also goes with the high risk taking in 
favor of the share holders-owner group at the expense of the other creditor groups. 
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determinants of smoothing are based on agency conflicts for example free cash flow problems 
as in Easterbrook (1984), Jensen (1986), and De Angelo and De Angelo (2007), later 
Knyazeva and Knyazeva (2014) have provided evidence that smoothing may also arise to 
mitigate governance problem. One interesting observation is that all these explanations are 
related to information asymmetry problems, for example monitoring problem in the last study 
mentioned. 
 
There have been some earlier theoretical models which have incorporated information 
asymmetry problems more directly. Kang and Kumar (1990), Kumar and Spatt (1987), 
Kumar (1988) have shown that in a multi period setting dividend smoothing can be generated 
from the ‘coarse’ signaling properties of the models67. 
 
The concept of coarse signaling is related to the information problem that the higher 
quality firms cannot distinguish themselves until quality increases discretely. Hence 
qualities which are close to each other pay same level of dividends, which results in 
dividend smoothing relative to firm qualities. In the model of Kumar and Spatt (1987) 
dividend smoothing arises from the relationship between dividends and managers 
consumption needs68. One important point to note is that in Modigliani – Miller theorems 
based on perfect capital market there is no such link between dividend pay outs and 
managerial consumption, hence there is also no incentive to smooth from such perspective. 
Robe (1994) further developed a smoothing model as an extension on the seminal dividend 
signaling model by Miller and Rocks (1985). Hence these models do show that smoothing 
can be directly generated from a more static signaling model when intertemporal69 
allocations are considered. 
There are many examples of such extensions, for example, John and Nachman (1987), 
                                                          
67 Hence as an empirical extension to such theoretical multi-period model we have here a dynamic adjustment 
model based on changing quarterly data. 
68 Here one of the roles played by the bank specific variables like credit risk  level or default risk level is also 
related to the quality of underlying assets, mainly the loan portfolios. 
69 Which in this case means that the insider managers would choose to adjust the reinvestment amount from 
the free cash flow over periods. 
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Juster (1994) and others have extended the static models of John and Williams and Myer 
and Mazluf (1984) respectively, and derived intertemporal signaling (which is the 
theoretical version of partial adjustment ) equilibria which are based on costly dividend 
pay outs. 
 
There are some more explicit models, for example, Dybvig and Zender (1991), where the 
dividend smoothing has been suggested as the solution of adverse selection problem, in 
these models the managerial incentives are endogenised. 
 
There is a distinct strand of literature which suggests dividend smoothing as a solution to the 
agency conflict problems. Fluck (1998, 1999), Myers (2000), Lambrecht and Myers (2008) 
among others have laid down the foundation of theoretical agency models of dividend pay 
outs. For example Lambracht and Myres (2012) suggests that dividend smoothing may 
prevent shareholders from taking action against managerial rent seeking. 
 
Here the main objective of the managers is to maximise manager’s utility, as opposed to 
typical neoclassical theory of shareholders utility maximisation, which then generates risk 
aversion, and habit formations among managers. Again habit formations in particular 
motivates the managers to initiate dividend smoothing (such a suggestion has been 
provided by Fundenberg and Tirole (1995) who proposed that smoothing is based on 
maximising a concave managerial utility function). In recent models too smoothing is 
generated from endogenous objective functions. 
 
Dividend smoothing can also be generated from maintaining of optimal managerial 
incentives. Chang (1993), Fundenberg and Tirole (1995) among others have established 
dividend smoothing models based on such considerations. For example in Chang (1993) 
managers can extract direct utility from over spending the retained earnings, hence to prevent 
managers from overspending smoothing of dividends can be linked to pay outs. Overall there 
is some overspending in the model, but dividends are smoothed with relative to the cash 
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flows. Hence the last model shows that retained earnings, which is also a life cycle variable 
as explained in the first section of this thesis, can play a critical role in smoothing.  
 
There can be dividend smoothing relative to share prices (Shiller, 1981), which actually 
reflects the residual cash flow. If value increases of share prices then the incentive for 
managerial perquisites decreases. Hence the increase in sensitivity of share price to value 
realization is simultaneous with the sensitivity of dividend decreases. 
 
There can be incentive for dividend smoothing when investment and external capital 
requirements are introduced. In these studies (as suggested by Loderer and Mauer, 1992) 
there is a strict requirement for the firms to maintain contemporaneous dividend pay outs 
even when the firms are constrained to raise external capital for investments, and such 
behaviours do generate dividend smoothing70. 
 
Again firms whose stocks are known to be undervalued always have an incentive to signal 
their profitability through the increase of dividends. However to make the signal credible 
firms usually need to smooth dividends if and only they can maintain increased earnings 
(Guttman et al, 2010). Its standard to think that due to adverse selection cost of equity capital 
in the capital markets the over all cost of external capital increases, and therefore there is a 
strong incentive for the managers to hoard large free cash flow. In general this cash flow 
requirement makes the managers constrained from increasing dividends during the periods of 
good performances. 
 
Based on such considerations Gugler (2003) shows that speed of dividend adjustment 
is associated with the information asymmetry and agency conflict. 
To summarize the general studies the following strands can be specified, one, 
information asymmetry based models which suggests dividend smoothing as costly 
signals to solve adverse selection, and or moral hazard problems in a dynamic setting, 
                                                          
70 In the current thesis the inclusion of share repurchase data is also based on the external capital market need. 
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two, pure agency based models which uses managerial incentives like rent seeking to 
generate dividend smoothing (here also an argument can be provided that such agency 
conflicts are also based on information asymmetry problem ultimately), and three, 
incentive based models where external financing needs along with maintaining 
dividend pay outs is present. 
3.2.3 Empirical literature of dividend smoothing 
 
 
In a frictionless capital market scenario firms would always maintain their target pay out 
ratios, however as author (Oliver et al, 2015) observe that in presence of various frictions 
(information asymmetry, or opacity level being one such) there is a trade off faced by the 
firms, i.e. if the adjustment costs are significant then whether to adjust towards the target pay 
out level or to keep operating at a sub optimal level (Flannery and Rangan, 2006). For 
banking firms such study has been done of late where the adjustment process studied is for 
leverage, however, no such study has been undertaken for dividend pay outs. 
Empirical literature (Leary & Michaely, 2011) shows that dividends paid by firms are not 
stochastic but follow smoothing. Managers first decide whether to set a new target for 
dividend pay-out, which might be measured in terms of per share, and then partially adjust to 
the target level. Leary & Michaely (2011) argue that insider managers first decide whether its 
cost effective to shift from the existing dividend policy and then only set a new target. 
However, researchers do not agree on the factors impacting the decision of a firm to smooth 
dividends. Till date there have been many theoretical models formulated to rationalise 
dividend smoothing behaviour, they can be clubbed as information asymmetry 
theories(Kumar, 1988, Kumar &Lee, 2001,Brenman & Thakor,1990 Guttman etal, 2010), 
agency cost theories(Fndenberg &Tirole,1995, DeMarzo & Sannikov, 2008, DeMarzo et 
al,2006), and external capital constraints theories(Almedia etal, 2004, Bates etal, 2009). 
Another critical point to observe is though the possible explanations are drawn from diverse 
theories all of them have opacity as the central cause. 
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Impact of agency conflict- Specifically the agency cost associated with free cash flow 
problem is explored. Here in general greater is the free cash flow problem; greater is the 
propensity of the firms to signal dividends71.  
Impact of external financing constraints: This strand holds that for those firms who faces high 
cost of external capital, they sigh away from increasing dividends, rather they set low 
dividend targets and smooth out. Again related studies for banking firms are rare to cite. 
Firms which are at the growth phase and also face higher cost of external capital set low 
dividend targets, and then signal whereas Firms which are matured, and have greater agency 
conflict due to free cash flow problem set higher targets, and smooth out. However as already 
observed these problems can generate from the fundamental problem of high degree of 
information asymmetry72.  
The previous section explored the impact of opacity on dividend pay outs by banks, and 
investigated the same from the perspectives of signaling and smoothing hypotheses, however 
there is a diverse literature on various kinds of pay out smoothing by firms where dividend 
smoothing is also one sub group. Again there are many underlying theoretical perspectives 
on the cause of partial adjustment or smoothing. 
 
The current section extends the earlier section mainly in two directions, one, here the 
emphasis is on bank specific factors including bank specific opacity levels on bank specific 
speeds of adjustments which certainly calls for various sub sample investigations which is 
duly reported, and two, along with dividend smoothing other pay out variables, namely, 
total dividend payout which includes both cash and stock dividends, and total payout 
                                                          
71 Critical point to note is that the problem generates from the inability of the outside shareholders to monitor 
efficiently the insider managers which is a direct consequence of opacity level. However, for banks the degree of 
complexity is more, since many parties are involved, like insiders, depositors, investors, borrowers, regulators, 
and society at large (due to externality issues). 
 
72 Recently Onali (2009) has analysed the impact of life cycle factors on dividend pay outs by banking firms. In 
the studies mentioned in the table dividend signaling is used in the form of smoothing out dividends, hence 
these studies have analysed the impact of opacity, and other lifecycle factors on the intensity of smoothing by 
the firms. 
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variable, which includes share repurchase data, have also been investigated. 
 
This section then is a more elaborate study of smoothing, where there are scopes of 
investigating multiple theoretical implications73.  
 
Specifically, the current section based on both univariate and dynamic panel data analysis of 
bank holding companies pay out policies (as obtained from COMPUSTAT and CRSP 
merged data base which has been explained earlier) have observed the following results: 
1. When the sample is split across the median values of bank specific opacity levels, namely, 
across median values of size, tangibility, turn over, and spread, it is found that the bank 
specific adjustment speeds (related to dividend per share, total dividend pay outs, and total 
pay outs as defined earlier) differ significantly with the opacity levels(at 1% level), which 
lends support to the earlier section where average speed of smoothing was found to be 
impacted significantly by average opacity level across the sample.  
2. Continuing with this univariate analysis, it is also found that specific target levels set by 
specific banks are also impacted significantly by the opacity levels, and the differences in 
the target levels for the banks above and below the median levels of opacity measures 
(tangibility, spread, size and turnover) is significant (at 1% level), specifically, banks with 
greater than median size has higher targets than the other half, and the difference is 
significant, banks with greater than median tangibility has lower targets , difference being 
significant, banks with higher than median spread has higher targets, and banks with 
higher than median turnover has lower targets, all differences are significant at 1% level. 
Hence such univariate subsample analysis also lends support to the signaling theory/ 
hypothesis, however other factors for example agency theory, life cycle theory, and 
managerial behavioral perspectives are also implied which are discussed in details later. 
The dynamic partial adjustment model has been improved in this section by introducing 
                                                          
73 Again to the best of the knowledge of the author the current thesis is first of its kind in providing detailed 
investigations on the similar line for the banking firms. In the current section the standard convention is adapted 
based on Leary and Michely (2011) which holds that greater smoothing implies lower adjustment speeds. Hence 
the interpretations of results will be based on the very convention. 
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both bank specific and exogenous variables, and then a three step estimation has been 
carried out where the impact of bank specific opacity levels on the target pay out levels 
are being analyzed. 
3.2.4 Implication of dividend smoothing: Various perspectives a brief review 
 
 
Brav et al (2005) provided evidence based on their comprehensive sample that 90% of the 
CFOs practice smoothing of dividends on an annual basis and avoid omitting or cutting 
dividends74.  
 
Studies done till the early half of the 2000 (Ahorany and Swary, 1980, Loderer and Mauer, 
1992, Nissim and Ziv, 2001) have all observed that at an average 80% of the sample firms 
have not changed annual dividends, and such persistence in the pay outs supports the 
signaling hypothesis that under information asymmetry the market participants places 
significant premium on the firms which practices smoothing. Guttmann et al (2010) have 
provided a comprehensive survey of all COMPUSTAT firms where the finding is that 25% 
of such firms have practiced smoothing spanning across all sectors. 
 
One important lacuna in the earlier dividend signaling models (Bernheim, 1991, 
Bhattacharya, 1979, John and Williams, 1985) has been the inability to include and analyses 
other types of pay out policies as signals, for example the share repurchases along with 
dividend pay outs. Allen et al (2000), Allen et al (2002), have observed that significant 
number of firms have preferred dividend pay outs to share repurchases as signals, which can 
be explained by the clientele effect. For example when the institutional investors faces 
relatively less taxation on dividends than the retail investors, they get attracted more to firms 
paying dividends, again its also true that there has been a significant rise in the institutional 
holdings in all developed markets, and specifically in USA. 
                                                          
74 This perspective has also been observed for banking firms during crisis period too. The main proposition 
for dividend smoothing has been the signaling hypothesis (Baker and Powell, 1999, Bernheim, 1991) which 
holds that under information asymmetry scenario market participants place a significant premium on those 
firms which practice stability or gradual growth rate in dividends. 
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The problem with such models is that they are static theoretical models which are incapable 
of capturing dynamic pay out behaviors. There are earlier theoretical models too which 
predicts dividend persistence even when there are small changes in underlying productivities 
in firms (Kumar, 1988). Garret and Priestley (2000) provides a cost benefit analysis of 
dividend smoothing, where they show that if there are increase on earnings on a permanent 
basis then there is less than one third of increase in the dividend pay outs. 
 
In recent times agency cost theory has been considered as the driving force behind dividend 
smoothing (as in Lambrecht and Myers, 2012), and the authors argue that it’s the total pay 
out which is smoothed over time, which includes dividends and net share repurchases. The 
theoretical implication is also that managers want to smooth their rents or consumptions, 
since they are financially constrained they prefer non-volatile and smooth overall 
consumption. Hence the insider manager would practice a smooth rent consumption which 
would further lead to smoothing of pay outs. 
 
 
Amidst the financial crisis of 2007-, and specifically in banking sector surveys have been 
done to provide evidence of correlation of higher default risks with the stable dividend pay 
outs. Even earlier papers (Kumar and Lee, 2001) have observed that in general high default 
probabilities (measured by interest cover ratios, or cash to current liability ratio) are 
positively associated with stable dividend smoothing policies, and such observations are at 
odds with the 
standard costly signaling theory, where dividend smoothing can be viewed as dynamic 
signaling to solve adverse selection and or moral hazard problems. 
 
 
 
 
Javakhadze et al (2014) have provided a comprehensive analysis of dividend smoothing by 
firms across countries, and have found evidence for agency costs and information 
asymmetry as the prime determinants of dynamic dividend behaviors. One important 
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suggestion by the study is that there is a simultaneous impact of agency cost and information 
asymmetry on smoothing behavior. Allen et al. (2000); Fudenberg and Tirole( 1995) have 
earlier provided the theoretical base for rationalizing dividend smoothing as a tool for 
mitigating manager-shareholder agency conflict, which is also called as type1 agency 
conflict. Such a theoretical model would predict that dividends in the very scenario of type 1 
agency conflict would be stable and predictable75. 
 
Hence firms which face greater agency conflict would smooth dividends more to mitigate 
the same. Since pay outs reduce free cash flow the practice of smoothing might also 
incentivize the firms to raise external capital more frequently which would expose them to 
market monitoring, hence again mitigating agency conflicts. Easterbrook (1984) and Jensen( 
1986) have predicted smoothing behaviors in their seminal studies on agency costs76. 
 
Dividend are more important for banks, and as observed by recent studies for example, Floyd 
et al (2015), banks do not show any propensity of declining dividends, except in crisis periods. 
                                                          
75 In banking industry there can be other type of agency conflict too, which is among the different creditor 
groups, for example between the share holders and the depositor or non deposit creditor groups, hence the 
problem of risk shifting becomes critical. The current literature is not clear on whether the risk shifting is 
related to such different types of agency problems. 
76 Javakhadze et al (2014) have specifically found positive significant impact of tangibility at firm level on the 
speed of adjustments of dividend pay outs, again significant negative impact of stock turn over and size on the 
speed of adjustments (SOA). The authors claim that such impacts do lend support to both agency cost and 
information asymmetry theory as discussed above. 
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However based on the studies of dividend pay outs in the crisis period it is not clear that 
whether there was a significant change in the smoothing of pay outs during the crisis, 
specifically in the period 2007-09. 
More specifically the current thesis investigates whether there has been a significant 
slowing down of speeds of adjustments of pay outs across banks and over time periods, 
which may have further implications from the perspective of signaling theory. To the 
best of the authors’ knowledge partial adjustment behaviour of banking firms across the 
crisis period has not been studied from the perspective of value signaling, or signaling 
of financial strengths. In the remaining half of the review some recent observations on 
the dynamic dividend pay outs of banking firms is explored. 
 
First its important to note that banking firms also do share repurchase, as has been 
investigated in the current thesis, but the general observations suggest that share repurchase 
volume is nearly one third of the dividend pay outs, and has never exceeded bank dividend 
pay outs. There can be signaling implications of the same, for example as observed by Floyd 
et al (2015), Skinner (2008) among others, dividend pay out generally implies commitment 
from the managerial perspective, there is an implied steady dividend pay put policy for the 
banks who pay regular dividends as relative to stochastic underlying earnings, such 
commitment may not be observed for share repurchases. 
Floyd et al (2015) have observed that the majority of banks in developed countries have 
reduced dividends in crisis, however the speed of adjustments have been very slow. In terms 
of smoothing it can be said that banks have exhibited greater smoothing (following the 
definition of smoothing as in Leary and Michael (2011)). 
Before the crisis period however, for example from 2001 onwards, there have been an 
upsurge in the dividend pay outs and the share repurchases also, both for the banking firms 
and the industrial firms. But as Floyd et al (2015) reports that unlike industrial firms even 
though the share repurchases have increased many fold dividend pay outs have always been 
126 
 
greater in volume77. For example the same authors observe that the pay outs for banks have 
increased from $34 billion in 1998 for US banks to $71 billion in 2007. 
 
That the dividends pay out by banks have always been considered as to be a commitment for the 
managers (Lintner 1956, Brav et al, 2005, De Angelo et al, 2008) provides two most important 
explanations for dividends from the perspective of banks, one, since bank dividends are ongoing 
commitments they may help reduce agency costs of free cash flow (Jensen, 1986), there can be 
other forms of expropriation which dividends can help mitigate for example tunnelling which is 
mostly observed in the closely held firms of emerging markets (La Porta et al, 1998, 1999), 
Dittmar et al( 2003), however this form of expropriation is different from the free cash flow 
agency cost which is observed in the firms with dispersed share holders owners, second, bank 
dividends should signal managers confidence in the underlying profitability and financial strength 
(Miller and Rock, 1985; Baker et al, 2012). 
 
The current thesis also draws upon the related literature which explains why banking firms are 
fundamentally different from the non-banking industrial firms, for example as observed by Berger 
et al (1995), Calomiris and Wilson (2004), Diamond and Dybvig (1983), Kashyap et al (2002), 
Laven (2013). These authors have pointed that since banks face liquidity risk problem due to 
mismatch of assets and liability maturity, and since banks are more opaque such that it is 
harder for the information sensitive investors to ascertain values to banks assets it is implied 
that banks have a natural tendency to signal via pay outs. 
 
There is another striking feature as observed by Floyd et al (2015), i.e. the banks are a more 
homogenous group as compared to the industrial firms, which make them more vulnerable 
to an economic shock, and this feature reinforces the value of dividend as signals. 
 
There are two contradicting theories on the reluctance of the banks to cut back dividends 
and repurchases during crisis period, one theory is of risk shifting (Acharya, Li and Shin, 
                                                          
77 Hence one may observe that banks have used both types of pay out policies to the share holders, however it 
is intriguing to note whether opacity levels have impacted such different pay outs in similar or different ways. 
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2013; Hirtle 2014; Rosengren, 2010) which is met with mixed evidence and this theory is 
further investigated in the current thesis in the later sections, the second theory is as 
suggested in recent studies like Forti and Schozer (2015), or Acharya, Gujral, Kulkarni, and 
Shin (2011), that banks reluctance to cut dividends can be explained by their ongoing need 
to signal value or financial strength. 
 
Recent studies suggest that industrial and banking firms both have increased various pay out 
types during the last decade, and this trend has remained strong till the beginning of the last 
financial crisis. However as Floyd et al (2015) have suggested that the evolution of pay out 
strategies for banks are different than non-banking industrial firms over the last 30 years. 
 
Specifically for the industrial firms dividends have been concentrated for those firms who 
also have done repurchases for the last decade. 
 
The same authors suggest that persistence of dividend pay outs for the industrial firms may 
be explained better by the free cash flow cost theory of Jensen (1986), which also coincides 
with the life cycle explanations, less so from the perspective of Pecking order theory, and 
neoclassical signaling theory of firm value, for example such explanations is valid for the 
industries dominated by large and matured firms (De Angelo, De Angelo and Skinner, 2008). 
 
For such large and matured firms it is observed that the dividend increase is rare, but the pay 
out policy is very persistent with managerial reluctance to cut back dividends. Certainly 
dividend smoothing or pay out smoothing in general is what exhibited by such large and 
matured public firms. Recent studies, for example, by Leary and Michealy (2011), or 
Michaely and Roberts (2012) have supported the dividend smoothing theory for the industrial 
firms. However in the same studies there have been less support from the signaling or 
information asymmetry (mainly adverse selection of equity capital) theory. 
 
On the other hand a scarce literature on the persistence of bank dividend signaling has shown 
greater compatibility with the neoclassical signaling theory, i.e. as Floyd et al (2015) 
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summaries that the most plausible explanation for the bank dividend pay outs is the use of 
dividends as costly signals for signaling the future financial strength. However there is a gap 
in the empirical literature to investigate the bank dividend smoothing phenomenon form the 
perspective of bank specific characteristics, for example, liquidity risk, solvency risk, capital 
adequacy, leverage etc78. Bliss et al (2015) is another related study. 
 
The study by Floyd et al (2015) have suggested that over the last 30 years the banks have not 
cut dividends in general, and the banks have increased their dividend per share level (also the 
main pay out variable in the current thesis) in larger amount and more frequently as compared 
to the industrial firms. Whereas the share repurchases by banking firms are different than the 
industrial firms, since the mix of dividend pay outs and share repurchases for banks is always 
inclined towards the dividend pay outs, as opposed to the case of the industrial firms in the 
last 30 years79. However there is a gap in the standard literature in investigating the 
information content of smoothing via repurchases.  
Another striking difference between the characteristics of firms paying out dividends is that if 
for the industrial firms mainly the large and matured firms pay out dividends, and also exhibit 
smoothing of dividends, for banks the signaling and smoothing of dividends is across board, 
over all sizes and all phases of maturity (more to be discussed in the descriptive statistics 
sections in the appendix). 
 
Overall the study by Floyd et al (2015) shows that the persistence of bank dividends have 
been compatible with the persistence and rise of share repurchases. The main difference of 
explanations of dividend pay outs and pay outs in general between banks and industrial firms 
come from the signaling and agency cost theories. However these studies have not 
comprehensively investigated the impact of such theories on the adjustment processes of the 
                                                          
78 As we have noted earlier theoretically banks are different since the signaling of liquidity and solvency is an 
important issue faced by BHCs. 
79 This point makes the substitution hypothesis between dividends and share repurchases intriguing for bank 
holding firms, since perfect substitution may not be possible. However the information content of pay outs is 
important to investigate. 
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pay outs specifically80. 
 
 
Main stream studies on dividend smoothing have ignored the implication of pay out 
smoothing in general, for example whether share repurchases also follow a smooth policy. 
This thesis investigates the information content of bank share repurchases also along with the 
dividend pay outs, hence partial adjustment of share repurchases by banks have also been 
studied here, the main focus has been to bring forth the similarities and differences between 
the information contents of these different types of banks pay out policies. 
 
There is a strong literature on the implications of share repurchases for the capital markets as 
discussed in Andriosopoulos et al (2013). There is a consistent study of positive market 
reaction to the announcement of share repurchases, for example by Varmaelen (1981), 
Ikenberry et al (1995), Chen et al (2002). There is some degree of argument on whether 
share repurchases are different from dividend pay outs as signals to the market, since it is 
assumed that dividends are costly commitments for the firms whereas share repurchases 
don’t entail such commitments, hence it can be rendered costless. 
 
However later Bhattacharya and Dittmar (2001) have argued that there is a considerable 
degree of market scrutiny after the buy back announcements are made so that bad firms 
(with weak financial prospects) can not easily mimic the good firms, hence if the buy back 
announcements are credible, i.e. firms really honor their announcements over time, there can 
be consistent positive response by the capital markets. 
 
 
Recently Andriosopolous et al (2013) have found information disclosure and CEO over 
confidence are the main determinants of the buy back programs. However the same study has 
not specified the information content of buy backs if they are really signaling tools. 
                                                          
80 There is certainly another factor, investment opportunity, namely which can also explain the aggregate 
distributions of dividends. As the same authors observe, due to the increase in uncertainty in the investments it 
may have been optimal for many firms in general to increase pay outs to mitigate further agency problems. 
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3.2.4 Firm specific variables: impact on speed of adjustments across firms 
 
 
Size: Frank and Goyal (2003, 2004, 2007,2008), Lemmon and Zender (2010) among others 
have observed that since the larger and matured firms are relatively more reputed they might 
face less information asymmetry, hence they might smooth dividends less (which again 
means they are not required to adjust dividends as slowly as compared to relatively highly 
opaque and smaller firms). However its also well known (since Jensen, 1986) that larger firms 
face greater agency cost problems, like free cash flow problem, which might again have a 
positive influence of dividend smoothing behavior by them. Fama and French (2002), Lang 
and Litzenberger (1989),81 have used related measures either to proxy for agency cost or 
overinvestment problems. Hence as regard size the net impact is uncertain82. 
 
 
 
 
Tangibility: Harris and Raviv (1991) were the first among scholars to use the asset tangibility 
values as a proxy for opacity level, later in various smoothing studies (Leary and Micheil , 
2011, Javakhadze et al (2014) ) tangibility has been used regularly as one determinant for the 
dividend adjustments. Since tangibility is negatively correlated with opacity level, the 
common finding is there is a negative impact of tangibility on smoothing. Market to book 
value has also been used in the same context. However its also known that market value often 
captures investor sentiments (Chatterjee et al, 201283) which is difficult to rationalize and 
hence might not be a good candidate for investigating the real purposes of dividend 
smoothing84. 
Volatility measures: Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996), O’Hara (2003) among others 
                                                          
81 In this paper the authors have brought out the inherent conflicts between the predictions of signaling theory 
visa vi other theories like pecking order and free cash flow theories.  
82 We can observe here that the relation between size and opacity is not very direct, since if we consider the 
standard adverse selection problem then it should be that smaller and less reputed firms face more adverse 
selection cost, however for large firms there may be a problem of suboptimal monitoring by the external 
shareholders, which is more of a moral hazard problem. 
83 One such measure is diversity of investor opinions, which is not one to one correlated with adverse selection 
problem. 
84 Intangibility is another alternative variable, which has been used in the last section. 
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have used the volatility measures like stock price volatility as both information asymmetry 
and risk measures. However here again the stock market volatility might not be always 
positively correlated with fundamental information asymmetry level, or agency cost 
problems. Investor sentiments might play important roles in inflating such measures too. 
One alternative measure has been bid-ask spread for stocks (JavaKhdze etal (2014)) which 
is argued to be positively correlated with the opacity levels. 
 
Analysts forecast: Lang and Lundholm (1996) were among the first academics to use 
dispersion of analysts forecast measure as a proxy for information asymmetry. There is a long 
strand of theoretical (Miller, 1977) as well as empirical studies (as summarized succinctly in 
Chaterjee etal, 2012) which have investigated the impact of such diapersion measures on 
stock price returns. The studies are still undecided on the underlying explanation for the 
impact, there might be information asymmetry led problems, for example, adverse selection 
issues in financial markets which might be reflected in dispersion measures, or, as Chatterjee 
etal (2012) argue, these measures might also reflect investor optimism. Hence inclusion of 
such measures as determinants of dividend adjustments might not be rational, even though 
some authors have investigated in the same line (Leary and Micheil , 2011). 
 
 
 
 
Alternative information asymmetry type’s measure: Babenko, Tserlukevich, and 
Vedrashko (2009) among others have used the measure of no of analysts forecasting for an 
individual firm as an information asymmetry measure among the investors, for example 
between the retail and institutional investors. Such measures are based on the information 
asymmetry theories by scholars like Brennan and Thakor (1990)85.  
 
                                                          
85 However in the current investigation information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders is emphasized, 
since that seems to impact dividend policies or pay out policies at large more directly. Hence any further 
investigations on the impact of institutional holdings on smoothing and signaling has to be based on the 
fundamental information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders. 
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Institutional holdings: Hotchkiss and Lawrence (2007), Ferreira, Massa, and Matos (2009). 
Allen, Bernardo, and Welch (2000) among others have also used institutional holdings for 
specific firms as a proxy for information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders, the basic 
theoretical underpinning is that bigger institutions are better monitors of the insider managers 
hence in effect should be reducing agency/ information related problems. However one 
should also recall the literature on conflict between the various shareholder groups (Brennan 
and Thakor (1990)) mainly institutional investors versus retail investors86.  
 
3.2.5 Evidence on smoothing of total pay outs: 
 
 
Fama and French (2001), Grullon and Michaely (2002) among others have noted that pay out 
policies of firms should be considered more broadly including the share repurchase data. 
These authors hold that at least theoretically dividend smoothing theory can also be extended 
to total payout smoothing, or, as Leary and Micheal (2011) finds agency problems and 
information asymmetry led problems (adverse selection/ moral hazard) might be mitigated by 
greater smoothing of total pay outs. 
 
There has been a recent growing literature for non-financial firms’ (Jagannathan, Stephens, 
and Weisbach (1999)) share repurchase behavior and its impact on dividend smoothing. Here 
again Leary and Michail (2011) based on COMPUSTAT data base have provided evidence 
for the phenomenon that firms which practice less share repurchase have higher speeds of 
adjustments, hence smooth less. Hence it can be expected that total pay out smoothing 
including share repurchases should have similar characteristics as dividend smoothing alone. 
 
Boudoukh et al. (2007) among others have provided empirical evidence for total pay out 
smoothing relatively more than the dividend smoothing, the authors have conjectured that 
firms might be focused on time series properties of total pay outs rather than dividend s alone. 
                                                          
86 Hence its not completely clear that whether the presence of institutional holdings will naturally resolve agency 
problems between all shareholders groups and the managers. 
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However, Skinner (2008), and then Leary (2011) have shown that firms smooth dividends 
more than the total pay outs, which means that the median speed of adjustment and volatility 
of total pay out smoothing is significantly greater than that of dividend smoothing87. 
  
 
3.2.6 Impact of life cycle variables on dividend smoothing 
 
 
Life cycle hypothesis (De ANgelo, et al 2006) proposes that firms which are in the early 
growth stage as reflected in relatively lower retained earnings to total asset mix (in some 
studies retained earnings to total equity mix) have to rely more on the external capital, 
where as firms with relatively greater values of the mix are in the maturity stage of life 
cycle, and hence are better candidates for paying dividends. However in this context it's 
worth recalling that matured firms also do face greater free cash flow problem or in other 
words greater agency costs. Hence to mitigate agency cost these firms might pay greater 
dividends, and also maintain steady dividend pay out policy. 
 
Though there are rare studies on the impact of life cycle phase on dividend smoothing, it. 
can be conjectured that since matured firms face greater agency cost they might smooth 
more. Denis and Osobof (2008) also observed that the propensity to pay dividends is 
positively associated with size, growth opportunities and profitability. Hence as noted 
earlier size can also be a proxy for agency cost problem. 
New studies (Abrue and Golamhussen 2013, Hsiao and Tseng, 2015) have investigated the 
dividend pay out behaviours by the bank holding companies of the US and other European 
countries during the 2007-2009 financial crsis. most of the studies have found support for the 
dividend signaling, and smoothing based on various underlying hypotheses, for example from 
the standard signaling hypotheses to lifecycle hypothesis. The later holds that for the more 
profitable, less growing, and larger matured banks the propensity to pay dividends are 
                                                          
87 For banking firms though we do not have such detailed study as of yet. 
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more. However a direct impact of such factors on the dynamic dividend adjustment has not 
been tested as of yet. 
 
Cziraki et al (2015) have provided fresh evidence that US banks have reduced share 
repurchases during 2007-09 but there is no such cut or omission in dividends until 2009. the 
same authors have not found any excessive dividend pay outs as compared to the bank 
fundamentals during the same period, as is claimed by some theoretical papers (Acharya 
2012, 2013). 
 
Again the relatively better performing banks have rather enhanced pay outs, which might 
again relate to the signaling implications for dividends. As the current thesis has also 
observed that adjustments should be perceived from a much broader perspective of various 
types of pay outs, for example stock dividends, cash dividends, as well as share repurchases, 
Floyd (2014) have observed that adjustments happened mainly via reducing share 
repurchases for the period 2007-09, during this period there were rare cuts and omissions in 
dividend pay outs, it is only after 2009 that there were some minor rise in the dividend cut 
backs by banks which was always warranted from the capital regulation requirements. 
 
Cziraki et al (2015) have modelled the propensity to pay out dividends by banks according to 
Fama and Fench (2001), and De Angelo (2006) to investigate whether the dividend pay outs 
during the crisis period was excessive or not, to which they have found the answer is 
negative. However, one also should consider that the models on which the very paper is based 
have mainly life cycle factors as the determinants of dividends, but no opacity measures and 
regulatory measures are used as explanatory variables. This point is worth noting since again 
referring back to Flannery et al (2010) banks become relatively more opaque during the crisis 
periods, hence the impact of such increase in opacity on pay out adjustments is an 
intriguing area which has not been explored.  
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3.2.7Recent empirical studies 
 
 
Recently authors (Al-Malkawai et al, 2014) have deployed Litner’s model of dividend 
smoothing with some extensions, namely, censored regression models for example panel 
data TOBIT models to test the impact of several firms specific, as well as regulatory, or 
country specific factors on the speed of adjustment of dividend pay outs, as well as the 
signaling implications of dividend pay outs. For example the above mentioned study has 
found that the firms listed on Muscat stock market exchange follow a stable dividend pay 
out policy, or persistence of dividend pay outs, which is continued even in the global 
financial crisis period. 
 
Again firm specific factors for example ownership structure and agency conflict have 
significant impact on the dividend smoothing behaviors of firms. However this study has not 
directly studied the impact of opacity levels on the signaling as well as smoothing behavior 
of pay outs, but only has observed that the average speed of adjustment of Muscat firms is 
significantly lower than that of the developed country’s’ listed firms. 
 
However the study has not provided any justification for the very finding, the current author 
suspects there can be significant differences in agency conflict levels among firms listed at 
developed and less developed markets which is again driven by the differences in 
information asymmetry levels, hence there are differences in speed of adjustments too. In 
later sections more rigorous study will be done based on the firm specific adjustment speeds 
rather than average (and biased from the perspective of econometric modelling) speed 
of adjustment. 
 
Jvakhadze et al (2014) have provided a cross country based (2000 firms spanning 24 
nations) evidence of significant impact of agency conflict and opacity levels on the dividend 
persistence, which indicates clearly that higher levels of these firm specific characteristics 
have a slowing down impact on smoothing, or firms with higher agency conflicts (expressed 
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in free cash flow problems in one such examples) practice slower adjustments of dividend 
pay outs. 
 
The authors also argue (based on Funden burg and Tirole, 1995) that such slower adjustment 
of dividends act as efficient signals to the outsiders about the solvency, or, future financial 
prospects of the firms. However there some inconsistencies in the paper since the direct 
impact of opacity measures, such as asset tangibility level, or turnover levels have opposite 
impact on the speed of adjustment as predicted by the underlying theories. This finding 
seems to be explained less clearly by the authors since opacity levels and agency conflict 
levels ought to have deep positive correlations. 
 
In similar papers ((Lang and Litzenberger, 1989, Fama and French, 2002, Michaely and 
Roberts 2012) free cash flow problem has been emphasized, where as a proxy for measure 
of free cash flow, market to book value, or logarithm of total assets, or free cash flow scaled 
by total assets have been used. Every measure has been found to have significant impact on 
the speed of adjustment. 
 
Allen at al (2000) in addition argue that once the companies which have higher dividend 
levels are more attractive to institutional investors who further want managers to smooth 
dividends more. In general (as observed by Jvakhadze et al 2014) dividend smoothing 
theory suggests that the industries, or firms, which are more opaque, or have greater 
uncertainty  
about their asset valuations will smooth dividend more. The same paper has observed a 
positive significant relationship between the mean return volatilities of industries and the 
measure of dividend smoothing for those industries. Banking industry is however not 
studied in the very work. 
Implications of dividend signaling for banking industry has been studied occasionally (by 
this the author mean that not as frequently as for the non financial firms in general). There 
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have been some seminal empirical studies for USA based banking firms, for example, in, 
Mayne (1980), Boldin and Leggett (1995), Bessler and Nohel (1996, 2000), Basse et al 
(2014) and authors have been divided on the issue that whether dividend signaling should 
be treated as a more effective means for gaining investor confidence that retain earnings 
more, or even cut back pay outs to strengthen the capital base. 
 
However recent industry reports, for example, by Federal Reserve in USA during the 
period of 2012 onwards have witnessed dividend persistence by the banking firms88.  
Basse et al (2014) have argued (based on earlier theoretical studies, for example, Allen, 2001) 
that in banking industry dividend signaling and or smoothing may have different implications as 
compared to the suggestions by standard signaling literature. On one hand there is a dire need 
for solvency and strengthening capital base mainly during the crisis period, hence there are 
recommendations for cutting back or even omitting dividends, on the other hand, there are 
typical concerns by the investors that cutting back dividends or deviating from stable dividend 
pay out policy might indicate weak financial prospects in future. Hence banking firms have 
to decide which path to adopt based on a rigorous cost-benefit analysis89.  
 
Again reality seems to be quite different, for example if we turn to Acharya et al (2011) we 
find that even amidst the worse phases of financial crisis banks have been quite persistent 
with dividend policies, exhibiting signaling and smoothing (though the authors have mainly 
provided a comprehensive survey of dividend policies rather than explaining/ analyzing 
signaling or smoothing mechanisms). 
 
                                                          
88 Recently Goddard et al (2006), Reddemann et al (2010), have proposed VAR (vector 
auto regression modelling) based modelling to investigate the factors impacting dividend 
signaling by banks. 
 
89 The same authors following econometric approach suggested by Reddmann et al ( 2010) 
have reached the conclusion that signaling and smoothing of dividends for banks are of 
secondary importance as compared to capital base strengthening. However, its entirely not 
clear that whether this conclusion is valid for all periods, or is it critical mainly in financial 
crisis periods. 
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There have been some alternative explanations for dividend persistence by banks during 
crisis period too, for example Acharya et al (2011) have argued that banks might shift risk 
from share holders to depositors via dividend pay outs, or in other words shift wealth in the 
opposite direction. Hence there can be further consequences of pay outs in such manners. 
This section will not focus on risk shifting specifically, however later in the thesis there will 
be opportunities to present some analysis on the same. 
 
Imran et al (2013) provide a recent evidence of dividend smoothing by the listed banks on 
Karachi stock exchange in Pakistan. The authors have found the firm level variables for 
example, size, last periods dividend pay outs, earnings per share, capital ratio among 
others have strong positive significant impact on pay outs, cash flow as expected has 
negative significant impact. 
 
The authors have found support for the Linters’ original hypotheses, as well as transaction cost 
hypotheses. The authors have found that banks in their sample have followed a stable or 
persistent dividend pay out policy, rather than omitting or cutting back even in the periods 
of financial crisis. Justification for such persistence lies in the agency conflict theory, where 
dividend smoothing can be effectively deployed to mitigate intensity of conflicts among 
agents and principals90. 
3.2.8 A brief account of risk shifting behaviours by banking firms through dividend pay 
outs: Empirics 
 
Amidst the financial crisis (2007-2009) there have been some critical surveys of dividend 
payout policies which throws insights into incentives of insider managers to practice risk 
shifting. In corporate finance the basic principle dictates that the shareholders are the 
                                                          
90 Basse et al (2014) though have observed that signaling and smoothing are relatively less 
significant or ‘important’ economic phenomena for the banks there has been no strong 
justification for so, more over their findings are at odds with other industry reports and 
studies which observe dividend persistence even in crisis episodes. 
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residual claimants and creditors have the seniority in claims, however when under extreme 
circumstances the creditor group is deprived by shifting huge wealth towards the 
shareholders group risk shifting occurs. Acharya et al (2011) observes that there has been 
structural shift in the capital structure of banks (USA based) during 2007-09 from common 
equity to debt like hybrid claims, for example preferred equity and subordinate debts. Such 
corrosion of common equity base has been aggravated by persistence of dividend payments 
during crisis, and under financial distress conditions. 
 
The authors further propose that dwindling common equity base might have been the main 
reason for the banking firms to be reluctant in lending further. Hence risk shifting in such 
manner has further policy implications. In a similar study Abrue and Gulamhussen (2013) 
find that the regulatory pressure has been ineffective for the undercapitalized banks to limit 
dividend pay outs amidst the crisis. 
 
However commentators are not in agreement over whether such persistence of 
dividend pay outs can have only risk shifting implications, for example, Floyd et al 
(2014) have also documented comprehensively the persistence of dividend pay outs 
(as contrary to dividend cuts and omissions by non-financial firms) by US banking 
firms over 2007-09, however their perspective is that such dynamic behaviors might 
also convey costly signals to the market regarding future financial prospect 
(standard signaling theory), given that the market participants systematically 
respond negatively to the dividend omissions. 
 
Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009) on the contrary have provided evidence for increase in cash 
holdings by industrial firms in the same economy. Hence it is unclear that why signaling 
implications would not hold for industrial firms. Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007; 
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Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson, 201391, among others also observe similar behavior by 
industrial firms. Hence simple signaling theory is incapable of such dynamic behaviors, 
mainly during crisis period. 
 
Floyd et al (2014) also provides critical survey for stable dividend payout patterns by both 
industrial and banking firms. Over a considerable period of time (1981-99) the fraction of banks 
which actually increased annual dividend per share increased by 74%, though that fraction 
decreased during 2007-09, but the overall fraction of banks which kept increasing dividend per 
share remained above 60%, which is significantly higher than the median value. 
 
One limitation of such studies is that though dividend pay outs have been investigated partial 
adjustment or dividend smoothing has not been studied in this context. Hence an obvious 
question generates what is the impact of default risk on smoothing behaviors by banking 
firms? This question will also be addressed briefly in the current section (which is explored 
in details later in the thesis). 
 
3.2.9 Agency conflict theoretic explanation of dividend smoothing 
 
 
Though the main emphasis in the current thesis is on the implications of signaling theory on 
the pay out smoothing behaviour by bank holding companies, it is also important to focus on 
the agency theoretic explanations of pay out smoothing behaviours in general. As already 
mentioned in the thesis that Lambrecht and Myers (2012) have provided an agency theoretic 
view of dividend smoothing which is compatible with rent seeking by managers. The same 
authors based their investigation on various agency cost related studies, for example, Tirole 
and Fundenburg (1995), and come to conclusion that managers smooth their pay outs since 
they would also like to smooth their own compensation. However this theoretical strand of 
literature should be supported by the empirical findings, for example, whether the large and 
matured firms exhibit more smoothing? Since these are also those firms which face agency 
                                                          
91 The main investigations have been on the change in the pay outs and cash holdings of US bank holding firms 
during and after the crisis period. 
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cost of monitoring the most92. 
 
 
John and Williams (1985) proposed that in a signaling equilibrium the optimal dividend 
strategy of firms should be to smooth dividend pays relative to stock prices which are 
stochastic. Models alike predict that if there is a higher agency cost of monitoring due to 
higher information asymmetry level then dividend will be smoothed more. There are 
alternative theoretical models also, as explained earlier, for example Kumar (1988) 
proposed a pooling equilibrium model. In Kumar’s model there is a partial pooling 
equilibrium of different firm types based on different levels of private information 
regarding the quality of firm’s cash flows. In the very study there is a unique dividend pay 
out related to a distinct range of firm values. 
 
Whenever a firm announces dividend whose absolute value is different from a certain range as 
prescribed by the model the market perceives the firm as to be in the lowest range of values. 
Later Leary and Michaelly (2011) proposed that such a model in dynamic setting, i.e in multiple 
periods modelling may generate smoothing behaviours. Later Gutman et al (2010) have shown 
that a partial pooling equilibrium may exist where dividend is constant for 
 
a given range of underlying earnings. 
 
Here the risk levels of firms become an important determinants of speed of adjustment, 
since both Kumar (1988) and Gutman et al (2010) have predicted that riskier firms would 
tend to smooth more, or in other words the speed of adjustment for such firms are lower at 
an average. Again it is well known that agency conflict and risk levels of firms are 
compatible with each other. 
 
Agency theory can explain dividend smoothing from the perspective of taxation too, for 
example, Rozycki (1997) have shown that personal income tax provision provides incentives 
                                                          
92 Recently Hoang and Hoxha (2016) have provided a comprehensive investigation of corporate smoothing 
policies in a related context. The authors argue that corporate pay out decisions are based on the rationale that 
the variability in pay outs have to be minimized relative to the underlying incomes since that can minimize 
agency cost. 
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to managers to smooth dividend payments. Michaelly and Roberts (2012) have observed that 
firms with concentrated shareholders or large shareholders may smooth less, since such 
firms do not face severe agency problems and information asymmetry problems as the more 
dispersed shareholder owned firms do. Hence in the current thesis since publicly listed bank 
holding companies are studied in the sample, there is a greater propensity for these banks to 
smooth due to larger dispersed shareholder ownership. Leary and Michaelly (2011) also find 
support to the proposition that firms which face higher agency costs smooth their dividends 
more. 
3.2.10Hypotheses building 
 
 
H1a:  speed of adjustment increases if the BHC is of above median size in the sample 
 
In the first section the positive impact of size on the signaling level of pay outs is analyzed. 
However the current section investigates if the size factor has some significant impact on the 
speed of adjustment of the firms. Here the main aim is to investigate whether the impact of the 
bank specific variables have similar nature with regards to the smoothing of dividends, since 
then only it can be inferred that smoothing can also be accepted as signaling value. 
The impact of size, as observed in the literature above, can be related to agency costs, 
opacity as well as factors like diversification. Leary and Michaely (2011) observe that 
generally firms with more individual investors and among larger and more financially stable 
smooth their dividends relatively more. 
 
Since in this section a related measure of speed of adjustment is also used, namely, the half 
life of adjustment (Olivera et al, op cit), a corollary of the above hypothesis is as below: 
H1b:  half life of dividend adjustments reduce if the BHC is above the median size of the 
sample 
 
This hypothesis is a further robustness check for the value signaling nature of dynamic 
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dividend adjustments. Here the main objective is to test whether the large bank holding 
companies set greater half life for dividend adjustments. There are some seminal works in 
the theoretical literature on income and dividend smoothing of firms (Tirole and 
Fundenburg,op cit ) which can be related to the hypothesis. 
 
Income smoothing and dividend smoothing are closely related (Miller and Scholes, 1978). 
Here the main issue is that the investors can reduce the dividend taxation by utilizing some 
provisions of the personal income tax. Again the utilization of such provisions is a dynamic 
and long term process, which further suggests that such investors then would value dividend 
smoothing by corporates . another prediction of this theory is that dividend smoothing will be 
most valued by the public listed firms with retail investors (Leary and Michealy, 2011). 
 
Since the sample of BHCs which have been used in the current study are public listed 
firms with dispersed ownership it can be assumed that dividend smoothing is perceived as 
a value signaling from the above perspective too. 
 
Further Baker et al (2007) observe in the lie of the earlier theoretical models that as long as 
 
investors want to smooth consumption dividend smoothing is resulted. 
 
         Expected impact of bank level control variables on the speed of adjustment 
 
 
1. Speed of adjustment of pay outs may reduce with the increase in the capital adequacy 
level by bank holding firms. This proposition is based on the theoretical assertion that 
banking firms with greater capital adequacy needs might smooth their pay outs more, 
since that would be aligned with the signaling theory as investigated in the first 
section. Hence the negative and significant impact of the capital adequacy on the 
speed of smoothing supports signaling by dividend smoothing. 
In other words as a corollary value of half-life increases with the capital adequacy 
level of the BHCs. Since the half life of adjustment is a managerial choice it can be 
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used strategically by the banks to delay the achievement of the pay out target levels, 
and during the period increase the buffer capital as per the need of the capital 
regulation. Hence this adjustment can also be perceived as compatible with signaling 
via dividend smoothing. 
 
2. the level of default risk has a negative probabilistic impact on the speed of adjustment 
 
As observed and tested in the first section there are a number of surveys which have held that 
banks in developed economies have exhibited moral hazard by increasing dividend payouts, 
or maintaining steady pay outs during the crisis period when their default risk was very high. 
The above hypothesis is a direct test of such claims. However the above hypothesis extends 
on the standard literature by including dynamic pay out adjustments. 
 
If the impact of default risk is negative on the speed of adjustments then default risk 
might cause greater smoothing for banking firms, which is again compatible with the 
overall signaling behavior. 
The impact of default risk on the speed of adjustment is not directly investigated in the 
literature of banking firms, however Baker and Wurgler (2010) have suggested that as more 
loss averse shareholders value dividends with respect to a reference point of lagged 
dividend pay outs, firms smooth their dividends more. Hence this observation is also in line 
with the value signaling theory. Hence under greater default risk level investors might 
become more loss averse hence more smoothing is warranted. 
In other words the level of default risk has a positive probabilistic impact on the half-life 
periods for the BHCs.  This corollary also tests that whether high default banking firms have 
increased the half life period for meeting the target pay outs so that in the given period they 
can build up more buffer capital. 
 
1.  retained earnings mix has a negative probabilistic impact on the speed of adjustments 
 
As in the first section retained earnings mix is used as the life cycle variable. The standard 
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prediction for agency cost theory is that greater is the agency cost of free cash flow more is 
the dividend pay out level. However the standard literature has not investigated the impact of 
the very factor on the speed of adjustments, and hence whether agency cost makes managers 
to smooth pay outs more, and specifically for the BHCs. 
In other words retained earnings mix has a positive probabilistic impact on the half life 
periods of BHCs. The above assertion is again the corollary of the last hypothesis. 
Overall for all the hypotheses three types of pay outs are used as the dependent variables, 
namely, the dividend per share, total dividend pay outs including the stock and the cash 
 
dividends, and the total pay outs including the stock repurchases by the BHCs. 
 
 
 
3.3 Methodology 
 Partial adjustment model 
The following partial adjustment model has been developed, which is a modified partial 
adjustment model following Oliver etal (2015), Flannery and Rangan (2006) among others. In 
this form, a bank’s current pay out ratio (or DPS) is a weighted average of its target pay out 
ratio and the previous period’s pay out ratio, where the weight λ has the closed range (0,1), 
with a stochastic term, as below. 
DPSi,t= λ DPSi,t* + (1-λ)DPSi,t-1 + ei,t….(1)  
Hence ever period a bank can adjust towards the target level by λ proportion, which implies 
that smaller is the λ greater is the rigidity of the bank to change dividend pay outs towards the 
target. Hence, λ is considered as the speed of adjustment (SOA), and (1-λ) the portion of 
dividend pay out which is inertial. However since the target level is unobserved, and is a 
function of bank specific heterogeneities, it is further modelled as a function of bank level, 
and bank specific factors, as shown below: 
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𝐷𝑃𝑆∗ = 𝛽𝑋 + 𝜈𝑖 + 𝜇𝑡 … . (2)  
In the above equation x is the vector of firm specific characteristics, and the two error terms 
represents heterogeneity across space and time. At this stage for firm specific factors we have 
used standard life cycle variables following the very literature. Substituting 2 in 1 the 
following equation is generated. 
DPSi,t= λ(β xi,t-1 + νi +μt) + (1-λ)DPSi,t-1 + ei,t  ….(3) 
Again as the standard literature (Flannery and Rangan (2006), Lemmon et al. 
(2008),Huangand Ritter (2009), and Gropp and Heider (2010)) suggest that in the presence of 
lagged dependent variable with a short panel data, using fixed effect models can generate 
biasedestimates for λ. Hence following the recent estimations (Oliver et al, 2015, Flannery 
and Hankins (2013)) a system GMM estimation of the model (3) is adapted here by the 
author. Again we assume that each banking firm will have its own SOA factor, which is again 
a function of some bank specific variables, which can be captured in the following way: 
λi,t = λ0+αZi,t-1, where Z is the vector of firm specific variables, here we use the opacity 
level as one of such  firm  specific  variables  to  explicitly  measure  the  impact  of  degree of 
information asymmetry on the adjustment process. hence substituting again this in 3 we get, 
DPS*-DPS =(λ+αZ)( βx+ ν+μ–Y)+e …(4) 
Again the last term in the bracket can be expressed as the difference between the target level 
and the lagged dependent variable, this can be termed as GAPi,t-1, hence symbolically the 
partial adjustment model can now be written as  
Yi,t-Yi,t-1 =( λ0+αZi,t-1)GAPi,t-1+ei,t ...(5) 
Overall following Jiang, Hong and Molleneaux (2015), who have used a similar partial 
adjustment model for investigating capital structure adjustment of bank holding firms, the 
estimation of the above steps have been done. Hence the first step which contains the lagged 
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dependent variable has been estimated using system GMM method, whereas the remaining 
steps have been estimated using standard panel data fixed effect estimation method. There 
have been a huge literature on such estimation methods, specifically on the advantages on 
using GMM estimation techniques for panel data models. Following is the brief account of the 
three steps in which the partial adjustment model is run in the current paper.The paper follows 
studies by Flannery and Rangan (2006), De Jonghe and Oztekin (2015), and Xiang et al 
(2015) among others for a three step partial adjustment model, which allows for bank specific 
and time varying pay out targets and heterogeneous adjustment speeds. First a constant 
adjustment speed λ is assumed for all banking firms for measuring target pay outs for each 
quarter, this is the first step of the model. In the second step the gap between the actual pay 
out level and the estimated target pay out level for each bank is used to measure the varying 
speed of adjustment for each bank. Finally, in the third step, the varying target pay outs for 
each bank is re-estimated using the varying speed of adjustment measured from the second 
step. 
In a partial adjustment model, a bank’s current pay out level/ pay out ratio ( k) is a 
weighted average of its target  ( k*  ) and its previous period’s (in the current study previous 
quarter) pay out level/ ratio, Ki,t= λ K*i,t+(1-λ)Ki,t-1+µi,t (2). Substituting the equation 1 into the 
equation 2 we get the following equation: Ki,t=λβXt-1+(1-λ)Ki,t-1+µi,t (3). However the 
assumption of the constant speed of adjustment can be relaxed, and we can have a firm 
specific adjustment speed which varies over time or bank quarters: λi,i=Z i,t−1, where Z is 
another firm specific characteristics vector.  Hence we get the equation(4) as  Ki,t-Ki,t-1=Z 
i,t−1(βXi,t-1-Ki,t-1)+µi,t. 
Then the model is estimated in a three step procedure. Assuming a constant adjustment speed 
λ  a standard partial adjustment model is estimated in (3), for this step the estimation 
technique is system GMM (as explained earlier, and here the widely cited study of De Jonghe 
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and Oztekin (2015) is followed, who have used system GMM mainly for the presence of the 
lagged dependent variable). The main purpose for the first step is to calculate an initial set of 
estimated β s , which are then used to measure the initial estimates of the target pay outs by 
the banks, K*i,t=β Xi,t-1, for each bank quarter. These estimates are likely to be biased since λ is 
assumed to be constant. 
Hence in the second step, the gap between the estimated and the actual pay outs by banks in 
the previous quarter is estimated, say, Gi,t, which is then substituted in the equation (3), Gi,t=β 
Xi,t-1-Ki,t-1 (5), hence Ki,t-Ki,t-1 =Z i,t−1G+µi,t (6), where G is the estimate of the gap as 
defined. 
The equation (6) is used to calculate the estimates of, which is required for estimating the 
varying speeds of adjustments of the banking firms for each quarter. The varying speed of 
adjustment is given by the formula, λi,t=()Zi,t-1.Hence the estimation of varying speed of 
adjustment comprises the second step of the model. 
In the third step the pay out measures are re-estimated by using the varying speed of 
adjustment obtained in the second step into the equation (3), hence after re-arranging the 
equation we have the following equation, Ki,t-Ki,t-1(1-Zi,t-1)=β−Xi,t-1+µi,t(7), where the 
estimated values have been used for, in this step bank specific adjustment speed is used for 
measuring the bank specific and time varying pay out targets, which can be perceived as the 
optimal pay outs93.  
3.3.1Estimation method: a technical note 
 
 
In the next stage a GMM technique is deployed to measure the impact of product of GAP 
and opacity (among other variables) on the first difference of DPS, as interpreted by other 
                                                          
93 Again as the standard literature (Flannery and Rangan (2006), Lemmon et al. (2008), Huangand Ritter 
(2009), and Gropp and Heider (2010)) suggest that in the presence of lagged dependent variable with a short 
panel data, using fixed effect models can generate biased estimates of the speed of adjustment, hence the use 
of system GMM. 
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researchers (Leary etal, 2011) this might measure the impact of opacity level on dividend. 
smoothing, more specifically this might test the theoretical prediction (as cited in the review 
section) that opacity generates smoothing behavior. Here the inclusion of opacity variable 
(which impacts SOA) is as an endogenous variable94.  
 
3.3.2 A brief observation on system GMM estimation 
 
 
In general, as observed by authors, since panel data always deal with observed 
heterogeneities, for example the individual effects and time fixed effects, there can be 
either one way fixed effect models/ random effect models (based on standard hypothesis 
tests, for eg hausman test, where the null hypothesis is that the random effect estimators are 
consistent), or using first difference forms of models if the second dimension of the panel 
data is a proper to series. 
 
First differencing is done to remove the unobserved heterogeneities, or individual effects, and 
such estimation techniques mainly comprises of dynamic panel data models with lagged 
dependent variables. In such models there is an inbuilt partial adjustment process. 
 
Nickel (1981) observed for the first time that if fixed effect model is run in the presence of the 
dynamic panel data, then there can be serious serial correlation problems, since the 
regressions can get correlated with the error terms. Such problem mainly arises when there is 
so called short panel bias, where the time dimension of the panel is much smaller compared to 
the cross sectional dimension. This serial correlation error creates bias in the estimation of the 
coefficient of the lagged dependent variable, which can't be removed by increasing the no of 
cross sectional units. Demeaning process in the fixed effect estimations create such regressors 
which are significantly correlated with the error terms, hence violating the classical assumption of 
                                                          
94 There are other estimation techniques possible for example system GMM which might increase the 
efficiency of estimation (Baltagi, 2013) but since system GMM uses more no of instruments than difference 
GMM it might not be efficient to use in case of relatively less no of periods in the panel data, since this might 
weaken the Sargan test results for AR. 
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the explanatory variables being independently distributed of the error term. Nickel showed that 
the correlation coefficient in this case is of the order inverse of the time dimension, hence 
increases rapidly with the decrease in the no of time period observations. Hence of the measure of 
the correlation is significantly greater than zero, then there is a negative bias in the coefficient of 
the lagged dependent variable(more on this later). 
 
There is one critical point to be noted here, I.e. The bias ness is not due to any autocorrelation 
error terms, since even if the error term is normal and iid such problems can arise, only that in 
case of a further auto correlation the estimates of the auto regressive model becomes severely 
inconsistent. Such serial correlation problems can also occur in case of random effect models, 
hence that too is not a solution. 
 
There can be alternative solutions here, for example, one solution is to take first difference of 
the dynamic model as shown below 
 
Hence its clear that first difference removes both the fixed effect as well as the constant term 
from the model. However in the resultant model too, there is a correlation between the 
difference of the lagged dependent variable and the differences error term, which is of a 
moving average of first order type. 
 
Hence after removing the fixed effects completely, there is an opportunity to construct 
instrumental variable estimator. Instruments of the lagged dependent variable is generated from 
the higher order lags of the dependent variable. Such lags are highly correlated with the lagged 
dependent variable, however if the error is iid they are uncorrelated with the composite error 
term. This is the so called instrumental variable approach, and there are specific commands in 
packages like stata to operate, for example here, xtivreg. 
The DPD approach however is a further modification of the above approach, the main argument 
here is that the instrumental variable approach is incapable of using all the information provided 
in the sample. Hence GMM method can accomplish the task, and thus can create better estimates 
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of the dynamic panel data model. 
 
AB argues that the AH method fails to exploit all the orthogonally conditions. Hence the 
GMM method they suggest also has one commonality with the AH method, I.e. the 
instruments are still the internal in the sense that they are still the lagged dependent variables, 
either in lagged form or differences form. However the estimators allow the external 
instruments also. 
We can summarize the conditions in which the AB method can be used as below 
 
 
1. Short panel bias, with longer cross sectional element than the time period element  
 
 
2. Where the relationship between the explanatory variables and the dependent variable is 
linear  
 
3. Dynamic panel data model  
 
 
4. Some of the explanatory variables which is not exogenous, hence correlated with the 
past or current error terms  
5. Presence of fixed effects  
 
 
6. Presence of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation with in the error terms.  
 
 
AB method actually generates a GMM set up for the model, which means that the model is 
set up as system of equations, one equation for each time period where the instrumental 
variables for every equation may vary. 
 
Stata commands: 
 
 
There are some frequently used commands in stata for example, xtabond, or xtdpd, or built in 
command like xtabond2, the last command is developed by David Roodman. 
 
Which provides various additional features which are not available in the normal Stata 
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commands. 
 
 
 
 
 
The instrument variable matrix in system GMM 
 
 
In the standard 2SLS approach the twice lagged level is introduced in the matrix of 
instrumental variables, as below 
 
The first row comprises of the time period 2, where the first observation is lost due to first 
differencing transformation. Which also mean that observation for each panel unit for the 
very order is missing from the matrix. Again if the thrice lagged level is used as another 
instrument, then there will be loss of observations per panel for the third order too as below 
 
Loss of observations also do mean loss of degree of freedom, hence a method has been 
devised to arrest such loss in degrees of freedom. Holtz-Eakin, have popularised a method 
where there are instruments for each time period which are also different from each other, in 
this case the instrumental variable matrix takes the below form 
 
Hence in this case the method is simply to replace missing variables with 0, a critique can be 
that this rule is arbitrary,which is true in this sense. However one benefit is that each column 
of instrumental variables thus found is orthogonal to the transformed error term, hence 
satisfying the moment condition that the instrumental variables and the transformed error 
terms are not correlated. 
 
This approach helps to construct instrumental variable of all available lags of the 
untransformed variables. If the enogenous variables are used then lag 2 and higher are used, 
for those variables which are not strictly endogenous lag 1 is a valid option, and such lagged 
variables are only correlated with the errors of t-2 and earlier periods. The typical matrix has 
the following structure 
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In this set up there are different no of instruments for each time period, for example for 
time period 2 there is one instrument, for time period 3 there are two instruments or 
generally for time period n we have n-1 instruments. When higher time periods are 
considered more orthogonality conditions are available which in effect improves the AB 
estimators. 
 
One disadvantage is however that the no of lagged instruments are quadratic in the length of 
time periods available, if the time period is short, less than 10 in general then it's manageable 
to run the model in stata, however for larger time series the past lags used has to be restricted. 
As shown by Flannery and Hankins (2013), the measure of the average adjustment speed 
across the firms will vary considerably among the estimation techniques. The authors have 
found a very low estimation for OLS to a very high estimation of speed of adjustment for FE 
estimation. Now the authors have shortened the panel length from 30 to 10, and repeated the 
same exercise, OLS estimation expectedly remained unchanged (which can be interpreted as 
that OLS estimation ignores firm level heterogeneities and introduces short panel bias in the 
results), for FE model the estimation rises further than before by a significant amount, where 
as for the System GMM estimation the rise in the estimation for speed is only minimal. When 
the panel length is curtailed to 5, the OLS estimation remained unchanged, FE estimation 
increased even further, but the GMM estimation did not rise further at all. From this 
perspective GMM estimation seems to be more robust over the change in the panel lengths. 
Summarily the following points can be collated from the relevant scholarship: 
 
 
1. Bond (2002) observe that if OLS estimation is used in case of dynamic panel data 
analysis, there will be a strong upward bias in the coefficient of lagged dependent 
variable (since the adjustment speed is 1 – the lagged coefficient, there will be a 
downward bias in the speed of adjustment as found by Flannery and Hankins (op cit)) 
which is due to ignoring the firm fixed effects.  
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2. Nickell (1981), Baltagi (2008) among others observe that for FE estimation though the 
structure of the panel is incorporated, it ignores the correlation between the coefficient of the 
lagged dependent variable and the error term of the regression model.  
 
Hence there have been suggestions by scholars about the better estimation methods to solve 
the bias for standard FE models. Following are some alternative estimation based on the 
relevant studies: 
 
 
 
 
1. System GMM uses a two equation system in regression models, the first one in levels and 
the second one in first difference of the lag, in case of specific packages like STATA the 
default program is set for one lagged exogenous variable set, where the standard command 
is XTABOND2, again following Flannery and Hankins(op cit) lags can be restricted to 
two also. Such estimation can be used to produce unbiased estimate under the conditions 
of unobserved heterogeneity, dynamic panel data, unbalanced panel data, and in the 
presence of endogenous variables. However there can be some bias in the presence of 
second order serial correlation.  
2. Difference GMM estimation creates the first difference of the linear regression model 
and then uses the lagged dependent variable levels as instruments for first difference 
of lags. Difference GMM estimation technique can also be used in all the scenarios as 
mentioned earlier for the system GMM case. However there are ceratin important 
differences between these two estimations, which have led the experts to use system 
GMM more commonly.  
3. Heid et al (2011), presents eloquently the pros and cons of using these estimation 
techniques. For example Acemoglu (2008) has used difference GMM estimator in 
dynamic panel models, here the second and greater lags of the dependent variable can 
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be used as the instrument for the residuals in the initial model/ equation. 
4.  
5. However as the authors (Alonso-Borrego and Arellano, 1999) observe that such 
estimation will exhibit huge small sample bias when the no of time periods used in 
the panel data is small and the dependent variable shows a high degree of 
persistence. 
6.  
7. Which may well be the reason that such estimation should not be used in case of 
partial adjustment models, for dividend smoothing or leverage smoothing. One way to 
solve the small sample bias will be to take the average values of the variables, which 
might restrict the no of observations. 
 
8. Hence better way is to deploy the system GMM estimation, which is based on some 
further moment conditions, unlike in the difference GMM simple lags of the 
dependent variables are not used in the orthogonality condition, rather first difference 
of lagged dependent variables are used. However as observed by Heid eta l (2011) 
that such so called asymptotic gain conditions in case of system GMM do not come 
with out cost, and one such cost is that the no of instruments increases exponentially 
with the no of time periods. Such increase in instruments have further consequences, 
for example very high pass rates for specification tests like Hansen J –TEST, which 
is a standard test to check the validity of the dynamic models. 
A small note on power and size 
 
Power of a statistical test 
 
 
Statisticians observes that the significance level, or alpha, and the power of a test are 
complementary to each other, while the alpha factor quantifies the probability of rejecting 
the null hypothesis when it's actually true, I.e. a wrong decision, then power of a test 
quantifies the chance of rejecting the null hypothesis when it's actually false, I.e. a right 
decision. 
Generally power of a test also demonstrates whether the size of the sample used is large 
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enough for correct inference to be drawn from the tests. Generally power of a test can be 
easily calculated for from testing null hypotheses which are based on mean values, for 
example if we have a sample size of n with null hypothesis that the mean value is x, and 
alternative hypothesis of mean value y, then at 5 percentage level of significance the 
critical z score will be 1.645 which if is lower than the calculated z score, the null 
hypothesis will be rejected. Now we can equate this critical value of z with the formula for 
z score in the typical case and find out the mean value of the sample, this mean value will 
be that value for which the null can't be rejected. Then one can plug in this mean value and 
the value of alternative hypothesis in the z score formula, based on the assumption that 
alternative hypothesis is rather true. 
Then we can see what is the probability that actual z score is greater than the obtained z 
score, this will be regarded as the power of the test, which gives the percentage chance of 
rejecting the null hypothesis when it is actually false. The thumb rule in this case is that any 
test with 80% power can be considered as to be powerful. 
Reasons for using GMM estimation method in this specific analysis 
In empirical finance literature there is a wide usage of linear factor models, for example, 
Fama&MacBeth (1973) methodology and the Shanken (1992) correction. However 
Fama&Macbeth model even after corrections are not free from some errors the most 
important is that the assumptions underlying the Shanken correction are not valid for 
heteroskedastic asset pricing models and so the modified standard errors are not consistent. 
Though in the current context the estimation is based on measurement of speed of adjustment 
of bank pay outs rather than asset pricing, consistency of standard errors is critical otherwise 
the speed of adjustment measure will be biased significantly.95 
                                                          
95 Flannery and Henkeins (2013) have shown in details how estimation techniques like OLS, FE Fama&Macbeth 
generates biased values of the speed of adjustment measures in the partial adjustment model. The same 
authors also suggest that system GMM estimation to be better than first difference regressions. 
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The usual method of estimation while facing Heteroskedsticity of unknown form is GMM as 
introduced first by Hansen (1982). GMM estimation uses the orthogonality conditions to 
allow for efficient estimation of coefficients in the presence of heteroskedascticity of 
unknown form. Comparing with IV estimator, if heteroscedasticity is present then GMM is 
more efficient than IV estimator, however in the absence of heteroscedasticity it is not less 
efficient than IV.  
More specifically for the partial adjustment model for dividend pay outs, there have been 
studies using cross sectional time series analysis, specifically when an average slope 
coefficient (in the present case it would mean an average speed of adjustment) is needed to be 
measured. However there in the current study such estimations could not have been 
appropriate since, one, the main objective of the study is to measure bank specific 
heterogeneous speed of adjustment rather than any industry average, and two,  averaging data 
over such long periods wastes valuable information on the dynamics of the phenomenon 
under analysis. This is particularly the case with the analysis of Lintner’s(1956) and 
Brittain’sbehavioural adjustment models, which are dynamic by definition.  
Technically, such estimations also face the omitted variable bias problem due to the presence 
of heterogeneity, and then certainly there are some variables explaining dividend behavior 
which are endogenous in nature (for example the opacity variables in the current study) for 
which again GMM is a preferred estimator. 96 
A brief account of comparison between the system GMM and other estimations 
In the current study since a partial adjustment model is used for measuring speed of 
adjustment of pay outs, there is a strong case for correcting the biases caused due to the 
presence of lagged dependent variable. Nerlove (1967), Nickell (1981), Blatagi (2008) among 
others have shown that for standard OLS estimation there can be severe bias in the coefficient 
                                                          
96 Recently Oliver et al (2015/13), Xiang et al (2015) have used system GMM estimation for mitigating the 
endogeneity problem in the partial adjustment models. 
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of the lagged dependent variable in a dynamic panel data model due to correlation between 
the fixed effects and the lagged dependent variable.  
Again such bias is inversely related to the panel data length, T (Flanery and Hankins, 2013), 
but significant bias can remain even with T =30. Such bias is thus known as to be the short 
panel bias. The current study is based on COMPUSTAT data base on a quarterly basis (1990-
2015), and even though the panel data length is in the range of less than sever bias care was 
taken for choosing the appropriate estimation technique to make the bias minimum. Flannery 
and Hankins (2012) also argue that due to the persistence of short panel bias in standard 
studies there have been a significant amount of disagreement among the authors regarding the 
coefficient of lagged dependent variable, or the speed of adjustment thus measured. Such bias 
then generates different conclusions regarding the adjustment processes followed by firms in 
general. 97 
There have been quite a few econometric techniques evolved for the correction of such bias, 
for example, instrumental variables (IV), generalized method of moments (GMM) estimators, 
long differencing (LD), and bias correction formulae (Flannery and Hankins, 2012). Again 
Flannery and Hankins (2012)98 argue that these estimation techniques have been used mainly 
for small data sets with less no of explanatory variables, however for large data sets with 
many explanatory variables there can still remain endogeneity and serial correlation problems 
which may not be minimized by these standard estimations. In the current study multiple bank 
level explanatory variables have been used, hence extra care was taken for minimizing 
endogeneity and serial correlation problems. Further advanced estimates have been explored 
in the study by Flanery and Hankins (2012), for example, difference GMM, Blundell and 
Bond (1998) system GMM, two variations of long differencing (Hahn et al., 2007, Huang and 
                                                          
97 For example Welch (2004), Fama and French (2002), Lemmon et al (2008) have found completely different 
estimates for speeds of adjustments, and disagree significantly on how firms set target pay outs and smooth 
accordingly. 
98 Flannery and Hankins (2013) data set comprise panel data observations between 3000 and 15000, in the 
current study the range is between 3000 and 5000 data points. 
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Ritter, 2009), and corrected least-squares dependent variable, LSDVC (Kiviet, 1995, Bruno, 
2005). Below a short summary of comparison of results obtained by alternative estimates is 
provided, which also supports why system GMM is selected as the appropriate technique for 
measuring an unbiased coefficient of the lagged dependent variable, which appears in the first 
step of the current partial adjustment model. 
1. Estimation by OLS ignores firm specific heterogeneity altogether, hence varying the 
panel length might not change the coefficient estimate from OLS but the estimate 
itself is severely biased, for example in the study by Flannery and Hankins (2013), the 
OLS estimate for the coefficient of the lagged depended variable, and thus the speed 
of adjustment is abnormally low. 
2. Estimation by standard FE model ignores the short panel bias, hence changing the 
panel length slightly would also change the estimate of the speed of adjustment 
significantly, as also found by Flannery and Hnakins (2013), and hence such an 
estimate cannot be relied upon as a consistent estimate. 
3.  LSDVC has the extra constraint of assuming exogenous regressors, which is not 
applicable in corporate financial research in general and partial adjustment models in 
particular due to the presence of endogeneity. 
4. Relatively then system GMM is a better estimator, since, it incorporates endogenous 
regressors, it incorporates firm specific heterogeneity, it can be used for an unbalanced 
panel data, and also it mitigates short panel bias problem, such that when the panel 
length is changed significantly there is much less significant change of the coefficient 
estimate of the lagged dependent variable, and hence of speed of adjustment.  
A brief note on the short panel bias and the use of system GMM to remove the same 
Nickel (1981) observed for the first time that if fixed effect model is run in the 
presence of the dynamic panel data, then there can be serious serial correlation 
problems, since the regressions can get correlated with the error terms. Such problem 
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mainly arises when there is so called short panel bias, where the time dimension of the 
panel is much smaller compared to the cross sectional dimension. This serial 
correlation error creates bias in the estimation of the coefficient of the lagged 
dependent variable, which can't be removed by increasing the no of cross sectional 
units. 
Demeaning process in the fixed effect estimations create such regressors which are 
significantly correlated with the error terms, hence violating the classical assumption 
of the explanatory variables being independently distributed of the error term. Nickel 
showed that the correlation coefficient in this case is of the order inverse of the time 
dimension, hence increases rapidly with the decrease in the no of time period 
observations. Hence of the measure of the correlation is significantly greater than zero, 
then there is a negative bias in the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable(more 
on this later). 
There is one critical point to be noted here, I.e. The bias ness is not due to any 
autocorrelation error terms, since even if the error term is normal and iid such 
problems can arise, only that in case of a further auto correlation the estimates of the 
auto regressive model becomes severely inconsistent. Such serial correlation problems 
can also occur in case of random effect models, hence that too is not a solution. There 
can be alternative solutions here, for example, one solution is to take first difference of 
the dynamic model as shown below Hence its clear that first difference removes both 
the fixed effect as well as the constant term from the model. However in the resultant 
model too, there is a correlation between the difference of the lagged dependent 
variable and the differences error term, which is of a moving average of first order 
type. 
Hence after removing the fixed effects completely, there is an opportunity to construct 
instrumental variable estimator. Instruments of the lagged dependent variable is 
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generated from the higher order lags of the dependent variable. Such lags are highly 
correlated with the lagged dependent variable, however if the error is iid they are 
uncorrelated with the composite error term. This is the so called instrumental variable 
approach, and there are specific commands in packages like stata to operate, for 
example here, xtivreg. 
AB argues that the AH method fails to exploit all the orthogonally conditions. Hence 
the GMM method they suggest also has one commonality with the AH method, I.e. the 
instruments are still the internal in the sense that they are still the lagged dependent 
variables, either in lagged form or differences form. However the estimators allow the 
external instruments also.  
We can summarize the conditions in which the AB method can be used as below 
 
1. Short panel bias, with longer cross sectional element than the time period element 
2. Where the relationship between the explanatory variables and the dependent 
variable is linear 
3. Dynamic panel data model 
4. Some of the explanatory variables which is not exogenous, hence correlated with 
the past or current error terms 
5. Presence of fixed effects 
6. Presence of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation with in the error terms. 
AB method actually generates a GMM set up for the model, which means that the 
model is set up as system of equations, one equation for each time period where the 
instrumental variables for every equation may vary. 
To summarize, Flannery and Hankins (2013) observe that dynamic panel data models 
are quite extensively used in corporate finance studies, specifically in the context of 
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partial adjustment processes for example dividend adjustment, or capital adjustment. 
However use of fixed effect models with lagged depended variables may cause serious 
econometric biases in the estimations. There have been some methods which have 
been used (generally on small samples which have independent and normally 
distributed explanatory variables) to remove such biases. 
 
However the main challenge in the realm of corporate finance (Flannery and Hankins, 
2013) is that depended variables may be clustered or censored (for example if the 
depended variable is dividend per share or pay out ratios), and, or the independent 
variable data may be missing altogether. Independent variables may also be correlated 
with each other, or endogenous in nature. 
 
Such properties of data have significant impact on estimators. In this brief account we 
will explore the various types of impact which the data characteristics might have on 
the estimators’ performances, which might also provide a clear guideline as to which 
estimation technique is appropriate given the scenarios. 
 
Nerlove (1967), Nickell (1981), also Baltagi (2008) observe that there can be severe 
bias of estimators if OLS model is used in case of dynamic panel data, and the main 
reason is that the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is biased due to 
correlation between fixed effects and the lagged dependent variable. However there is 
less consensus among the authors regarding the adjustment behavior and of the factors 
affecting the leverage ratios in this case. Flannery and Hankins (2013) make the point 
that such lack of consensus is mainly caused by the econometric biases or 
uncertainties in the estimation techniques chosen in the studies.There have been some 
techniques evolved to correct such biases, for example, GMM estimation, instrumental 
variables estimations, long differencing estimations etc. Flannery and Hankins (2013) 
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have provided first of its kind comparison among seven estimation techniques for 
dynamic panel data models, namely, OLS, standard FE, Difference GMM (Arellano 
and Bond's, 1991), System GMM (Blundell and Bond, 1998), variations of Long 
differencing estimations (Hahn et al., 2007, Huang and Ritter, 2009), and also 
corrected least squares (Kiviet, 1995, Bruno, 2005). 
In simple words, short panel bias can be detected by estimating the same dynamic 
model using OLS, FE and System GMM. In the main partial adjustment model (as will 
be discussed in details later) if the target ratio (which may be target leverage ratio, or 
target dividend pay outs etc) is a function of both observed firm specific variables and 
fixed effects, then there should be biases in the coefficient of the lagged dependent 
variable while running OLS or FE, since in case of OLS the fixed effect is completely 
ignored, and in case of FE the short panel bias is completely ignored. Relatively then 
System GMM is a better estimation. 
Moment conditions for GMM estimation 
General method of moments (GMM) is a general estimation method where the estimators are 
derived from the moment conditions. Moment condition is a statement about the data and 
parameters, as shown below: 
𝑔(𝜃) = 𝐸[𝑓(𝑤, 𝑧, 𝜃)] = 0 
Where θ is a K x 1 vector of parameters, f(.) is an R dimensional vector of non-linear 
functions, w contains the model variables, and z contains the instruments. Hence if the 
expectation values are known then it is possible to solve for θ. If there is a unique solution, or 
there is one θ which solves E[f(.)]=0, then the system is called identified. Again two issues 
regarding identification may arise, one, is the model constructed so that θ is unique, and two, 
are the data informative enough to determine the unique value of θ. 
1. Instrumental variables estimation 
164 
 
In many applications the moment condition can be written as 𝑓(𝑤, 𝑧, 𝜃) = 𝑢(𝑤, 𝜃) ∗ 𝑧, here R 
instruments in z are multiplied by the disturbance term u, here u(.) is 1x1 and z is Rx1. here u 
can be thought of as an equivalent of an error term, hence then the moment condition 
becomes, 𝑔(𝜃) = 𝐸[𝑢(. ) ∗ 𝑧] = 0, which is the statement that the error terms are uncorrelated 
with the instruments of the model. These classes of estimators are called as the instrumental 
variables estimators. The function u(.) may be linear or non linear in θ.  
2. Method of moment estimator (MM) 
Here given the sample, wt, and zt (t=1,2,…,T), the sample moment conditions are measured: 
𝑔(𝜃) = 1/𝑇∑𝑓(𝑤, 𝑧, 𝜃),  here we can derive an estimator θ’as solution of g(θ’)=0. 
The basic criteria for finding the estimator is that we need at least as many equations as we 
have parameters. The order condition for identification𝑅 ≥ 𝐾: 
1. R=K, is called as the exact identification, the estimator is denoted as the method of 
moment estimator. 
2. R>K, is called as the over estimation, and the estimator is called as the generalized 
method of moment estimator (GMM). 
MM estimator of the mean: Let us consider yt as a random variable extracted from the 
population with the mean value µ0, here we need only one moment condition, 
g(µ0)=E(f(yt,µ0))=E(yt-µ0)=0. Where f(.)=yt-µ0. 
Therefore for a sample of y1,y2,…,yT we have the sample moment condition as  
gT= 1/T*∑(yt-µ)=0. Here the MM estimator of the mean is the solution, which is 
µaverage=1/T∑yt, which is the sample average. 
However for the case of over estimation as defined in 2 there is no general solution for 
gT(θ)=0. Hence the optimal method is to minimize the distance between gT(θ) and 0. This 
distance is measured in the quadratic form QT(θ)=gT(θ)’WTgT(θ), where W is RXR 
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positive definite weight matrix. Here the GMM estimator is a function of the weight 
matrix: 
Hence, estimate of θGMM =arg min { gT(θ)’WTgT(θ)}. There can be different choices of the 
weight matrix, for example it can be conceived as the Identity matrices where there are 2 
moment conditions, say g1, and g2, therefore gT=(
𝑔1
𝑔2
), the W matrix can be considered as 
to be I2. Hence QT(θ)=gT’I2gT=g12+g22. This measure is nothing but the square of 
Euclidean distance from 0. Here then both the coordinates are equally important. However 
if the choice of the W matrix is (
2 0
0 1
) then the distance will be 2g12+g22, where the first 
coordinate has more weight than the second coordinate. 
The main reason that such a mechanism should work is that the law of large numbers 
should hold, i.e. 1/T∑f(w,z.θ) tends to E(f(w,z.θ)) as T approaches infinity. Which also 
implies that if the moment conditions are correct than the GMM is consistent, which 
means that the estimate value approaches the true population value as T becomes very 
large. 
Asymptotic distribution: it is assumed that there is a central limit theorem corresponding 
to f(w,z,θ), which means √T. gT(θ) approaches N(0,S), where S is the asymptotic variance 
term. It follows then that for any positive definitive W matrix, the GMM estimator term 
has an asymptotic distribution which is given by √T(θGMM-θ0) approaches N(0,V), where 
V is the asymptotic variance. Where V= (D’WD)-1D’WSWD(D’WD)-1. 
Hence the efficient GMM estimator has the smallest possible variance. A moment with 
small variance also means it is highly informative and hence should have large weight. It 
again follows that the optimal weight matrix W has the property, plim W=S-1. Hence if 
this value is plugged into the expression of V, we get V=(D’S-1D)-1. The best moment 
conditions have small S and large D. small S implies that the sample variation or noise is 
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small. Whereas large D means moment condition is violated if θ≠θ0, and the moment is 
very informative on true values of θ0. 
Testing the over identified moment conditions: K moment conditions are sufficient to 
estimate K parameters in θ. If R>K, the validity of R-K moment condition needs to be 
tested. MM conditions demand that the K moment conditions be set equal to 0, then if R 
moment conditions are valid R-K moments should also be closed to 0. Here J test or 
Hansen test is performed for testing over identifying restrictions, for linear models Sargan 
test is used. 
3.4.  Data and variable selection 
 
 
Data extraction and variables used in this section is in continuity with the earlier sections, 
since the objective of the thesis is also to investigate whether the similar bank specific 
variables have significant impact on the adjustment process, i.e. the speed of smoothing. 
Another objective, as stated earlier, is to investigate whether the same sample of bank 
holding firms which pays dividends on a regular basis also practice smoothing of pay outs 
in general. The last objective is related to the theoretical underpinning of signaling via 
dynamic dividend pay outs, or pay outs in general (here signaling means value signaling as 
explained earlier). 
 
Data collection 
 
 
To analyze how the banking firms adjust dividend payout levels data has been extracted 
from two sources, one, balance sheet data for all listed and active BHC from COMPUSTAT, 
and two, all listed BHC stock market data (stock price, and turnover) from CRSP. Sampling 
period is 1990-2015, hence covering the financial crisis period. We have used some selection 
criteria to ensure that we can capture the adjustment process, one, dropping the bank period 
observations which have missing data for the basic variables 
used, two, selecting those banks which have paid dividends for consecutive 4 periods to 
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capture the adjustment process, three, winsorizing all variables used (standard 1% and 99% 
level) to remove any outlier effect99. 
 
Variables used 
 
 
The bank level variables used here are again based on the recent empirical literature on 
dynamic dividend adjustment. First, there are some standard opacity variables like size, bid 
ask spread over the periods, tangibility of assets, or intangibility of assets, average turnover 
or volume of trade on the firms share which will be used as the reflection of information 
asymmetry between the insider managers and the outsider shareholders. 
 
There are alternative measures of opacity among the investors in general, for example, the 
adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread, in the current section since agency 
conflict between outsiders and insiders is more critical the earlier mentioned measures have 
been used. 
 
There is a growing literature which investigates the impact of default risk measures on the 
level of dividend pay outs, since there is a theoretical suggestion that high default risk banks 
which have deposit insurance system can shift the risk to the depositors via paying out more 
dividends, and this phenomenon is more observed during the crisis periods. Such risk is 
captured by z score measures. 
 
A similar risk measure will be loan risks which is measured by non-performing assets to 
total assets, or non-performing loans to total loans. Such measures have been used in the 
current section to investigate the impact on the speed of adjustments. Along with the 
opacity measures the firm specific control variables are adopted from the standard 
dividend life cycle theory literature (Densi etal, 2008) which holds that with the change of 
the life cycle phases reflected by these suitable variables dividend pay-out levels also do 
change significantly. These measures are retained earnings to total asset(RE/TA), common 
                                                          
99 a more detailed description of data and variables is provided in the appendix section. 
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equity to total asset(CE/TA), long term debt to total asset(D/TA), and interest expenditure 
to total assets(IE/TA).  
Retained earnings to Total asset (RE/TA) : following Denis etal (2008), DeAngelo etal (2006) 
among other studies on dividend life cycle theory we use RE/TA mix as the measure of life cycle 
phase of a firm. A relative low value of the ratio indicates relatively young firm with greater 
investment opportunities as compared to the relatively matured firms with higher value of the 
ratio. The standard theory of dividend lifecycle propose that with greater retained earnings ratio 
and shrinking investment opportunities the agency conflict rises, since under information 
asymmetry between insider managers and outsider investors the latter group finds it more costly 
to monitor whether the firm managers are managing shareholders wealth or destroying the same 
by investing in negative NPV projects. Hence in such a scenario its predicted by agency theory 
that dividends should be paid out more steadily to mitigate agency conflict. However, there is no 
extensive study done on the impact of retained earnings mix on dividend smoothing, specifically 
on the speed of adjustment. 
Common equity to total asset (CE/TA): we follow Flannery etal (2010) and use CE/TA as 
another measure of lifecycle phase which is indirectly related with information asymmetry, or 
opacity level. The same author have observed that among banking firms a relatively lower 
vale of common equity reflects higher opacity level as comared to a relatively higher value, 
and this distinction has been shown very prominent during the last financial crisis 2007-09 as 
studied by the author. 
Long term debt to total asset ratio (D/TA): we follow a strong body of literature 
(Flannery,1986, Liu etal 2012) and use long term debt to asset ratio as another frim 
specific variable which indirectly reflects the bank opacity level. Earlier studies mention 
that maturity structure of debt, or interest rate spread measures, or higher outstanding long 
term debt might reflect higher level of opacity for banking firms, and this is also related to 
the fact that generally long term debt held by banks are highly illiquid due to high opacity. 
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Interest expenditure to asset ratio (IE/TA): we follow a growing body of literature (Liao 
etal, 2012, Denis etal, 2005) which use measures of interest expenditure by both banking 
and non-banking firms as a firm specific variable which is used to reflect the information 
asymmetry level, even theoretical literature (Miller, 1977) holds that greater interest 
expense ratio reflects higher information asymmetry level. However the study of the impact 
of this measure on smoothing behaviour by banks has not been done hitherto. 
Hence overall we find that both the direct measures of information asymmetry and indirect 
lifecycle or firm specific measures rationally seems to impact dividend smoothing, since 
smoothing, as predicted by the theoretical literature cited earlier, is generated by 
information asymmetry. However the nature of relationship is intriguing to study since it 
has not been investigated in details as of yet. 
 
Overall the list of the variables remain similar as in the last section on dividend signaling. 
Here as the dependent variable for the adjustment model different types of dividend pay outs 
have been used, namely, DPS, cash dividend, stock dividend, total value of the dividend paid 
out. Share repurchase data has also been used. 
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3.5. Results and Discussion100 
The table below provides results for information content of signaling through smoothing of pay outs, where the dependent 
variables are adjustment speed of dividend per share pay outs, adjustment speed of total dividend pay outs (including stock 
and cash dividend pays), and adjustment speed of total pay outs (including share repurchases). Among the bank specific 
explanatory variables a default risk dummy is also included, as described in the data and variables section. Significance of 
the impact of the explanatory variables are shown by *** as p< 0.01, ** as p value<0.05, and * as p< 0.10. Nature of 
impacts are discussed in the 
 
result section for section 2. The estimation technique is standard TOBIT. 
 
 
(1) 
(2) (3) 
 
 Adjustment Adjustment   
Adjustment   
Speed Speed   
Speed DPS 
 
 
Total dividend Total pay    
 
No. of observations 3358 3360 3395 
 
SIZE DUMMY 
0.060*** 0.001** 0.021***   
 
LEVERAGE LAG -0.005** -0.01* -.001 
 
CISIS 0.004 0.004 0.012 
 
CREDIT GRTH -0.014* -0.011 -0.001 
 
LOAN RISK -0.001 -0.001 -0.0001 
 
CAPITAL ADQCY -0.479*** -0.020*** -0.028** 
 
Default Risk Dummy -.223*** -.013* -.010 
 
RE/TA LAG -0.481*** -.036** -0.38*** 
 
EPS LAG .001 -.309*** 0.001 
 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Time dummy yes yes yes 
 
    
 
 
TABLE 4 of the section investigates the specific information content of the speed of 
adjustments related to the dividend per share adjustment, total dividend pay-out adjustment 
which comprises both stock dividends and cash dividends, and total pay-out adjustments 
which comprises dividend levels as well as the share repurchase levels. In the descriptive 
analysis section further details of comparative statistics between these adjustment speeds are 
provided. In the above table the main focus is to investigate whether or not these adjustment 
speeds reflect smoothing as a signaling tool. Hence the main focus is whether the information 
content of these adjustment speeds or smoothing processes is consistent with the earlier 
sections on dividend or pay out signaling by banking firms in general. It is already mentioned 
                                                          
100 Tables 1, 2, and 3 or the three step results of the partial adjustment model is presented in the appendix. 
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in the literature review of this section that there are multiple studies which have extended the 
seminal signaling models.  
Miller and Rock (1985), or Bhattacharya (1977) and generated dynamic signaling models 
(for example Kumar and Lee, 1984) where smoothing or partial adjustment of dividends 
have resulted which can also convey insider information, or can be used as a costly signal to 
resolve agency conflict like free cash flow problem in a dynamic setting. Of late there have 
been some empirical studies which have investigated the firm specific or industry specific 
characteristics which determines the speed of smoothing, or whether firms should smooth 
more or less. 
 
However the earlier studies have failed to investigate the firm specific adjustment speeds 
which may vary over time or periods, such heterogeneous adjustment speeds can reveal 
greater information or identify more firm specific characteristics which determines smoothing 
speed. Hence the current study has adopted a modified partial adjustment model which enable 
to estimate such heterogeneous adjustment speeds, and also such estimations are done for 
different types of adjustments comprising all three different adjustment speeds as mentioned 
above. The main contribution is however to extend the partial adjustment investigation to the 
bank holding companies and reveal the signaling nature of such adjustments. 
 
Leary and Michaely (2011) have provided a comprehensive investigation on the 
dividend smoothing determinants for the industrial firms. The main finding is 
that smoothing is more prevalent among firms where the agency costs are 
higher, which is again reflected in the fact that larger firms, more matured firms 
with larger market to book values, or larger retained earnings do smooth more. 
By smoothing more it is implied that the speed of smoothing for such firms are 
lower compared to the industry average. Such finding is in line with the 
dividend signaling investigation for the industrial firms (as explored in the last 
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section), where agency cost theory holds more that the signaling theory. In the 
above mentioned study too value signaling, or signaling or future financial 
strength is found to be a weak determinant of smoothing. 
 
Compared to the above finding it is worthwhile to recollect that for banks signaling of 
dividends or pay outs (as in the last section) in the current thesis is found to be the 
neoclassical value signaling, where solvency, financial strength, capital adequacy and related 
measures are found to be information content of pay out signaling. This difference in nature 
of signaling is the fundamental difference between the banks and non-banks, which is also 
found by Floyd et al (2015), or Forti and Schiozer (2015), but the current study extended the 
literature by investigating smoothing as signaling by banks. 
 
The estimation used in the above table is a standard panel data TOBIT which is consistent 
with the earlier section as well as the recent bank specific studies as mentioned. The first 
significant impact is of size, which means that greater is the lagged value of size higher is the 
probability of increasing the adjustment speeds by the specific banks. Again higher 
adjustment speed according to the standard definition of smoothing means lower smoothing. 
This finding in conjunction with the earlier finding of positive impact of size on pay out levels 
do confirm that the impact of size on the smoothing or pay out levels support agency cost 
theory more than signaling theory. This finding is in line with the standard empirical literature 
that larger firms or more matured firms may use dividends or pay outs as tools for mitigating 
free cash flow agency costs. In the last section the impact of retained earnings has been shown 
to have positive impact on pay out levels already. 
 
Agency cost signaling is also captured by the significant negative impact of the retained 
earnings level measure in the above table. It is clear that banks with greater retained earnings 
measure slows down the adjustment processes, or greater is the retained earnings measure 
lower is the probability of increasing the speed of adjustment. This result is compatible with 
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the impact of the retained earning level on the pay out levels in the last section, which again 
reveals that free cash flow agency cost too has a significant role to play in the adjustment 
processes for the banks. 
 
However the signaling theory lends support more to the other bank specific characteristics, 
which is again in the line with the section 1. For example, leverage level has a negative 
significant impact on the bank specific adjustment speed, which as explained in the last 
section is well supported by the signaling theory. 
 
Credit growth, which is considered as the investment opportunity for banks (Forti and 
Schiozer, 2015), is found to have similar negative impact on the bank specific adjustment 
speed as in the last section. This impact can also be explained by the neo classical signaling 
theory as in the last section. 
 
Loan risk which is found to have a significant negative impact on signaling level in the 
last section is found to have still negative impact on bank specific adjustment speed , but 
less significant. However taken together, i.e. both pay outs and adjustment speeds of pay 
outs the signaling theory lends support to the observed behaviours. 
 
Capital adequacy level has exactly the similar significant and negative impact on the 
adjustment speeds as it has on the absolute pay out levels as found in the last section. This 
probabilistic impact is well supported by the signaling theory as explored in the last section, 
or in the literature review. This impact is also observed in recent studies of bank dividend 
signaling by Forti and Schiozer (2015). 
 
Default risk dummy, as explained in the variable section, also is found to have a significant 
negative impact on the adjustment speeds, which is compatible with the recent dividend pay out 
literature for banks, i.e banks may reduce dividend during high default risk levels to build up 
capital. Here we can again recall two conflicting strands, as mentioned in details earlier, one 
strand holds that banks may cash out, or exhibit risk shifting or wealth transfers during high 
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default risk periods, and thus pay larger dividends to shareholders, the other strand however 
holds exactly opposite of this and suggests that banks use dividends to signal financial 
strength or value hence should behave the opposite way. The finding in the current thesis 
supports the costly value signaling literature rather the risk shifting strand. 
Table 5 CHAPTER 3, The table below provides results for information content of signaling through half life estimations 
(Oliviera, et al, 2014) of pay outs, where the dependent variables are adjustment speed of dividend per share pay outs, 
adjustment speed of total dividend pay outs (including stock and cash dividend pays), and adjustment speed of total pay outs 
(including share repurchases). Among the bank specific explanatory variables a default risk dummy is also included, as 
described in the data and variables section. Significance of the impact of the explanatory variables are shown by *** as p< 
0.01, ** as p value<0.05, and * as p< 0.10. Nature of impacts are discussed in the result section for section 2. The estimation 
technique is standard TOBIT. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
 Half life Half life Half life 
 
 DPS Total Div Totalpay 
 
No. of observations 3358 3360 3395 
 
SIZE DUMMY 
-.776*** -1.05*** -0.3***   
 
LEVERAGE LAG -0.005 -0.01* -.001 
 
CISIS -.207** -0.083 -0.017 
 
CREDIT GRTH 0.008 -0.015 0.004 
 
LOAN RISK 0.001 0.001 0.0001 
 
CAPITAL ADQCY 3.680*** 4.28*** 1.40*** 
 
Default Risk Dummy 0.538* 4.289*** 0.248* 
 
RE/TA LAG 6.450*** 5.86 5.05*** 
 
EPS LAG .001 0.002 0.001 
 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Time dummy yes yes yes 
 
    
 
 
 
Table 5 of the section is based on the regression results where half life is the dependent variable 
and the bank specific characteristics are the explanatory variables. The main purpose of this 
table is to investigate the information content of the half life of pay out smoothing by bank 
holding companies. The estimation technique here also is TOBIT as a consistent method with 
the earlier tables. Half life is an important measure for the smoothing behaviours as has been 
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calculated in recent studies (for example by Oliver et al (2014)). This estimate (details of the 
estimation formula is discussed in the literature review) captures the managerial expectation, 
since this estimate reveals the time taken for the managers to cover the half of the targeted 
pay out levels (which is further determined by other sets of bank specific variables as has 
been estimated in the current study, based on the standard literature, for example by Hong et 
al (2015) or Oliver et al (2014)). A simple expectation is that if rate of smoothing or 
adjustment speed is high then the half life is lower. Factors which have a negative impact on 
half life measure also speeds up the smoothing process. 
 
According to the table size has a significant negative impact on half life which varies across 
the bank holding companies over quarters in the study. The impact is probabilistic which 
means that higher is the value of lagged size lower is the probability of increasing the half life 
value, or in other words larger banks do not have the incentives to smooth more by increasing 
the half life period. This impact is in line with the result for the impact of size on the 
adjustment speed. However if we keep in mind that in the last section where signaling content 
of absolute pay outs is investigated, positive impact of size on absolute level of pay out is 
always noted. Hence two results gets clarified, one, if agency theory based explanation is 
considered then larger banks paying larger absolute dividends gets supported by the free cash 
flow theory, however that does not imply that larger banks also smooths more, rather they 
smooth less, or in other words their adjustment speeds is greater than the smaller banks. The 
smoothing result for size is again more related to information asymmetry theory, which 
suggests that larger and more diversified and reputed banks may not smooth more since the 
level of opacity is lower as relative to the more young banks with lower size, hence less 
diversified. Hence for size the signaling theory prediction is more suitable. 
 
Lagged value of the leverage variable has a negative significant impact of the total dividend 
payed out (at 10% level), which implies that for higher leverage levels of banks the half life is 
 
more, which again hints at the greater smoothing practised by the highly leveraged banks, 
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though the impact is not very consistent since the negative impact is not significant for the 
adjustment speed, hence the half life of the total pay out policy, which comprises total dividend 
pay outs as well as the buy back levels. Earlier tables however have reported more significant 
impacts of leverage levels for signaling by dividends as well as pay outs by buy outs. 
 
The impact of credit growth (which has been used in the current study as a proxy for 
investment opportunities, following Forti and Schiozer (2015) and others) is however not 
significant across the three different half life measures. Credit growth have some negative 
significant impact on the adjustment speed corresponding to the dividend per share level (as 
in the last table). However earlier in as per the signaling results in the first section of the study 
there is some significant impact of the investment opportunities on the absolute levels of pay 
outs. Here it can be observed that it is not always that the same variables affect the absolute 
value of bank specific signaling as well as bank specific speed of adjustments. Hence though 
there is a consistency between signaling and smoothing results, one cannot be considered as 
to be just an extension of the other. 
 
Loan risk or the risk of the loan portfolio of banks have consistent positive impact on the three 
half-life measures, which is consistent with the impact of the same variable on the adjustment 
speeds. Hence it can be inferred that higher is the level of portfolio risk greater is the 
probability of increasing the half-life of bank pay outs, which means more smoothing. Such 
behaviors of banks is consistent with the regulatory requirement of capital building, hence 
following a more slow adjustment process of paying out via dividends. It should be kept in 
mind that studies on the information content of bank dividends loan risk is consistently found 
to have negative probabilistic impact on the absolute level of dividends, as in the current study 
also in the earlier section. Hence in this case we find a consistency between the signaling and 
smoothing behaviours of bank holding companies in regards with the information content. 
One very critical finding is that consistency between the regulatory capital need and the 
smoothing behaviours of bank holding companies in general (which again contradicts some 
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studies on risk shifting by very large banks but lends support to the value signaling literature 
as explored earlier). The striking support for this observation comes from the result that 
capital adequacy level has consistent negative significant impact on all three types of half life 
estimations, where as in the last table capital adequacy has a consistent positive impact on all 
three estimated levels of bank specific adjustment speeds. This result indicates clearly that 
there is a compatibility between the building up of capital and more smoothing of pay outs. 
This study for the first time has shown some bank specific consistent results on the same, i.e. 
consistency between regulatory capital build up requirement, smoothing and signaling of pay 
outs. 
 
Default risk dummy as explained in the variable section captures whether the specific banks 
are above or below median level of default risk in the panel data sample. The results from the 
table clearly shows that there is a consistent positive significant impact on the half life 
estimations of the dummy variable. This result implies that specific banks which have default 
risk levels greater than the median level prefers to slow down the adjustment process, hence 
more smoothing is exhibited by such banking firms. 
 
According to this result also there is no indication of cash out hypothesis by Acharya et al 
(2011), and this result is consistent with Forti and Schiozer (2015) for absolute pay out 
levels. 
 
Retained earnings ratio has a very consistent positive significant impact on the three estimates 
of half lives, which is compatible with the agency cost of free cash flow studies (Floyd et al, 
2015; Lambrecht and Myers, 2013 among others).Throughout the earlier tables it is observed 
that free cash flow hypothesis is supported both by signaling in terms of absolute pay levels of 
dividends and smoothing of dividends, which implies that banks relatively richer in free cash 
flow signals greater dividends in absolute terms but along with it also slows down the 
adjustment process. Earlier there are only theoretical studies which have predicted such bank 
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specific behaviour. 
Subsample Result 1The table below provides a mean difference test for the adjustment speed of dividend per share pay 
outs, when the sample is split around the median values of opacity levels, and size, the first two columns reports the mean 
values of adjustment speeds above and below the medians and the third column reports the significance level of the 
differences. Such differences are then discussed in the result section, based on underlying theoretical models, namely, 
signaling theory, pecking order theory and life cycle theory. 
 
Table 6 Chapter 3 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
 Above Below Significance 
 
 Median Median Difference 
 
 Speed Speed  
 
No. of observations 3358 3358 3358 
 
Around Size 
0.3241 0.2985 0.004***   
 
Around Tangibility 0.321 0.300 0.019** 
 
Around Turnover 0.331 0.290 0.000*** 
 
Around Spread 0.311 0.300 0.990 
 
    
 
 
 
 
Difference between average adjustment speeds across banks based on median opacity values 
 
 
The partial adjustment model developed in the current thesis is different from the standard 
partial adjustment models where only average speed of adjustments can be estimated (for 
example in Flannery and Rnagan (2006)) since the modified partial adjustment model used 
in the thesis (based on Oliver et al (2014), and Hong et al (2015)) it is possible to estimate 
the bank specific and time varying adjustment speeds and half life values. 
 
Such bank specific values is then used to perform some further sub sample analysis, where 
the adjustment speed values and half life values are split around the median values of 
opacity levels, and then standard mean difference analysis is performed to investigate if 
these values of adjustment speeds and half life are significantly different from each other. 
Such subsample results give further support to the underlying theories. 
In the first subsample result, the results show that above the median size bank holding 
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companies have greater adjustment speeds compared to the adjustment speeds of below the 
median size banks, and the difference is statistically significant at 5% level. This result 
support the earlier signaling and smoothing results in a more direct way. Signaling theory 
has held that the smaller and younger banks are relatively more opaque and therefore should 
face greater need to signal more to mitigate adverse selection of equity cost mainly. 
 
Its clear from the earlier results that there are implications of signaling theory via the size 
impact, in the above table the result is more clear since only smaller and more opaque bank 
holding companies have the incentive to maintain a slower adjustment process, which means 
smoothing pay outs more (this result has to be compared with the impact of agency cost of 
free cash flow as suggested in the earlier tables). 
 
Tangibility across all the tables have consistent negative significant impact on pay out level 
of dividends which is consistent with the signaling theory, which may not be consistent with 
the pecking order theory which as explained earlier predicts opposite. 
In the subsample analysis table 1 it is clear that adjustment speed average for the bank holding 
companies have below the median level of tangible assets, hence more opaque, is less 
compared to the upper 50% of banks. Hence it can be inferred that to maintain a consistent 
pay out policy there is a compatibility between the absolute level pay out of dividends and 
smoothing of the same. 
 
However when the adjustment speed averages are compared for subsample across the below 
and above median values of turnover it is found that the difference is significant but the 
former group of bank holding companies are smoothing more compared to the later. The 
results alsoprovides no significant difference across the spread measure. 
 
Subsample Result 2 The table below provides a mean difference test for the target dividend per share levels , when the 
sample is split around the median values of opacity levels, and size, the first two columns reports the mean values of 
adjustment speeds above and below the medians and the third column reports the significance level of the differences. Such 
differences are then discussed in the result section, based on underlying theoretical models, namely, signaling theory, pecking 
order theory and life cycle theory. 
 
Table 7 Chapter 3  
 (1) (2) (3) 
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 Above Below Significance 
 
 Median Median Difference 
 
 Target Target  
 
No. of observations 3358 3358 3358 
 
Around Size 
0.421 0.311 0.000***   
 
Around Tangibility 0.337 0.395 0.000** 
 
Around Turnover 0.414 0.318 0.000*** 
 
Around Spread 0.380 0.352 0.000*** 
 
    
 
 
 
 
Difference between target pay outs as estimated from the adjustment model based on 
difference in median opacity values 
 
The partial adjustment analysis used in the thesis has also enabled the author to estimate the 
bank specific target pay outs (in terms of dividend per-share as well as other pay-out types 
which is discussed more in appendix). Again the same subsample analysis is done on these 
pay out target values. The results for the subsample analysis table 2 provides insights in to 
how the target values are changed according to the median opacity levels, which further 
reveals the importance of underlying theoretical explanation, primarily from the signaling 
and agency cost perspectives. 
 
 
 
 
Bank holding companies which have greater than the median size also sets higher pay out targets 
as dividend per share basis, and the difference between the target values is statistically significant 
at 5% level significance. This finding is consistent with the findings of the actual pay out levels. 
Hence agency cost of free cash flow can be a compatible explanation for the same. 
 
Bank holding companies with above median level of tangibility or proportionate tangible 
assets sets lower dividend per share targets compared to the below median tangibility group, 
and the difference is statistically significant at 5% level of significance. 
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This result is directly supported by the neoclassical value signaling theory, and is also 
supported by the actual pay out results in the earlier tables. Hence this result supports the 
Miller and Rocks (1985) type prediction that is at a separating equilibrium greater is the 
opacity level higher will be the pay out level or signaling level. 
 
Bank holding companies with greater than the median turnover also sets greater targets as pay 
outs, and the difference between the two sub groups is also statistically significant. This result 
is also compatible with the impact of turnover on pay outs actual as in the earlier tables. 
 
Bank holding companies with greater than the median level of bid ask spread for their 
equities also set greater pay out level targets, and the difference is significant at 5% level. 
This result is compatible with the adverse selection of equity theory which suggests that 
greater spread also reflects greater opacity between insider managers and outsider 
investors, hence higher adverse selection premium is demanded, higher dividend pay 
outs is a costly signal in this case to mitigate the cost. 
 
In more market based studies adverse selection component of bid ask spread is measured as 
the opacity level, but such measure reflects the information asymmetry premium between the 
less informed and more informed investors. 
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Subsample Result 3 The table below provides a mean difference test for the target level pay outs for the total dividend 
pay outs including cash and stock dividends, when the sample is split around the median values of opacity levels, and size, 
the first two columns reports the mean values of adjustment speeds above and below the medians and the third column 
reports the significance level of the differences. Such differences are then discussed in the result section, based on 
underlying theoretical models, namely, signaling theory, pecking order theory and life cycle theory. 
 
Table 8 Chapter 3  
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
 Above Below Significance 
 
 Median Median Difference 
 
 target target  
 
No. of observations 3360 3360 3360 
 
Around Size 
2.53 1.63 0.000***   
 
Around Tangibility 2.04 2.12 0.000** 
 
Around Turnover 2.35 1.81 0.000*** 
 
Around Spread 2.12 2.03 0.000*** 
 
    
 
 
 
Subsample result 3 provides results for the target levels for the total dividend pay outs when 
the whole sample is split around the median values of the opacity levels. 
In the standard dividend signaling literature pay outs are perfect substitute of each other 
(Bhattacharya, 1979; Miller and Rocks, 1985; Grullon et al, 2003 among others), such that the 
ultimate signaling nature is kept intact. 
However later studies like Floyd etal (2015) have argued that types of pay outs by banks 
have changed fundamentally over last decade. In specific there has been a growing tendency 
of stock dividends and share repurchases. 
 
The total dividend level in the current thesis is the sum of cash dividend and stock 
dividends. Here the speed of smoothing is for the total dividend pay outs, hence 
corresponding target levels is also the total dividend pay out targets. 
 
The average target level of total dividend pay outs for the banks of above median size is 
greater than the banks with lower median size, and the difference is significant at 1% level. 
This result is consistent with the earlier tables and supports the agency cost of free cash flow 
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theory. Bank holding companies are consistent between setting targets and actual pay outs as 
shown in the signaling results earlier. 
 
The average total dividend pay out target for the below median level tangibility banks is 
significantly greater than the upper 50% of banks. Since lower tangibility implies greater 
opacity level or higher adverse selection cost the signaling theory implies such a result. 
The result is consistent with the earlier signaling results in the first section of the thesis. 
 
When the sample is split between the median level of turnover the total dividend pay outs of 
the above median turnover banks is found to be significantly greater than that of the lower 
median turnover banks. This result also supports the theory that higher turnover is associated 
with greater adverse selection cost.When the sample is split across the spread level of the 
equity values, which represents higher adverse selection premium in general, it is found that 
the total target dividends for the above median spread level banks is significantly greater than 
that of the lower 50%. This result also supports the signaling theory under adverse selection. 
Subsample Result 4 The table below provides a mean difference test for the target level pay outs for the total pays 
including cash dividends, stock dividends, and share repurchases, when the sample is split around the median values of 
opacity levels, and size, the first two columns reports the mean values of adjustment speeds above and below the medians 
and the third column reports the significance level of the differences. Such differences are then discussed in the result 
section, based on underlying theoretical models, namely, signaling theory, pecking order theory and life cycle theory. 
Table 9 Chapter 3 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
 Above Below Significance 
 
 Median Median Difference 
 
 Target Target  
 
No. of observations 3395 3395 3395 
 
Around Size 
5.64 4.42 0.000***   
 
Around Tangibility 4.90 5.96 0.000** 
 
Around Turnover 5.55 4.51 0.000*** 
 
Around Spread 5.15 4.90 0.000*** 
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Subsample result 4 provides the results for the total pay out target levels, which comprises 
dividends in cash and stock forms and share repurchases. Recently there is a good debate on 
the substitutability of these pay out types, specifically whether repurchases can substitute 
dividends. Earlier it has been shown in the current thesis that both dividends and repurchases 
can be thought of as signals, since their information contents relate to the agency cost theory 
and more specifically to the neoclassical value signal theory. However the information 
content is more bank specific rather than supporting general studies on firms. 
 
The current table shows that the banks having greater than median size have also set greater 
total pay out targets, and the difference is significant at 1% level. This finding is consistent 
with other tables throughout. Grullon et al (2002) raised the question that why the larger and 
more matured firms pay more dividends rather than share repurchases? However for banking 
firms, as observed by Floyd et al (2015) there is nearly comparable rise in repurchases too. 
The current table supports the recent results which can again be explained by signaling, and 
or, agency theory of free cash flow. 
 
Bank holding companies are also found to set greater targets for total pay outs when their 
turnover levels are greater than the median level, and the difference is significant at 1% 
level. This finding is consistent with the adverse selection problem as explained earlier. 
Subsample result for spread is supported by the earlier target levels too. 
 
Hence for each model the result of interest is the impact of lagged opacity variables 
 
on the DPS level, hence if the corresponding p value is less than 5% then the null hypothesis 
that lagged opacity variable does not impact DPS is rejected. The outputs clearly show that 
the p values corresponding to all such pairs are all less than 5%, hence all the associated null 
hypotheses can be safely rejected. The p value corresponding to the impact of DPS lagged on 
DPS is always significant and positive for all the models, but this is not an output of main 
concern here. Hence from the results till here its clarified that the impact of opacity on 
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dividend level is significant and robust in the implied sense. For the interpretation of the 
Granger tests the p values corresponding to the null hypothesis opacity does not G causes 
DPS is exhibited, and here too the rejection rule is same i.e. the p values should be less 
than 5%. In the table the first figure for the G tests against all the pairs is the chi-squared 
statistics, and the corresponding figure is the p value. 
Various adjustment speeds of pay outs 
 
 
In the current thesis different pay out types have been considered, namely, dividend per share 
(DPS), total dividend pay outs including cash dividends and stock dividends, and total 
payout including dividend pay outs and share repurchases. Hence the same partial adjustment 
model is utilized to measure the speed of adjustments of the last two pay out variables also. 
The below tables provides results for whether there has been significant differences in the 
mean value of speed of adjustment among these pay outs. Again in the relevant current 
literature such bank specific speed of adjustment comparisons are rare. Such comparisons 
may enhance our insight regarding the signaling / smoothing behaviors of banking firms. 
 
 
Table Results 10 Chapter 3 
 
VARIABLE OBS MEAN STD.ERROR STD.DEV 
SOA DPS 3196 .3145 0.0049 0.2780 
SOA total 3196 0.0694 0.0009 0.0509 
dividend pay     
H0: MEAN (SOA DPS) - MEAN (SOA total dividend pay) = 
0 Ha: difference of means < 0 
 
Pr(T<t) = 1.000  t = 49.018 
 
The above table provides a mean difference result between the DPS and the total dividend pay 
out, the mean SOA for the DPS is significantly higher than that of the total dividend pay out, 
again the standard deviation measure of total dividend pay out is also smaller than that of the 
DPS, which indicates that bank holding firms smooth total dividends more than the DPS 
which further calls for investigating the strategic targeting of the cash dividend and stock 
dividend pay outs by the banks. 
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VARIABLE OBS MEAN STD.ERROR STD.DEV 
SOA DPS 3196 .3145 0.0049 0.2780 
SOA total pay 3196 0.2191 0.0028 0.1611 
H0: MEAN (SOA DPS) - MEAN (SOA total pay) = 0 
 
Ha: difference of means < 0 
 
Pr(T<t) = 1.00  t = 16.018 
 
Above results show that the speed of adjustment of DPS is significantly higher than that 
of the total pay which also comprise the share repurchases data. As has already been 
shown in the result sections that share repurchases do have signaling content, it is also 
evident from the above table that share repurchases also play significant role in 
smoothing of pay outs.  
Dividend smoothing before, during and since the crisis 
 
 
As already discussed in the thesis that there has been a considerable amount of interest in the 
payout patterns by bank holding firms during and since the financial crisis (2007-2009) the 
current section provides some results for bank dividend smoothing. The main objective here is 
to investigate if there has been some significant structural shifts in the speed of adjustment of 
dividend payed out, between before, during and since the crisis period. There have been 
studies, as mentioned earlier, regarding pay outs, however less studies are done about 
structural shifts in speed of adjustment of bank pay outs. 
 
 
VARIABLE OBS MEAN STD.ERROR STD.DEV 
SOA before crisis 2316 0.2777 0.0037 0.1814 
SOA during 821 0.3054 0.0070 0.2028 
crisis     
H0: MEAN (SOA before) - MEAN (SOA during crisis) = 0 
 
Ha: difference of means < 0 
 
Pr(T<t) = 0.0001  t = -3.7027 
 
In the above table the mean value of speed of adjustment of dividend per share (SOA) is 
observed for a subsample, before and during the crisis period (2007-2009 quarter 1), two 
sample t test clarifies that the null hypothesis of no mean difference is rejected at 1% level of 
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significance, which shows that the mean value of SOA during the crisis was significantly 
higher than the mean value of SOA before the crisis period (which in this case is quite 
considerable since it starts from 1981 in the current sub sample till 2006 last quarter). 
The significant impact of lagged opacity variables on next period DPS is intact after this 
splitting. Hence overall there are two robustness checks, one, with four separate measures 
of opacity levels, and two analyzing whether the significance of impacts remain intact for 
the relatively more opaque firms. However, as will be clarified later in case of the impact 
of lagged turnover on the DPS level there is a significant change in the sign of the 
coefficient for the more opaque banks. Significant results are obtained for three pairs, viz, 
size, DPS, turnover, DPS, and Spread, DPS. 
 
Previous findings on the impact of opacity on dividend smoothing 
 
 
There is a scarcity of empirical studies in the area for the banking firms, however, recently 
thorough studies have been done on the non-financial firms, and these papers don’t lend 
support to the standard signaling theories. For example Leary etal (2011) find that smoothing 
is prevalent among those non-financial firms which are larger, matured, less financially 
constrained, have more tangible assets, and face less agency conflict emerging from opacity 
problems, as opposed to the firms which have opposite characteristics hence are supposed to 
be more opaque. Deangelo etal (2008) have also observed similar deviation in practice from 
theoretical predictions. 
However, even theoretically as mentioned earlier its not absolutely clear that whether 
banking firms can be treated similarly as their non banking counterparts, and whether similar 
kinds of results should be expected for them. Given this back drop this paper finds significant 
difference in the results for the banks in the sample which might overall suggest that there is 
better match between theory and practice in this case. More specifically in the line of the 
theoretical dividend smoothing models, as explored in the literature review, there is a good 
indication that for banking firms opacity level has a general tendency to generate smoothing 
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behaviour which is evident form the results from the partial adjustment model as explained 
earlier. 
 
3.6. Conclusion 
 
 
The following passages discuss the possible contributions by the current section in the 
literature of bank dividend signaling and smoothing. 
 
3.6.1 Capital regulation and dividend smoothing by bank holding companies: thesis findings 
 
 
Since the financial crisis of 2007-2009 there has been a sharp attention in the academic world 
on the relation between the dividend pay outs by the commercial banks and the regulation on 
capital requirements for the banks. Studies like Hsiao and Tseng (2016) and Acharya et al 
(2011) have shown that there are significant impact of the rising of capital requirements on 
the bank dividend pay out policies in the developed capital markets, for example in USA. 
 
Hsiao and Tseng (2016) have provided a robust un-balanced panel data analysis for 
cross country banking firms where they have found significant negative impact of the 
capital regulation on the dividend pay out levels. The authors have reported similar 
results for developed as well as developing economies. 
Brunnermeier et al( 2009) has earlier suggested that bank capital requirement should be 
adhered to by the commercial banks other wise they should face sanctions, since the capital 
requirements are required for maintaining solvency and liquidity for the banking firms. 
 
Onali (2010) has argued that bank dividend policy and capital requirement are two pillars 
for maintaining a prudent management policy overall. It has been well noted in the literature 
that it is very costly for the banks themselves to maintain capital requirements. Banks can 
achieve so either by raising costly external equity capital, and, or reducing the supply of 
credit in the system (Walsh and Wilcox, 1995; Akhter et al., 2010). However the last option 
is not favoured by the policymakers too for its negative externalities for the economic 
growth. 
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Along with the standard regulatory arguments like above, there have been a few studies on the 
bank dividend signaling during crisis (Abreu and Gulamhussen (2013)). Such studies have 
provided at best a very mixed results of whether signaling and smoothing by bank dividends 
can be related to capital requirements. 
 
There are however some recent studies which have investigated the signaling content of the 
dividend pay outs (Forti and Schizer, 2015) which include the capital adequacy levels for 
banks. Such studies based on panel data TOBIT models have shown significant relationship 
between dividend pay outs and the regulatory ratios. Hence the current thesis section has built 
upon such studies to investigate the role of such variables on the dynamic signaling by the 
bank holding firms, or dividend smoothing. 
 
Based on such studies there are several related hypotheses in this area, for example 
dividend smoothing hypothesis which relates the low growth and more profitable banks 
with more smoothing, there is then the regulation hypothesis which argues that bank 
holding companies may reduce dividends, and even omit them due to rise in regulatory 
pressure. 
However there is a critical gap in the current empirical literature in this context, since the 
direct impact of the capital requirement / capital adequacy level on the bank specific 
smoothing behaviour is not analysed. Such papers only provide an industry wide or country 
wide surveys. In the current thesis based on the partial adjustment model developed in this 
section it has been possible to measure the impact of capital adequacy level on bank specific 
adjustment speeds, and also on the bank specific half life period measurements. 
 
The results are quite consistent for all types of dividend pay outs, and the main finding is 
that there is a negative significant impact of the capital adequacy level on the adjustment 
speeds, and a positive significant impact on the bank specific half life periods. 
 
The finding is new, and this finding demonstrate that if the capital adequacy level is higher 
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then the bank holding companies would slow down the dividend adjustment process, and this 
is well compatible with the dynamic signaling theory, since slowing down of dividend 
adjustment signals solvency and liquidity management better. 
 
Here the difference between the findings of the standard studies and the thesis is called for 
attention, while in the standard studies the main finding is about reduction or omission of 
dividend levels, which is not clearly related to the costly signaling nature of pay outs, in the 
current thesis the finding is specifically about the smoothing process which contains the 
nature of costly signaling as argued elsewhere. 
 
A brief note on the dividend smoothing and signaling since the crisis: empirical evidence 
 
 
Since one of the main objectives of the current thesis is to investigate whether dividend 
smoothing can be a form of dynamic signaling, it’s important to summarize some very 
recent findings which are however more general, rather based on banking firms. Nguyen et 
al (2016) have provided good empirical evidence that firms in general in developed markets, 
specifically, in US have followed the dividend smoothing pattern since the crisis to keep 
paying large dividends, which the authors reason as the attempt to signal reputation to the 
potential investors. Hence for these firms dividend smoothing and dividend signaling 
complement each other’s. 
 
One the other hand the firms in the emerging economies, specifically, Philippines, Malaysia, 
and Indonesia have failed to pay out larger dividends in the post crisis period. However these 
firms have exhibited smoothing in a consistent manner. Again firms in Thailand and 
Singapore though have increased dividend pay outs since the crisis period, have failed to 
maintain any smoothing pattern. 
 
Hence one outcome of these recent studies is that dividend signaling naturally may not 
imply dividend smoothing. Again the stage of development of the financial markets as a 
whole may also have played some significant role in the firm behaviors. 
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The rationale for investigating the impact of crisis on the dividend signaling and smoothing 
behaviors is that during financial crisis firms may undergo greater external financial 
constraints, or in other words cost of capital may be higher than the normal or boom periods, 
which may increase the cost of paying outs (external capital constraint theories have been 
discussed briefly earlier in the thesis). Hence it might be worth studying the applicability of 
signaling and smoothing models in such structural shift conditions. 
 
However in the current study as the results section reveal that there has been a steady practice 
of dividend smoothing by the US bank holding firms. Results in this section thus also raises 
the question that whether bank holding firms should be treated at par with the non-banking 
firms, or in other words the bank holding firms may be more resilient in their behavior 
compared to the firms in general during crisis times. Overall the purpose the value signaling 
seems to be more important for the banking firms, which has the rationale in that the 
reputation capital is most critical in the banking business. 
Panel data causality results 
 
 
The granger causality results in the above table show that for long run the dividend policy or 
the pay out level is significantly correlated with the information asymmetry level for at least 
one lag. This can be interpreted as higher information asymmetry would lead to higher pay 
out policies. This result is consistent with those theoretical models which predict that at 
equilibrium dividend pay out level is an increasing function of opacity level, for example in, 
Bhattacharya (1979), Miller and Rocks (1985), William and John (1985), John and Lang 
(1991), Khan (2006)101. 102 
  
Further cautions on panel data causality tests 
 
 
                                                          
101 However these results are contrary to the findings of Li and Zhao (2008), or, Valipor et al(2009). 
 
102  Granger causality result shows a significant value (F or the p value since) which confirms that the 
direction of causality is from lagged opacity variable to the current dividend pay out level and not the other 
way round, or there is no so called feed back effect. 
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Dumitrescu and Herlin (2011) observe that Granger causality test of panel data for auto 
regressive models entails testing linear restrictions on the coefficients of the model. Granger 
(2003) observes that if one variable x causes another variable y for every panel observation, 
then it can be used as a strong hypothesis. Technically it can be said that x causes y when any 
other information set which excludes x can not predict y better. Hence in case of panel data if 
the causality of x to y is observed for N individuals then the problem boils down to estimating 
 
the optimal information set required to predict y. The most general solution adapted is to 
test the causality of ith element of x on jth element of y, when i =j, and when i #j. The last 
solution is relatively more restrictive and can be derived from the time series analysis, 
which simply measures the causal relationship for a given individual. 
 
 
 
 
3.6.2 Contribution to the extant empirical literature 
 
 
The relevant literature review has demonstrated that though the dynamic dividend adjustment 
literature is well developed since Lintner (1956) to Flannery and Rangan (2006) there is a 
very thin literature for the bank holding firms. Only recently there has been some important 
contributions (Oliver et al, 2015, Hong etal, 2016103) on the capital structure adjustments of 
BHCs. Hence from that perspective the current study is among the earliest such systematic 
study on the bank dividend smoothing under the impact of several bank specific factors. 
 
The main aim of the study has been to investigate the impact of different bank specific factors 
such as opacity levels, default risk levels, capital adequacy levels, credit growth levels, loan 
risk levels, along with bank life cycle variables eg, retained earnings to asset mix, on the bank 
specific speeds of adjustments and allied measures. Here is another contribution to the 
standard empirical methods used in the dividend smoothing literature, since the earlier studies 
have mainly estimated the industry average speed of adjustment measures, but not bank 
                                                          
103 Working paper where the authors measured the impact of several bank specific and industry specific 
variables on the speed of adjustment of capital structure. Opacity variables were also included in the 
investigation. 
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specific measures. 
 
Hence bank specific heterogeneity has been studied which has been ignored by the earlier 
general studies. From this perspective the current section builds upon the two afore 
mentioned studies on capital structure adjustments for BHCs and extend the same for the 
dividend smoothing behaviour.  
3.6.3 Exploring the underlying theories 
 
 
As observed in the literature review there have been many studies where theoretically it is 
predicted that agency cost and information asymmetry between managers and shareholders 
might generate dividend smoothing. However in the theoretical literature too there is no 
satisfactory model which can explain the dynamic dividend behaviour of banking firms. 
 
Most of the empirical studies in this regard have been mainly for the industrial firms 
which have mainly investigated the theoretical predictions of earlier information 
asymmetry based models or agency cost based models. However there is no systematic 
investigation for the banking firms in this regard. 
 
Again the last section it is observed that there are many bank specific factors which play 
significant roles in determining the dividend and other pay out levels, hence the current 
section builds upon the first section to investigate the impact of the same set of bank specific 
variables on the speed of smoothing and bank specific half life periods. Hence overall the 
attempt has been to investigate whether the dynamic adjustment of pay outs can play the role 
of signaling based on the similar theoretical models. 
 
The analysis section demonstrates very strongly that the dividend smoothing in different 
forms have similar significant relations with the same set of bank specific factors as is in the 
case of signaling. Specifically, opacity levels, life cycle factors, risk factors and capital 
adequacy levels have similar significant impacts on the speed of adjustments as well as bank 
specific half life periods. Again as explained in the analysis section the underlying theoretical 
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explanations relate to adverse selection, agency cost, moral hazard and income smoothing 
literature. 
3.6.4 A technical note on the current analysis 
 
 
As any study in corporate finance, the current study also has some limitations, it has been 
clarified that there are several underlying theories which are contending candidates for 
explaining the dividend policies by firms. However one common string running through all of 
such theories is information asymmetry among insider managers and outsiders (may be 
shareholders, creditors, other stake holders in case of banking), which generates multiple 
types of adverse selection, and or moral hazard problems, which are captured in a dispersed 
way in various such theoretical models. Hence as a solution to such problems signaling and 
smoothing of dividend pay outs have been suggested. The current thesis is devoted to the 
analysis in the same line for banking firms, however this also means that variables chosen in 
the current thesis is mainly firm level variables, be it life cycle or opacity levels, which 
immediately raises some limitations as below: 
 
 
 
 
1. As many authors observe that business cycles and macro-economic shocks arises 
often which impact the pay out policies randomly, as Singhania and Gupta (2015) 
observe  
that such shocks can generate unexplained and at times opposite results which can’t be 
easily explained based on neoclassical theories. For example in case of such shocks 
the dependent variable along with the explanatory variables will be impacted most 
likely in the same direction which might bias the estimations. 
 
2. The partial adjustment model developed in this study is a modification on Lintner’s 
original model, there are some alternative formulation of such models where along 
with partial adjustment rational adaptation is also included, for example, Waud ‘s 
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model (1966) which is a second order rational distributed lag order model (which has 
been recently modified by some authors like Kumar et al (2001), or, Fama and 
Baibak’s ETM or earning’s trend model (1968). However such models don’t consider 
the impact of information asymmetry level on the adjustment behavior.  
 
3. Here we provide a brief discussion on the dynamic panel data model as the suitable 
method to analyse the partial adjustment model instead of any other model like OLS or 
fixed effect. Generally if we consider any adjustment model of the following type, Yi,t = 
αYi,t-1+(μi+ei,t), we have two error terms, one the time invariant error which is 
again a function of firm specific characteristics, and the other the usual residual term 
which is a function of both firm specific characteristics and time, again since residuals  
 
of Yi,t-1 can be correlated with the time invariant error part any estimation of the 
above model by OLS will lead to an upward bias(Baltagi, 2001, Bond, 2002)  
hence other estimation techniques have to be called for, again specific to the 
adjustment model we use here if fixed effect regression technique is adopted then 
there would be bias in the estimation of the speed of adjustment (Oliver etal), hence 
we have chosen a difference GMM technique, a system GMM might be a better 
technique in the sense that it might have increased the efficiency of estimation, but as 
observed by previous studies since system GMM uses more no of instruments than 
difference GMM it might not be efficient to use in case of relatively less no of periods 
in the panel data, since this might weaken the diagnostic test results for AR. 
Limitations of this technique however rests on the fact that if there is high serial 
correlation problem in the error term and the dependent variable is highly persistent 
then the estimates by GMM would not be consistent, and this problem will show up in 
the AR test diagnostics, in our case the Hansen test for all the estimations is robust 
every time. 
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Chapter 4 (Investigation of risk shifting via pay outs by bank holding companies) 
 
 
4.1 Abstract 
 
 
There is a strong theoretical strand of literature which supposes that bank holding firms 
exhibit risk shifting, i.e. transfer of wealth from creditors to shareholders in general, hence 
shifting risk from share-holders to creditors. However there is no comprehensive study on 
whether such risk shifting can occur via pay outs mainly dividend pay outs, and through 
dynamic adjustment or partial adjustment of dividend pay outs. The current study builds 
upon the extant empirical literature to investigate the very problems. Based on a data set 
on BHCs from merged data bases of CRSP and COMPUSTAT for the period 1990-2015 
the study provides an early such investigation on risk shifting via dynamic pay out 
behaviours of bank holding firms. 
 
Key words: risk shifting, dividend pay outs, agency conflict theory, and dividend smoothing 
 
4.2 Introduction 
 
 
4.2.1Theoretical basis of risk shifting via pay outs: introduction 
 
 
The current section is a further extension on the first two sections of the thesis. In this section 
a very specific issue is investigated, namely, risk shifting via pay out policies of banks. Risk 
shifting is not a new problem to be investigated in corporate finance in general and banking in 
particular. There have been seminal theoretical models by Merton (1977), Keely (1990), 
among others who have observed that given the deposit insurance guarantees, or implicit bail 
out guarantees there can be a tendency among the bank managers to pay excessive dividends 
during bankruptcy such that wealth is transferred from the depositors end to the shareholders 
and hence risk is transferred in the opposite direction. However, there have been rare 
empirical studies to verify the risk shifting hypothesis. Risk shifting via pay outs in banking 
have again surfaced as a critical issue since the financial crisis of 2007-09.  
Costly dividend signaling has been well studied for general firms (Bhattachraya, 1977,Miller 
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and Rocks, 1985, Kumar and Lee, 1981), and the general consensus among the economists is 
that dividends can be used to signal future earnings growth, or solvency under specific 
scenarios. A huge body of empirical works have also provided support for the efficacy of 
dividend signaling for firms in general. For banking firms however there is a lack of well-
founded dividend signaling theory. Some recent attempts theorise dividend signaling as a 
strategy adopted by the informed insider managers to convey solvency to the less informed 
outside shareholders, and depositors, which again may help restore confidence in them and 
prevent unnecessary panic driven bank runs (Diamond and Dygvig, 1983). However the 
recent developments in the banking sectors worldwide (referring to the banking debacle in the 
last financial crisis) reveals that dividend signaling by banks are far too complex as far as 
their implications go as compared to the earlier simplistic theoretical models104.  
 
A more specific problem which has been exhibited widely by the banks with high default 
risk is risk shifting via dividend pay outs (Achraya et al 2011), which has roots in the earlier 
theoretical models (Merton, 1977) which predicts that given implicit guarantee schemes 
banks with high default probability might shift wealth from depositors to shareholders via 
large dividend payments, and hence would shift risk in the opposite direction. Acharya 
etal(2012) builds upon this strand and propose a simple risk shifting model via dividend pay 
outs.Hence here lies the trade off, on one hand steady dividend pay outs under information 
asymmetry may work as costly signals for future solvency or earning growths, but on the 
other hand, large dividend pay outs may also exhibit risk shifting. The basic problem which 
the current model wants to investigate is whether Acharya etal ‘s model (and alike) can be 
modified to introduce dividend signaling yet prevent risk shifting. 
 
However the problem of risk shifting is also very much an agency conflict problem, since 
                                                          
104 Overall the root of complexity rises from the fact that there are many stake holders in the model, insider 
bankers, depositors, shareholders, regulator and the society at large which suffers from the negative externalities. 
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its clear that there are winners (shareholders) and losers (depositors) in the process. 
Therefore to reach at any equilibrium solution the inherent agency conflict has to be 
mitigated. 
 
There have been many surveys (for example, Acharya et al, 2013, Adamati et al, 2013 a, b) of 
dividend pay out patterns by banks during the financial crisis period. Acharya et al (2013) in 
an influential theoretical study have observed that even though the losses were accumulating 
during the crisis banks kept on maintaining a smooth dividend pay out policy. Such 
observations were made in the US as well as UK banking systems. However it is not clear 
from such studies whether dividend smoothing played an important role in risk shifting, or 
whether more generally pay out smoothing played any critical role in the same. 
 
In the imperfect capital markets with presence of frictions like agency conflicts matters for the 
firm valuations (Harris and Raviv, 1991, Myers, 2001). Here arises the opportunities where the 
shareholders can exploit the debt holders by substituting safer assets with riskier assets. The 
standard rationale behind such behavior is that if the risky assets pay off then the shareholders 
may keep the maximum portion of returns and the debt holders due to limited liability and 
seniority of claims will be able to capture only a fixed proportion. Hence shareholders have the 
incentive to invest in negative NPV projects with very low probability of success. The moral 
hazard perspective on the very problem is that after the debt contract is finalized in practice the 
shareholders have the incentive, and can make the managers (hidden action) to invest in riskier 
projects which would undermine the debt holders interest. Hence if such moral hazard 
activities are realized then the shareholders would not like to keep the amount of ‘skin’ in the 
game which would be compatible with the underlying risk, which in other words would mean 
risk being shifted towards debt holders.  
In banking sector risk shifting can be particularly higher, since the leverage in this sector is 
systematically higher than in the other sectors (Berger et al, 1995). Again most of the 
liabilities in a commercial bank is in the form of deposits, where the owners of such deposits 
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have less resources and incentives to monitor the managers effectively (Capiro and Summers, 
1993). There have been creation of safety nets for the depositors through out the developed 
world, however as many authors (Bhattacharya and Thakor, 1998) have observed that creation 
of such safety nets have actually enhanced the moral hazard possibilities manifold. Risk 
shifting under deposit insurance however is no towards the depositors but towards non 
depositor based debt holders, as shown by Duran and Vivas (2014). Hence later capital 
requirements have been imposed on the bankers which may force the shareholders to keep 
greater skin in the game compatible with the underlying risk105. 
 
The empirical literature in banking have studied the impacts of deposit insurance, solvency 
regulation, the lender of last resort function of central banks, and market discipline over the 
incentives of moral hazards (for example, Berger et al, 1995, Stolz, 2002, Freixas and Rochet, 
2008, Degryse et al, 2009). Recently Duran and Vivas (2015) have contributed to the 
empirical literature by investigating various types of risk shifting in banking, where the main 
finding is that through various channels banks do shift risk from shareholders to non deposit 
based debt holders. 
 
Hence based on this evolving literature the current section builds upon some recent empirical 
studies of risk shifting (For example by Duran and Vivas (2015)) by banks, and extends the 
same to investigate whether risk shifting was practiced via pay outs, and more specifically by 
smoothing of pay outs. From this perspective too the current study is first of its kind. In the 
below section first of all a theoretical background of risk shifting is provided, which is 
followed by empirical literature review, methodology build up, results and analysis. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
105 Kauko (2014) in a theoretical model has investigated the potential of the bailouts to create significant moral 
hazard problems rather than creating franchise values for banks. 
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4.3 Literature review: 
 
 
4.3.1Theoretical studies 
 
 
Acahraya et al (2013) has observed that during the financial crisis of 2007-09 it is not only that 
the large bank holding companies, for example, Bank of America, JP Morgan and others 
maintained smooth dividend pay outs, but also some securities firms such as Lehman Brothers 
and Merril Lynch actually increased their pay outs, even when their losses were accumulating 
which even triggered their bankruptcy. Such behaviours can not be rationalised by perfect 
capital market theories like Miller and Modigliani propositions (1958), but has to be 
understood from the perspective of a specific kind of risk shifting or asset substitution process 
which prefers equity holders over the creditors in general. Such risk shifting is in line with 
agency conflict theory proposed by Jensen and Meckling (1976). 
 
There is a related and vast literature on moral hazard and managerial risk taking. Theoretically 
such risk taking behaviour generates from the convex pay off structure of the equity capital106. 
Saunders et al (1990) have provided early empirical evidence that banks whose managers have 
greater equity stakes, which also make them favour equity holders over the debt holders, are 
more prone to risk shifting since the managers are incentivised to invest in excessive risky 
assets. For less stake in equity the risk shifting tendency also falls. However these theoretical 
and early empirical studies have proposed risk shifting via the standard mechanism of 
excessive risky investment, but the recent financial crisis has shown that such can also be 
achieved via dividend pay outs107. 
Acharya et al (2013) provides first such theoretical model based on agency conflict. The very 
authors argue that when leverage is extremely high value transfers from debt holders to 
shareholders can be substantial, or in other words banks do have incentives to pay large 
                                                          
106 Earlier, Galai and Masulis (1976), have argued that since the debt holders cant do effective monitoring, and their control 
can be realized only on an ex-post basis, share holders can increase their equity value by increase of asset risk, which is 
equivalent to incentivizing managers to take on more risk. 
107 Rather pay outs can be considered as to be channels of risk shifting, as is investigated in the current thesis 
also. 
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dividends when the if their franchise value (which can be considered as to be the expected 
value of future cash flows) becomes too low108.  
 
Duran and Vivas (2014) have provided a comprehensive analysis of risk shifting among the 
US banks. The authors propose that type and paths through which transfer of risk takes place 
depends on the types of debt holders of banks to whim the risk is transferred. The authors have 
applied this methodology to a sample of US banks for the period 1998-2-11. The main purpose 
has been to study the relationship between types of risk shifting and financial crisis. For the 
subsample studies they have found that risk shifting is present for the pre-crisis and crisis 
periods, but such phenomena is absent after the crisis from 2008 onwards. The study has found 
that risk transfer has been from the shareholders to the non deposit based debt holders (since 
the deposits are normally covered by the implicit or explicit guarantees by the regulator). In the 
very study two types of bank specific variables are used, one, which directly demonstrate the 
process of risk shifting, two, variables which incentivise or dis-incentivise risk shifting. For 
example capital buffer is found to be one such dis-incentivising factor for banks. However this 
empirical study is different from the strand of literature which holds that pay outs by banks, 
mainly dividend pay outs can act as a channel of risk shifting. There is no indication in Duran 
and Vivas (2014) that pay outs have incentivised or dis-incentivised risk shifting. Hence the 
current study or the section of the current thesis builds upon the methodology of Duran and 
 
Vivas (2014) of system of equations and extends the same to investigate whether risk 
shifting has been incentivised by pay out mechanisms (dividends and share repurchases 
included)of bank holding companies in USA. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
108 There are critical differences between the dividend behaviours of the security companies and the bank holding 
companies, specifically for the large securities firms the franchise value have been worse hit during the crisis, 
since their franchise values are driven by flight prone customer relationship, compared to much more illiquid 
assets or loans in case of commercial banks. 
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4.3.2 Theory of risk shifting in banking 
 
 
According to the standard literature at any given level of capital to asset ratio any risk taking or 
risk enhancement in the banks’ portfolio of asset is considered as risk shifting. This risk change 
or increase can also be perceived as an investment strategy which increases the probability of 
default or losses which are to be absorbed by debt holders only. Whereas in this gamble the 
bulk of the return would go the shareholders109.  
 
Empirical investigation (as by Duran and Vivas (2014) for example) on risk shifting among 
banks have observed that if such risk shifting happens then there should be a negative 
relationship between the changes in risk and capital –to-assets ratio. Such relationship brings 
forth the underlying moral hazard problem in banking. Duran and Vivas (2014, 2015) further 
argues that on an average banks which increase risk also reduces their capital-to-assets ratio, 
which then becomes a strong signal for risk shifting. 
 
The standard literature in bank risk shifting has mainly focussed on the moral hazard problem 
created by deposit insurance or any other bail out guarantee (Berger et al, 1995; Van Hoose, 
2007; Frexias and Rochet, 2008; Degryse et al, 2009), however these studies have not 
investigated the methods of risk shifting or types of risk shifting in banks. Recent studies both 
 
theoretical as well as econometric have started addressing the issue. 
 
Risk shifting has always remained at the core of regulation in the banking industry, specifically 
for the capital regulation (Frexias and Rochet, 2008). Opacity of banking industry also plays an 
important role in risk shifting, for example as Myers and Rajan (1998) argued that the relative 
ease with which banks can transfer risk is the result of opacity which does not allow the 
outsider creditors to observe such risk transfers. Then certainly there is a strong literature on 
the risk incentivising role of the bail out guarantees (Bhattacharya and Thakor, 1993). 
                                                          
109 Again it also follows from the above argument that shareholders incentive to engage in the risk shifting will 
increase if their stake in the bank capital is reduced, this rationale also follows the standard skin in the game 
theory (Stiglitz and Hellman, 2000). Hence to prevent this pervert incentives there has been strong 
recommendations for capital buffer build up. 
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However this straight forward relationship between risk shifting and deposit insurance does 
not lack ambiguity, for example in contradiction to the deposit insurance subsidy hypothesis 
many banks do keep their capital ratio above the regulatory minimum (Ayuso et al, 2004; 
Lindquist, 2004; Jokipi and Milne, 2008; Stolz and Wedow, 2011). There are also some 
empirical evidence which suggest that deposit insurance are overpriced (Marcus and Shaked, 
1984; Ronn and Verna, 1986, Pennachi, 1987). Again the relationship between deposit 
insurance and risk shifting is also not homogenous, for example some recent studies have 
argued that the exact sign of relationship depends on other bank specific variables 
(Hovakimian et al, 2003; Bushman and Williams, 2012). 
 
Shrieves and Dahl (1992) have been the first of studies which have proposed a relationship 
between capital and risk changes in banks. However Duran and Vivas (2014) have expanded 
on the earlier approach to establish a more generalised investigation regarding the whole 
financial structure of the banks, hence they include capital, and debt as well as deposits in their 
systems of equations to identify types of risk shifting and also bank specific variables which 
incentivise risk shifting. Based on the specific method the authors propose four types of risk 
shifting, one, double sided risk shifting where the risk is shifted to both depositors and non-
deposit debt holders, two, deposit based risk shifting where the risk is shifted to depositors 
only, other debt based risk shifting where the risk is shifted towards non deposit based debt 
holders, and unclassified risk shifting where though risk shifting is present it is unclear to 
whom the risk is shifted110.  
 
Risk shifting problem is also at the core of banking regulation, mainly the capital regulation 
(Freixas and Rochet,2008). Since the increase in the capital requirement actually force the 
shareholders to have more skin in the game, hence their motive of making banks increase the 
risk of their assets reduces. However here a counterargument is that uniform capital regulation 
                                                          
110 In all of these cases however, risk is always shifted from the equity holders, and the main initiation is by 
increasing risk taking by the banks. 
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may not reduce the incentive of increasing risk sufficiently and hence there will remain 
significant insolvency (Koehnand Santomero, 1980; Kim and Santomero, 1988; Rochet, 
1992). Hence a more bank level oriented study is required. 
 
The literature of risk shifting in banking is generally a theoretical literature, and very less 
attention has been focused on the empirical study of risk shifting, let alone the relation between 
dividend pay outs and the risk shifting in banking.111 
 
Theoretically as observed by Myers (1977) onwards, there can be a deposit insurance subsidy. 
According to this theory in the presence of full deposit insurance the banks would shift risk 
via relaxed capital requirements to the tax payers, since during default scenario such banks 
have to be bailed out. However deposit insurance guarantee does not explain the empirical 
observations, where banks do have capital above the minimum requirements (Ayusoet al., 
2004; Lindquist, 2004; Jokipii and Milne, 2008; Stolz andWedow, 2011). There are various 
strands of literature which have observed that the relationship between risk shifting and deposit 
insurance is at best ambiguous112.  
 
4.3.3 Empirical studies on bank dividend pay outs during 2007-09 crisis 
 
 
Bank dividend pay outs during the financial crisis has been studied by Acharya et al (2013) 
more comprehensively than others. The authors have concentrated on large BHCs in USA 
which were converted to bank holding companies in 2008. These large firms include Bank of 
Amercica, JP Morgan Chase, Wells Fargo, Wachovia, Washinton Mutual, Goldman Sachs, 
Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch, and Lehman Brothers. For all of these large firms dividends 
were paid continuously even in 2008, this is striking since at this time there was 
                                                          
111 There are a few studies on the correlation between bank dividend pay outs and default risk of banks (Onali, 2013) however, 
the current section draws upon the further agency theoretic definitions of risk shifting, and attempts to extend the literature via 
investigating the role of bank specific pay outs and dynamic adjustment of such pay outs. 
 
112 There can be positive relation ((Demirgüc¸ -Kunt and Detagriache, 2002; Grossman, 1992; Wheelock, 
1992;Wheelock and Wilson, 1995), or negative relation ((Gropp andVesala, 2004), or complex relationship 
which is dependent on other bank specific variables (Hovakimian et al., 2003;Bushman and Williams, 2012). 
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recommendations from regulators to cutback dividends and build up capital. The authors have 
shown that these bank holding companies have maintained a smooth dividend pay out pattern, 
though whether technically these banks were smoothing dividends have not been studied in the 
very work. For some firms, for example, Merrill Lynch the pay outs were increased in the later 
half of 2008. One striking feature about all of the bank holding companies which either 
increased their dividends or smoothed their dividends during the peak of crisis was that they 
either failed completely or were taken over by the state. Hence if the standard definition of risk 
shifting is kept in mind then it becomes apparent that implicit or explicit bail out guarantees 
played an important role in the dividend pay outs during the crisis period. In the current thesis 
a more comprehensive study of risk shifting is attempted, where the sample comprises all listed 
bank holding companies as in the matched COMPUSTAT-CRSP data base. 
 
Acharya et al (2013) have also observed that there has been significant and drastic changes in 
 
the dividend pay outs by most of these large bank holding companies since 2008. There are 
outliers both in the high side and low side. Firms like Lehman Brothers and Merrill Lynch 
were on the high side since they doubled their dividend pay outs during 2008 as compared to 
first quarter of 2007. Shortly after this Lehman failed completely, and Merrill Lycnh was taken 
over by the Bank of America. Hence such behaviours prior to the collapses further supports the 
risk shifting theory. However the question which is critical here is that whether such risk 
shifting behaviour has been exhibited by the bank holding companies in general. 
 
A more recent study by Duran and Vivas (2015) has investigated whether risk shifting 
happened in the EU banking sector during the period 2002-09. In the very study various types 
of risk shifting has been investigated. There are two levels of study, one, in which the variables 
or the bank specific characters which are directly responsible for risk shifting are identified, 
two, another set of characteristics have been identified which either incentivize or 
disincentivize the risk shifting problem in banking. The main finding of the study has been that 
the banks in general have shifted risk to non-depository creditors. Again one of the findings of 
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the study is that deposit insurance guarantees have incentivized risk shifting. The very study 
has divided the bank financial structure into equity, deposits, and non deposit funding. Banks 
do not have absolute control on the changes in the sources of such funding’s, since one part of 
the funding source is always stochastic in nature. However the study has been able to find that 
changes in the discretionary part of funding is simultaneous with the changes in the underlying 
risk. The findings are compatible with that of the Duran and Vivas (2014) and Shrieves and 
Dahl (1992). The authors have provided subsample results before and during the crisis periods 
which show that similar kind of non depository based risk shifting is present throughout. 
 
Duran and Vivas (2015) have observed that capital can be perceived as a call option on the 
value of a firm. Which can also be explained from the truncated pay off distributions to the 
residual claimants or shareholders, since in the events of loss creditors bear maximum losses. 
Hence shareholders always have the tendency to invest in negative NPV projects whose 
probability of success is very low but can generate high returns. Such incentives only create 
moral hazard problems in firms, and specifically in baking. The contribution of the study by 
Duran and Vivas (2015) is that they have investigated the financial structure of banks from 
three stand points, of equity holders, of depositors (with or with out deposit insurance), and 
of non deposit debt holders, so that it is clarified to whom the risk is being transferred from 
shareholders end. There are two striking observations, one, risk shifting s a reality and the 
direction is from the shareholders to the non deposit debt holders (for EU15 banking systems 
during the period 2002-09), two, risk shifting has significantly increased during the crisis of 
2007-09. There are some regulatory implications of the study, and the authors are confident 
that if regulators perform their jobs prudently then banks may not have the incentives or 
opportunities to indulge in risk transfers. However the study seems to be incompatible with 
another growing strand of literature, namely, the studies on dividend pay out by banks during 
crisis (Acharaya et al, 2014) which have observed that risk shifting may have happened 
significantly via dividend pay outs. In Duran and Vivas (2014, 2015) pay outs have not been 
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investigated as potential channels for risk transfers. Hence the current thesis is an attempt to 
bridge between these two evolving strands. Hence there can be regulatory implications 
including the pay out strategies of banks for mitigating the risk shifting problem. 
 
There are further studies which have specified the salient features of risk shifting in bank 
holding companies, mainly such empirical papers have been focused on the US banking 
system. 
 
First of all, for the risk increasing banks, there should be a negative significant correlation 
between the change in the risk and the change in the capital to asset ratio. The reason being 
that increasing the risk for banks is a critical factor for risk shifting itself (Duran and Vivas, 
2014). Again this negative relationship also helps to capture the fact that the risk increasing 
banks are also those banks which reduces their capital ratios. 
The standard empirical literature (Berger et al., 1995, Van Hoose, 2007, Freixas et, al (1997) 
and Degryse et al., 2009) has mainly investigated the role of safety nets like full or partial 
deposit insurance on the tendency of the banks to increase risk in their asset portfolios, which 
is the aforementioned moral hazard problem. However recently the attention has shifted to the 
types of risk shifting present in the banking sector, and which are the methods through which 
such risk shifting happens. 
 
Hence in the current section too the main focus is on the different types of risk shifting, by 
which it is meant that how the bank shareholders can shift risk to the creditors in general, and 
specifically the non-deposit cerditors, since the non deposit creditors in the lack of full or 
partial safety net like deposit insurance would also be most affected by the risk shifting events. 
 
Specifically the most recent literature emphasizes on four types of risk shifting based on the 
aforementioned definition based on the group of creditors to whom the risk is transferred, 
namely, one, double sided where the risk is shifted to creditors in general, two, deposit based 
(where the risk is shifted to depositors), three, other debt based (where the risk is shifted to 
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the non deposit based creditors, and four, unclassified (where the risk shifting direction is 
unclear or the group to which the risk is shifted is unclear). 
 
Here again Duran and Vivas (2014) have documented significant risk shifting by the US bank 
holding companies during the crisis period, and the main type of risk shifting has been the 
other debt based. The authors have also formulated as system of equations analyses which 
indicates the specific channels or bank specific variables which have been responsible for such 
non deposit based risk shifting. 
 
The studies show that the risk shifting in such ways have weakened the resilience of the 
banking system as a whole and prolonged the crisis with increasing cost to the society as 
a whole. This finding do support the Basel committee recommendations (2011 onwards). 
However the studies as of now have not systematically investigated the role of pay outs and 
dynamic adjustment of pay outs by banks in the risk shifting process. However there are 
strong theoretical studies, as mentioned above, which propose that the dividend pay outs and 
dynamic dividend adjustments by banks can critically act as the risk shifting channels. 
However apart from some survey based studies there is no formal investigation on the same 
line. 
 
The main contribution that the current thesis attempts is the extension of the Duran and Vivas 
(2014, 2015) set up to investigate that whether pay outs by commercial bank holding 
companies may act as a direct or indirect factor for risk shifting towards non depository debt 
holders. The methodology builds upon the earlier sections too where the speeds of adjustments 
of different pay out kinds have already been estimated. Hence the current section specifically 
extends the literature in two ways: 
 
1. Investigating whether different pay outs, for example, dividends, share repurchases, 
different forms of dividend pay outs have direct or indirect roles in shifting risk. By 
direct role it means (following Duran and Vivas, 2014, 2015) whether these pay outs 
209 
 
cause risk shifting, and by indirect effect it means whether these pay outs 
incentivizes risk shifting or not.  
 
2. Investigating whether smoothing of dividends and other pay outs have direct or 
indirect role in the risk shifting process.  
3. Whether risk shifting can take place, or is indirectly affected by the 
dynamic adjustments of pay outs.  
The following section builds the relevant hypotheses which are then investigated using 
a system of equations analysis based on the standard literature.  
 
4.3.4 Hypothesis building 
 
 
H1a: bank holding companies exhibit risk shifting from shareholders to creditors in 
general through dividend pay outs 
 
The last two sections of the thesis have investigated the dividend pay outs and smoothing or 
dynamic behavior of dividend pay outs by the US bank holding companies, where financial 
crisis dummy variable has always been found to have a negative impact on the pay outs or the 
speed of adjustments. However this section focusses on whether the route of dividend pay outs 
or smoothing of dividends have been used to benefit shareholders by increasing the risk of 
default for the creditors in general, which can not be directly captured by the impact of 
financial crisis dummy on the level or speed of adjustments. 
 
There is a growing body of literature, both theoretical and empirical, which either confirms 
risk shifting or contradicts the same. For example Acharya et al (2013) to Duran and Vivas 
(2014) do confirm that there are various types of risk shifting exhibited by the bank holding 
firms, however Forti and Schiozer (2015) finds no significant risk shifting via dividend pay 
outs. The last mentioned study has termed such risk shifting as the cash out hypothesis, which 
means that the shareholders of the banking firms may tend to cash out via pay outs while the 
creditors may suffer from increased default risk. 
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However none of the studies has investigated the direct or incentivizing role of dividend pay 
outs in the risk shifting process, the current hypothesis aims at bridging the gap by 
investigating the role of dividend pay outs in a widely used framework of systems of equations 
(Peltzman (1970), Marcus (1983), Wall andPeterson (1988), and Shrieves and Dahl (1992) ). 
H1b: bank holding companies exhibit risk shifting from shareholders to creditors in general 
through other forms of pay outs like share repurchases 
 
Share repurchases by bank holding companies increased steeply during and after the financial 
crisis (Floyd et al, 2016), however there is no comprehensive study on the role of share 
repurchases on the types of risk shifting as aforementioned. Share repurchase has not been 
given the status of signaling in the standard literature as is mentioned in the earlier sections, 
specifically the substitution hypothesis as developed earlier in the literature has raised the 
question whether bank holding companies can signal to the shareholders or creditors via share 
repurchases as they can do via dividend pay outs. The main difference between the two types 
of pay outs being the larger commitment by the managers in maintaining dividend pay outs 
which may be absent in case of share repurchases. 
 
However the earlier sections of the current thesis has demonstrated that share repurchases by the 
US bank holding companies have shown significant probabilistic relationship between the bank 
specific and other control variables, which in most cases are of opposite nature to that of the 
dividend pay outs. Though there is an absence of formal theorization of such relationships the 
current thesis investigates the above hypothesis and hence builds upon the extant literature. 
H2a: bank holding companies exhibit risk shifting from shareholders to general creditors via 
dividend smoothing (as an enabler or channel of risk shifting, as explained above) 
The relevant literature has not investigated the possibility of risk shifting via dividend 
smoothing or dynamic adjustment of dividends, however as has been observed multiple times 
in the earlier sections that there has been a rise in the dividend smoothing over the crisis 
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periods and afterwards too. Hence the obvious extension of the extant literature can be to 
incorporate the dividend smoothing mechanism in the systems of equations framework. The 
last hypothesis can be conceived as the corollary to the earlier hypothesis, since as has been 
observed earlier that timing of adjustment or half life period of adjustments is a managerial 
decision and can certainly impact risk shifting. 
4.4.Methodology 
 
 
Since the main objective of the section is to model risk shifting via pay outs as mentioned 
earlier from the shareholders to the creditors in general, the main group of creditors 
considered here is the non depository debt holders. Another rationale for this choice is that 
deposit insurance guarantees have abated the risk shifting from shareholders to depositors up 
to a significant extent in developed economies, specifically in USA. Hence following Duran 
and Vivas (2014) two important bank specific ratios are considered, the equity to asset ratio, 
and total non depository debt to asset ratio. Adapting the standard notation such ratios is 
denoted as f’s in the current section. 
 
The main aim is to model the relationship between change in such ratios and the change in 
risk (specifically the default risk level). The relevant literature ( Marcus (1983), Fama and 
Jensen(1983), and Shrieves and Dahl (1992) suggest that the both the change in risk and the 
ratios as defined are composed of a random part and a discretionary part, where the former 
component can be considered as to be a white noise, and the second component can be 
considered as to be a managerial decision making. Pay outs and smoothing of pay outs, or 
half life measures are decision variables here. 
∆Ratiosi,t =∆managerial decision makingi,t+ ε    (1) 
Hence in the above equation the dependent variable is the total observable change in the above 
mentioned ratios or the risk levels, the first independent term is the change in such variables 
due to managerial decisions and the next component is the white noise. J denotes the J
th
 
banking firm and T denotes the period observation. 
 
The component ∆ can then be expressed as the partial adjustment process, where the 
change in the ratios and the risk levels are the differences between the target values of 
the variables and their one period lagged values. 
 
∆Ratiosi,t = αRatiosi,t*+β Ratiosi,t-1+ε   (2) 
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Where the first term in the parenthesis is the target level of any risk/ratio  measure, and the 
next term is the one period lagged value of the same.  
 
There are various risk scores or measures used in the relevant literature, however in the current 
section two relevant risk measures are used (Shreivas and Dahl (1992), Jokiipi and Milne 
(2011)) namely, risk weighted assets to total assets, and nonperforming assets to total assets. 
The above referred studies hold that risk weighted asset ratio reflects the managerial 
investment decisions. 
 
It is well documented in the relevant literature that the target values of the risk levels or the 
ratios as mentioned above can not be observed directly, hence the partial adjustment models 
are used to proxy the target levels by some firm level or firm specific variables with a 
stochastic disturbance term. In the current section the choice of such bank specific variables 
have been based on the recent studies, where the bank specific variables chosen are 
theoretically correlated with the level of the risk and the financial structure of the banks. 
However in this section the major addition on the standard studies is that among those 
explanatory variables the pay outs, namely, dividend per share, share repurchase volume, as 
well as the speed of dividend adjustments and half life measures have been included, since as 
demonstrated in the earlier section that there are recent studies (Onali, 2011 for instance) which 
have empirically measured the association between pay out levels and the risk levels of 
banking firms (more discussions on the variables follows later). 
In the current section partial adjustment models of risk measures and financial ratios are 
presented. Hence the target levels, differences and one period lag values of such variables are 
used (based on the related literature as cited in the section). Notations used in the equations are 
standard, for example ∆ signifies change in the variable(specifically ∆DR means the change in 
the deposit ratio, and ∆CR means the change in the capital adequacy ratio), * denotes the target 
level of any variable, for example risk levels or any financial ratio, please see the equations 
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below. 
The equations used in the current section are as follows: 
∆Ratiosi,t =∆managerial decision makingi,t-1+ ε    (1) 
Hence in the above equation the dependent variable is the total observable change in the 
above mentioned ratios or the risk levels, the first independent term is the change in such 
variables due to managerial decisions and the next component is the white noise. Here j 
denotes the jth banking firm and t denotes the period observation. 
The component ∆ can then be expressed as the partial adjustment process, where the 
change in the ratios and the risk levels are the differences between the target values of the 
variables and their one period lagged values. 
∆Ratiosi,t = αRatiosi,t*+β Ratiosi,t-1+ε   (2) 
Where the first term in the parenthesis is the target level of any risk/ratio measure, and the 
next term is the one period lagged value of the same.  
There are various risk scores or measures used in the relevant literature, however in the current 
section two relevant risk measures are used (Shreivas and Dahl (1992), Jokiipi and Milne 
(2011)) namely, risk weighted assets to total assets, and nonperforming assets to total assets. 
The above referred studies hold that risk weighted asset ratio reflects the managerial 
investment decisions. 
Based on the variables chosen (please see response to other questions too in this section) the 
following system of equations is used (also following Vivan and Duras, 2014, 2015): 
∆RISKi,t=α10+α11∆CRj,t+α12Xj,t+RISKj,t-1        (3) 
∆CRj,t= β10+β11∆RISKj,t+β12Xj,t+CRj,t-1              (4) 
The above system of equations is used to analyze the relation between the change in the risk 
measures and the capital ratios (namely the change in the capital adequacy ratio). X is the 
vector of bank specific variables, mainly the bank specific pay outs. 
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∆RISKj,t=α20+α21∆DRj,t+α22Xj,t+α23RISKi,t-1  (5) 
∆DRj,t= β20+β21∆RISKi,t+β22Xj,t+β23DRi,t-1     (6) 
The above system of equation is to analyze the relation between the change in risk measures 
and the deposit based debt ratio (DR), this system of equation is used to investigate whether 
risk shifting occurs towards the depositors. X is a vector of bank specific variables, which are 
bank specific controls for this set of equations. Here for our purpose X variables are bank 
specific pay out levels, for example dividend per share, share repurchases, speeds of 
adjustments (certainly these variables are used separately in equations). These variables, as 
also explained later in the section, might play the role for facilitating risk shifting. 
It is well documented in the relevant literature that the target values of the risk levels or the 
ratios as mentioned above can not be observed directly, hence the partial adjustment models 
are used to proxy the target levels by some firm level or firm specific variables with a 
stochastic error term. In the current section the choice of such bank specific variables have 
been based on the recent studies, where the bank specific variables chosen are theoretically 
correlated with the level of the risk and the financial structure of the banks. However in this 
section the major addition on the standard studies is that among those explanatory variables the 
pay outs, namely, dividend per share, share repurchase volume, as well as the speed of 
dividend adjustments and half life measures have been included, since as demonstrated in the 
earlier section that there are recent studies (Onali, 2013 for instance) which have empirically 
measured the association between pay out levels and the risk levels of banking firms. 
Hence based on the above mentioned explanatory and dependent variables the following 
system of equations is derived: 
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4.5 Variable selection  
The set of explanatory and the dependent variables are based on the similar set of variables 
which have been already used in the last two sections of the thesis, with some risk measures. 
Here the main risk measures are, one, the ratio of the risk weighted assets to the total assets, 
two, the ratio of nonperforming loans to total assets. The main bank specific explanatory 
variables used are, buffer capital level, size, dividend per share  vale, share repurchases value, 
speed of adjustment, half-life period, and the standard set of bank specific, industry specific 
and macroeconomic control variables which is used in the earlier sections too for consistency 
(for variable definitions please see the list of variables in the appendix). 
 
Sample selection 
 
Here the sample of the bank holding companies is not changed, same sample is used 
through out the thesis for consistency, however based on the suggestions of the 
standard empirical literature such bank holding companies are chosen whose change in 
risk level is greater than the median value of change in the risk. According to Duran 
and Vivas (2014, 2015) banks who are increasing the risk level are better candidates 
for analyzing whether risk shifting is exhibited by them too. 
 
4.6 Analysis and results 
 
The following two tables are interpreted to analyze, one, whether risk shifting is 
exhibited by the risk increasing banks, two, what is the direction of such risk 
shifting, i.e. towards depositors or non-depository based debt holders. 
 
(Insert Table 1 section 3) 
 
The above table is the first panel regression based on the following dependent 
and explanatory variables: 
1. ∆ RISK as the change in the risk weighted asset to total asset ratio over the 
one period  
2. ∆ CR as the change in the capital adequacy ratio, which reflects the change in 
the equity to asset ratio over the previous period  
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3. DPS or the dividend per share level as a bank specific pay out variable, which 
also plays the role of incentivizing or dis-incentivizing of risk shifting  
4. Buffer capital: In the current section the buffer capital is defined, as in the 
standard literature (Duran and Vivas, 2014), as the difference between the risk 
weighted capital ratio of the specific bank holding firm in the given period and 
the minimum  legal regulatory capital required for the specific period113. 
5. Crisis dummy, which is consistent with the measure as used in the other sections 
of this thesis, defined in the variable list in the appendix.  
6. An interaction term between crisis dummy and DPS to capture any change in 
the nature of impact of DPS on the change in risk/ capital ratio.  
7.  Lag of  the risk variable as defined. 
 
8. Lag of the CR variable as defined earlier.  
 
9. A set of industry specific and macroeconomic control variables.  
 
 
Hence in the above table the first set of the system of equations is analyzed where the main 
analysis is the relationship between the change in the risk and the capital ratio level. Here the 
first set of hypotheses is referred to where the pay outs may or may not have significant impact 
on risk shifting phenomenon. One critical consideration is about the risk shifting definition 
itself for the above analysis, in recent theoretical papers (Boyde and Nicolo, 2005) risk shifting 
is equated to enhancing of bank portfolio risk and looting by the bank managers, however in 
the empirical literature the direction of risk shifting is captured and analyzed. Hence risk 
increasing banks may also exhibit risk shifting and thus increase in risk is related to risk 
shifting but not equivalent as theoretical models assume.  
 
                                                          
113 Duran and Vivas (2014) have observed in their results that larger buffer capital (over and 
above the regulatory requirement) is negatively related to the risk shifting by bank holding 
firms, or in other words greater is the capital buffer less is the incentive for the bank managers 
to shift risk.  
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Results and Discussion 
Below table provides results for the system of equations in the section 3, which is used for analysing whether there is risk 
shifting exhibited by the bank holding companies in general, and which are the enabling factors for risk shifting to happen. In 
the very section the variables are defined which again follows some recent studies as mentioned in the section. Here RISK 
measure is typically a default risk measure, here the non-performing asset to total asset ratio, DPS denotes the cash dividend 
per share, CR is capital ratio. As discussed in the results section the signs and significance of the impacts clearly shows risk 
shifting, however the impact of dividends as an enabling factor is negligible. 
 
 (1) 
(2)   
Change   
Change in CR 
 
 
in RISK    
 
No. of observations 3943 3943 
 
∆ CR -2.43***  
 
DPS 0.198 0.05 
 
CRISIS 0.04 0.003 
 
BUFFER CAPITAL 0.37*** -.06*** 
 
DPS*CRISIS -.19 0.016 
 
LAGGED RISK -0.04***  
 
∆ RISK  -0.04*** 
 
LAGGED CR  -0.02 
 
 
 
 
Pr>F 0.000 0.000 
   
 
The first important result from the set of equations in table 1 is that there is a very significant 
and negative relation between the change in the risk and the change in the capital adequacy 
ratio, where the significance of the impact is at 1% level. This result is well supported by the 
recent empirical studies, where the rationale is that for the risk shifting banks the change in 
risk and the change in leverage level should be positively related, which needs that the change 
in the risk and change in the capital ratio should be negatively related. Hence the basic 
condition that banks engage in risk shifting is that the corresponding coefficient be negative 
and significant (Duran and Vivas, 2014, 2015). The negative coefficient also mean that larger 
is the decrease in the capital ratio larger is the increase in risk. Hence the table 1 indicates 
strong risk shifting for the risk increasing banks. 
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The table below is the continuation of the same system of equation, where now as one of the depended 
variables change in the deposit ratio, or DR is introduced, other variables remaining the same. The result 
section provides detailed discussions of the impacts, however here too though there is evidence of risk shifting 
as a whole, there is no clear evidence that dividend pay outs have enabled such transfers. 
 
Table 2 Chapter 4  
 (1)  
 Change (2) 
 in Change in DR 
 RISK  
No. of observations 3943 3943 
∆ DR -.58  
DPS 0.213 0.02 
CRISIS 0.07 -0.04 
BUFFER CAPITAL 0.83*** -.0.06*** 
DPS*CRISIS -.26 0.04 
LAGGED RISK 0.012  
∆ RISK  -.01 
LAGGED DR  -.12*** 
 
 
 
Pr>F 0.000 0.000 
 
Once the table results has shown that risk shifting is exhibited by the US bank holding 
companies in the sample, or in other words the banks have reduced their skin in the game, 
as opposed to the regulatory suggestions, the next task is to investigate the direction of this 
shift. Direction of the shift is captured in the above results. 
 
In the above table the dependent variable in the first column is still the change in the risk, 
where as the among the explanatory variables the change in the depository debt 
ratio (∆DR) is used as the main variable, along with the other controls. The result shows 
that the coefficient on the ∆DR is negative and significant, which is again according to 
the findings of Duran and Vivas (2014, 2015). Hence as per the explanations earlier 
these banks have shifted risk towards the non deposit based debts, rather than deposit 
based debts. This result is also backed by the standard assumption of deposit insurance 
for the retail depositors. 
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The above results have thus shown that risk shifting implies that the amount of risk taken by 
banks are not backed by enough capital, and the major cost of this process is borne by the non 
deposit based debt holders. Hovakimain and Kane (2000) have shown that the impact of risk 
shifting by banks is more severe on the economy if the risk- capital balance is 
disproportionate due to risk shifting. 
 
In the both of the above tables a crisis dummy has been used, as defined in the variable table in 
the appendix, the impact of the crisis dummy on the change on risk s always positive but 
significant at 10% level, which indicates that risk shifting is rather a general phenomenon. 
Further subsample analysis is provided in the appendix, where similar results are analyzed 
before, during, and after crisis period. Recent empirical studies as mentioned earlier have also 
found that risk shifting was a common practice among the US banks before and during the 
crisis periods. 
 
The impact of the other bank specific variables on the change of risk level and the change in 
the capital ratio level are as follows: the lagged value of risk always has a negative significant 
impact on the change in the risk level, which is according to the results of the earlier studies 
(Duran and Vivas, 2014, 2015), which actually indicates that the bank holding companies in 
the study are risk increasing over the period. 
 
The remaining half of the analysis section provides results for the incentivizing / strengthening/ 
weakening factors of risk shifting. In other words whether pay outs and dividend smoothing it 
self have strengthening impacts on the risk shifting process. However to start with the analysis 
it can also be observed that the impact of Buffer capital (defined in the table of variables in 
appendix) is more ambiguous as compared to the results obtained in Duran and Vivas (op cit). 
since the variable has a strong positive significant impact on the change in the risk level, where 
 
as the impact of the same on ∆CR and ∆DR are both negative and significant, which means 
that though increase in the buffer level is associated with increase in risk level it is unclear 
whether the buffer level incentivizes risk shifting in a specific direction. 
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Role of DPS variable: The above table now investigates if the risk has been shifted from 
the shareholders to the depositors. The following are the variables used for the table: 
 
1. Change in the risk level, DPS, buffer capital, lagged Risk variables and the 
control variables are similar to the other tables.  
2. ∆DR or the change in the deposit to asset ratio level is used in this case as the main 
explanatory variable, since here the main objective is to analyze the relationship 
between the change in the risk level and the deposit ratio level to infer the type of 
risk shifting.  
throughout the current thesis there has been no evidence of risk taking or increasing or 
cashing out through dividend pay outs, in the current section also its observed that the 
impact of DPS on ∆CR is positive, and on ∆DR is not-significant which again 
according to the earlier formulation means that DPS has no role to play in the risk 
shifting process overall.  
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The table below summarizes whether there is any risk shifting role played by the share repurchase by the individual banks in 
the crisis period, generally share repurchase variable is found to be insignificant, but the below table also uses an interaction 
variable of share repurchase with the crisis dummy. All the other variables are according to the earlier system of equations. 
 
Table 3 Chapter 4  
 Change  
Change in DR 
 
 
in RISK      
 
No. of observations 3943 3943 
 
∆ DR -.577   
 
Change in Risk   -0.002 
 
Share repurchase crisis 0.0946* -0.0005 
 
CRISIS -.140* -1.52 
 
BUFFER CAPITAL 0.833*** 0.0005 
 
LAGGED RISK 0.0121   
 
DR lag   -0.1259*** 
 
Pr>F 0.000 0.110 
 
      
 
 
 
Role of share re-purchases: the impact of the share-repurchase variable on the change in 
capital ratio is negative and significant whereas on the change in the debt ratio is negative and 
not significant. Again the above table also shows clearly that the impact of share repurchase 
during the crisis period has been positive and nearly significant on the change in risk level for 
individual banks. These impacts again according the prior formulation do indicate that the 
share repurchase variable strengthens other debt based or non-depository debt based risk 
shifting, though the impact is weak. The last tables’ demonstrated risk shifting in the US bank 
holding companies for the sample period 1990-2015, which is same throughout the thesis. 
However it is the share repurchases rather than the dividend pay outs which may have played 
some incentivizing role for risk shifting from shareholders to creditors in general. There is 
however a serious lack of theoretical modelling explaining the role of share repurchase in 
banking, whether signaling via it (referring to the substitution hypothesis as explained 
 
earlier) or its role in increasing or shifting risk. 
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The table below summarizes the potential relation between the change in loan risk for banks and the speeds of adjustments. 
Three speeds of adjustments have been used, namely SOA DPS which is the adjustment speed for the dividend per share in 
cash, SOA total DIV which is the speed of adjustment of the total dividend payed out including stock dividends, and SOA 
total PAY which also includes the share repurchases per bank. The estimation is similar to the other tables in this section, and 
is based on the earlier described system of equations. 
 
 
Table 4 Chapter 4 
 
 Change 
Change in RISK 
Change in RISK 
 
 
in RISK      
 
No. of observations 3943 3943 3943 
 
∆ CR -19.45 
-17.56 -18.82     
 
SOA DPS 10.47   
 
SOA total DIV  16.52*  
 
SOA total PAY   10.96 
 
CRISIS -1.34 -1.52 -1.09 
 
BUFFER CAPITAL -0.271 9.23 -0.2803 
 
LAGGED RISK 0.499*** -0.498*** 0.498*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pr>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Role of speed of adjustment: 
 
 
The impact of speed of adjustment on the change in capital ratio variable is however 
insignificant, the impact on the change in the debt ratio variable too is not statistically 
significant(which is not shown in the above table), which is a consistent finding with the 
nature of impact of dividend pay outs on the very variables. However there is a slight positive 
significant impact of the speed of adjustment of the total dividend payed out on the change in 
risk, as in the above table. This result is likely related to the earlier results that during crisis 
period there have been significant change in the speed of adjustments. 
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Hence the thesis through out maintains that the evidence of risk shifting via dividend pay 
outs or smoothing of dividends is not supported by the sample of BHCs. 
 
 
4.7 Conclusion 
 
 
The main contribution of this section of the thesis to the ongoing empirical literature is the 
explicit investigation of whether pay outs and dynamic pay out adjustments or behaviors play 
active role in strengthening or incentivizing the risk shifting types in bank holding 
companies. 
 
Here one should also note that there is a serious lack of theoretical models on how pay outs 
may incentivize risk shifting in banks, except very recent game theory based models (for eg, 
dividend externalities paper by Acharya et al), where risk shifting is theorized as a type of 
moral hazard imminent in the agency theoretic context. 
 
However the difference between the theoretical and the empirical studies, as done here, is that 
in theoretical studies as of now there is no indication of specific direction/ types of risk 
shifting, in theoretical models abrupt increase of risk is theorized as risk shifting (given 
regulatory incentives such as deposit insurance), where as in the empirical studies the main 
objective is to analyze the direction of risk shifting. 
 
Given such backdrop the current study confers with the recent econometric studies (Duran 
and Vivas specifically) that non depository debt based risk shifting is exhibited by the US 
bank holding companies during and before the crisis. The current study then builds upon the 
extant literature to show that some pay outs, eg, share repurchases might have incentivized 
such risk shifting phenomena. 
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4.7.1 Risk shifting in banking via pay outs: comparing results from other recent studies 
 
 
The theoretical literature on risk shifting in banking goes back to Jensen and Meckling (1976). 
The basic concept is that when the banks take excessive risk the equity holders get benefitted 
at the cost of the debt holders, and the main reason being that the equity holders have convex 
claims over the banks assets, which increases with the level of risk, whereas the debt holders 
(depositors mainly) have concave claims which decreases with the increase of risk level. 
 
Hence the problem is aggravated when the risk taking banks further increases the dividend 
pay outs, which leave less liquid assets for the banks to honour the depositors claim. Hence 
authors like Acharya and others have proposed that dividend pay out can be a possible 
channel for risk shifting by banks. 
 
Srivastav et al (2014) have further extended the literature by investigating whether other pay 
out strategies by bank holding companies also work as a risk shifting channels, specifically if 
the CEOs pay structures are more debt like than equity then banks may tend to favour debt 
holders over equity holders hence mitigating the risk shifting problem. In the same study the 
authors also note that such banks with CEO pay structure more debt like are likely to reduce 
both dividend pay outs and share repurchases. Hence there is an implicit assumption that share 
repurchases can also play roles for risk shifting, since buy backs can also be treated as an 
important source of channelling resources to equity holders at the cost of debt holders. 
 
As noted earlier in the thesis there is a long standing debate on whether the share buy backs 
can be treated as substitutes of dividend pay outs, the so called substitution hypothesis. The 
thesis in the earlier sections have provided a positive answer for the hypothesis in terms of 
both absolute levels of pay outs and smoothing of pay outs. Hence risk shifting via share 
repurchases is a valid investigation.As argued in the result section of this section there is 
significant evidence of risk shifting via share repurchases in general for the US bank holding 
companies, however insignificant results for other medium of risk shifting like via smoothing. 
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CHAPTER  5.  
 
Conclusion in general: contributions to the empirical literature 
 
 
In the concluding chapter, the major findings or potential contributions to the extant literature 
is discussed. The thesis is an elaborate econometric analysis rather than a theoretical model 
building, where the fundamental theoretical models have played a critical role in framing the 
empirical approach and also in hypotheses building. 
 
The main theoretical underpinnings arise from a costly dividend signaling model, dividend 
signaling in the presence of moral hazard, for example, the Jensen’s free cash flow model, 
different theoretical models based on agency theories, which suggest dynamic dividend 
behavior by firms in general, risk shifting theories in banking and allied models. In the 
following paragraphs, the main findings of the thesis are explored point by point. 
 
1. The main finding of the thesis is that dividend smoothing or, in general, payout smoothing 
can also play the role of costly signaling for information sensitive investors. Some very recent 
studies are cited in the literature review (Forti & Schiozer, 2015; Floyd et al., 2015). These 
include studies that have analyzed the information content of the dividend payouts by bank 
holding companies, or, in other words, how various bank specific variables relate to the 
payouts before and after the financial crisis period. Certainly, there is a strong general literature 
on the empirical study of the determinants of dividend payouts, which is again analyzed based 
on the underlying theories, for example, information asymmetry-based theories, agency 
theories and life cycle based theories. 
However, there is no systematic study in general, as well as in the banking sector, about 
whether dynamic payout behaviors of firms also reveal similar kinds of information. In other 
words, can dynamic partial adjustment also be considered as signaling? The literature review 
section shows that theoretical modelling has been done in the same way.  
This predicts smoothing or partial adjustment as a form of dynamic signaling to the investors 
226 
 
or shareholders in particular. However, an empirical investigation for the same is absent. 
 
There is a strong empirical literature which investigates the impact of information asymmetry 
or agency conflict on the dynamic dividend behaviors of firms in general (Leary & Roberts, op 
cit). However, firstly, these studies are based on Lintner type partial adjustment models, which 
are capable of measuring the average speed of adjustments, and secondly, these studies are not 
specific to bank holding firms. 
 
Generally, such studies have not found a significant association between opacity measures 
and the average speed of adjustments, and the impact of agency costs us found to be more 
significant but varied. 
 
Hence, in the empirical analysis in the thesis, the sections demonstrate that dividend 
smoothing by bank holding companies also exhibits a similar relationship to the sets of 
relevant variables as the dividend payouts do. Hence, the dynamic signaling quality of 
dividend smoothing is highlighted. 
 
2. A modified partial adjustment model is one empirical contribution to the extant literature, 
specifically in relation to the dividend smoothing by banking firms. In the standard 
literature which dates back to Lintner (1956), the formulation and estimation of the partial 
adjustment model are based on an average speed of adjustment, whether it is the capital 
structure adjustment (Rangan et al., 2006) or dividend adjustment. 
 
However, in the current thesis, the adjustment speed and the allied measures are firm specific, 
which varies over the time period. Again, to obtain such measures, the partial adjustment 
model has been run in some extra steps, which has been explained in section 2. 
This helps in the analysis of firm-specific heterogeneity, which is not possible in the standard 
framework, except in some very recent works (Oliver et al., 2015). Again, the measures which 
have been thus obtained, namely, adjustment speeds and half-life values have been then used 
to do further analyses. 
227 
 
 
3. Various types of payouts have been included in the investigations, mainly the share 
repurchases since there are studies which are not conclusive on whether share repurchases and 
dividend payouts are substitutes or not. There is a skepticism that repurchases cannot be 
considered as costly signals since managers are not needed to remain committed to buying 
back shares on a regular basis.  
 
4. Although there are theoretical models of dividend smoothing or income smoothing 
under agency conflict or information asymmetry, the standard models are not bank specific. 
As far as the bank specific theoretical models are concerned, there are a few of them where 
dividend payouts have been theorized as a mechanism or channel of shifting risk from 
shareholders to the creditors of banks. In the empirical literature, there is no comprehensive 
analysis to complement the theoretical literature on banks in this area.  
 
5. In the thesis, a standard system of equations approach is adopted in the third section 
to investigate the type and direction of risk shifting by BHCs, and also to investigate the 
factors which strengthen such risk shifting taking place.  
 
Bessler and Nohel (1996) suggest that dividends can be used to divert a bank’s equity to its 
owners. The authors report that most banks continued to distribute dividends during the 1980s 
despite suffering large losses (Bessler & Nohel, 1996, p. 1490). As happens in many cases, 
history repeats itself and, as reported by Acharya et al. (2011), during the recent global 
financial crisis, even as the banking system suffered the depletion of common equity through 
losses on asset portfolios, banks continued to pay dividends (Acharya et al., 2011, p. 3). 
The investigation has extended the extant empirical models by introducing the payouts and 
dynamic variables, such as bank specific adjustment speeds and half-life periods, to 
investigate their roles in the process of risk shifting. 
 
There is a good indication of non-depository debt based risk shifting, which is supported 
by some recent studies; however, the investigation also shows a significant positive 
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impact of share repurchase on such risk shifting. 
 
6. Throughout the thesis, the impact of various bank-specific and regulatory variables has 
been analyzed, and such bank-specific variables differentiate the results from the non-
banking firm’s study. One such variable is the regulatory capital requirement, or, as in this 
study, the capital adequacy measure. 
 
Recently studies (Hsiao &Tseng, 2016) have found strong evidence of a significant negative 
impact of such ratios or measures on the dividend payout levels during and after the financial 
crisis. In this study, however, such an impact is found on the speed of the adjustment of 
banking payouts, which is still not comprehensively studied in the extant banking literature. 
 
7. Recently, there has been an emergence of investigations on dividend smoothing by firms in 
general since the financial crisis (2007-2009). For example, a recent study by Nguyen and 
Tran (2016) has shown that dividend smoothing and signaling have been practiced by firms 
across various sectors in the US. 
 
The above study finds support for the value signaling literature of neoclassical economics, 
as has been explained in the current thesis, which suggests the use of costly signaling for 
reputation building, along with mitigating opacity problems. 
 
However, similar studies have not focused specifically on bank holding companies where the 
nature of signaling is also much more complex, as has been found throughout this thesis. 
8. During the financial crisis, as the aforementioned studies have also found, there was a 
significant rise in external financial constraints, specifically the cost of capital rise, coupled 
with the cost of regulations in banking industry being on a steep rise. However, given this rise 
in cost, signaling and smoothing practices have been continued by banks. Hence, this calls for 
a more comprehensive cost-benefit analysis of signaling and smoothing against the rise in 
regulatory and external finance costs. 
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Hence, an extension of the current empirical work would be to investigate the future impact 
of dividend or payout smoothing in general on the future cost of capital. 
 
An inter country-based investigation could be further built upon, which might demonstrate 
the impact of regulatory differences on the continuation of smoothing since the crisis, as the 
aforementioned work has shown that there are some Asian economies which have not been 
able to maintain smoothing in the post-crisis era. 
 
 
Does dividend smoothing has benefits of strong market reactions: some critical closing thoughts? 
 
 
Larkin et al (2016) have provided comprehensive evidence for dividend smoothing practices 
across industries. However according to the very authors dividend smoothing has less 
significant impact on the share prices in the capital markets, and rather is driven by the demand 
of the investors clientele. Specifically, the retail investors are less likely to hold the dividend 
smoothing stocks, whereas the mutual funds and institutional investors are more attracted 
towards the same. 
 
Hence based on the above mentioned study too, signaling nature of dividend smoothing 
can be inferred, which indicates that smoothing is a signal for the specific investor 
clientele. In the current thesis it has been shown throughout that information content of 
smoothing is specifically related to the information sensitive depositors and creditors in 
general, a finding which is also consistent with studies like of Forti and Sciozer (2015). 
 
Another growing theory is that managers practise dividend smoothing for establishing 
credibility among the investors. If there is a positive change in the dividends, then such 
change is perceived as to be a permanent change which is backed by the regular smoothing 
activities. 
 
In the current thesis some structural break results have been provided, which have shown after 
the positive enhancement of the dividend pay out levels (for example during the financial 
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crisis) managers have been reluctant to change the adjustment rates/ speed of smoothing. Such 
changes might be more prominent for the bank holding companies, as in the current thesis, 
since Larkin et al (2016) have not got significant results for the non-banking firms. Another 
finding is also that for non-financial firm’s interaction of dividend smoothing and dividend 
enhancements have less significant impact on the share prices. 
 
Hence overall it is not obvious from the findings on the non-banking firms that dividend 
smoothing practices have generated significant positive price reactions, however there is no 
doubt from the findings of the extant general literature as well as the current thesis that pay out 
smoothing by the banking firms have signaling content for the investors. 
 
Larkin et al (2016) have also provided strong evidence for insignificant impact of dividend 
smoothing on the cost of capital of non-financial firms, which also calls into question the 
basic underlying theoretical assumptions since Lintner (1956). The earlier theoretical 
assumption was that if investors are concerned about dividend smoothing then that should 
reflect in the higher price and hence less equity returns, or in other words the investors 
should want less return from such stocks.Hence a more relevant explanations for the value 
signaling aspect of dividend smoothing seems to stem from investor clientele effect. In the 
seminal works Miller and Modiglianni were also in the view that in the presence of investor 
clientele dividend policy of managers would change significantly. One such change in the 
dividend policy is certainly the dividend smoothing decision. 
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Appendix 1 
The current appendix contains description of data and variables, and extra tables or results from 
TOBIT, LOGIT and VAR estimations. These extra results are provided for a further robustness 
check, as well as for some extra explanatory variables, namely the dummy variables. 
Data and variables  
The revised thesis version contains three panel data sets(time period being  from 1990-2015), 
one, a restricted data set of only positive pay out values (2900 observations), two, an expanded 
data set of dividend pay out omission  (3685 observations), and three a data set of (6700 
observations) dividend per share pay out values which has been provided in the appendix as an 
extra result or for further robustness. Along with the main pay out measures (cash dividends, 
dividend per share, total dividends, and net share repurchases) every data set contains the bank 
level control variables (as discussed in details in the main thesis in the second chapter). Bank 
level opacity variables, namely, spread, tangibility, turnover and size are used for all the data 
sets. 
As was suggested by the examiners, dividend omission data has been used to mitigate any 
possible sample selection bias. Detailed results for VAR estimations for all data sets, however, 
show that the  nature and significance of impact of opacity variables on the pay outs have 
remained similar, supporting the underlying hypotheses.  Theoretically also there is an 
established literature of ‘counter signaling’ (Chung and Eso, 2013) which maintains that 
omission or cut back of pay outs can also be considered as costly signals to capital markets.  
Challenge faced during data mining was mainly matching bank level data between two sources: 
COMPUSTAT and CRSP, initially a large data base from COMPUSTSTAT was accessed, but 
there was recurring problem of missing data, mainly for price or market variables which were 
important for constructing opacity variables like spread and turnover, and controls such as 
earnings per share, and pay out variables such as dividend per share. Hence a careful and 
rigorous matching was done between COMPUSTAT and CRSP data bases based on company 
name or sticker for the years involved.  
COMPUSTAT DATA BASE 
The main data source used for the current thesis is the WRDS platform which has 
COMPUSTAT and CRSP data bases. The types of firms in the current thesis are the active 
bank holding firms. COMPUSTAT provides data for North American Bank holding firms, 
mainly fundamentals or balance sheet data, where as CRSP provides data on market variables. 
There are different frequencies of data available, for the current thesis quarterly bank level data 
is used. In many contemporary studies annual bank level data is used, however quarterly data 
can capture the partial adjustment process of pay outs in more details.  
COMPUSTAT BANK FUNADAMENTALS URL: 
https://wrds-www.wharton.upenn.edu/pages/support/data-overview/wrds-overview-compustat-
north-america-global-and-bank/ 
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Opacity: opacity is a general terms used to mean the degree of information asymmetry between 
the insider managers and the outsider share holders (or other types of investors like debt holders/ 
depositors in the context of banking firms). Assets held by firms can also be termed as opaque if 
they are difficult to value in the market, for example the opaque loan portfolio held by the banking 
firms. Bank loan portfolios are opaque since there is a high degree of information asymmetry 
between the potential investors/ buyers of such loans and the inherent default rates. In the current 
study opacity of banking firms relates to the asymmetry of information about quality of bank 
assets, or future profitability of banks. Opacity may also mean the asymmetry of information 
between the different types of investors, for example between the less informed and more 
informed equity holders. 
All such opacity problems generates adverse selection, and, or moral hazard problems in financial 
markets. In the context of banking firms the severity of the problems is even higher since bank 
holding firms are considered to be relatively more opaque than the non financial firms. 
Risk Shifting: Risk shifting is a general term used for the phenomenon of excessive risk taking 
by the banking firms in specific, and in the process shifting the cost and consequences of such 
risk taking to the depositors while benefitting the share holders. Risk shifting is widely observed 
in banking industry (as discussed in the chapter four on risk shifting by BHCs), mainly due to 
the presence of explicit or implicit bail out guarantees by the regulators. Hence presence of such 
safety nets actually increases the moral hazard problem in banking, meaning that bankers then 
have less incentive to monitor the borrowers, and hence practice bad lending which further 
enhances the overall default risk level. 
There are various forms of risk shifting which are described in the chapter four of the current 
thesis. 
 
 
SPECIFIC VARIABLE NAMES AND DESCRIPTIONS 
Bank pay out variables Variable definition Data Source 
   
Dividend per share  Quarterly dividends paid in COMPUSTAT&CRSP 
 per share term      
   
Cash dividend paid Total money value of the COMPUSTAT&CRSP 
    DVPD cash dividends paid  
 quarterly by the BHCs  
   
Stock dividend per share Quarterly measure of stock COMPUSTAT & CRSP 
     dividends paid in money  
   
 value term on a par share  
 basis  
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Share buyback Quarterly measure of COMPUSTAT&CRSP 
 amount of share buy back  
 by the BHCs in money  
 term (USD)  
   
Total dividend payed Quarterly value of total COMPUSTAT&CRSP 
    DVT dividends paid out,  
  comprising cash and stock  
 dividends in money value  
 term  
   
Bank specific adjustment Calculated based on the  
speed modified partial adjustment  
 model: bank specific  
 adjustment speed on a  
 quarterly basis  
   
Bank specific half-life Computed based on the  
period modified partial adjustment  
 model: quarterly for  
 individual firms  
Bank specific explanatory   
variables   
   
AT: Size Computed as the natural COMPUSTAT&CRSP 
 logarithm of the total assets  
 for individual bank holding  
 firm  
   
Tangibility/ Intangibility(INTAN) Measure of transparency: COMPUSTAT&CRSP 
 
ratio of tangible/intangible assets 
to  
 total assets  
   
Turnover Natural logarithm of total COMPUSTAT&CRSP 
 shares volume traded in a  
 quarter  
   
Spread The standard measure COMPUSTAT&CRSP 
 adopted here is the  
 difference between the  
 average bids and ask prices  
 in the end of the respective  
 quarters.  
   
Capital adequacy Capital adequacy ratio is COMPUSTAT&CRSP 
 calculated by taking the  
 ratio of the equity capital  
 and the risk-weighted  
 assets.  
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Credit growth This is a measure of the  
 growth rate of the loan  
 portfolio, which is obtained  
 by subtracting the last  
 period’s loan portfolio  
 value from the current loan  
 portfolio value and dividing  
 it by the previous year’s  
 portfolio value.  
   
Loan risk This is a measure of risk of  
 the bank loan portfolio,  
 which is obtained by the  
 ratio of non-performing  
 assets to total loans.  
   
   
Default risk A proxy is used for such  
 default risk level , which is  
 a dummy variable, equal to  
 one if the equity capital to  
 total asset ratio is less than  
 2%, which indicates very  
 high default risk bank, and  
 0 otherwise. In the third  
 section of the thesis default  
 risk measures are  
 increased.  
   
Financial crisis dummy In the current thesis, crisis  
 dummy is used, which  
 captures the banking crisis  
 period, i.e. the dummy has  
 the value 1 if for the  
 quarters between 2007 third  
 quarter and 2009 first  
 quarter, and 0 otherwise.  
   
Leverage Leverage capital is COMPUSTAT&CRSP 
 obtained by dividing  
 liabilities by equity capital,  
 a standard measure of  
 capital structure.  
   
Deposit to total asset ratio Ratio of deposit volume to COMPUSTAT&CRSP 
 total asset of a BHC, this  
 measure is a standard  
 measure for type of risk  
 shifting  
   
INTPN: Interest Paid - Net  COMPUSTAT&CRSP 
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Bank specific lifecycle   
controls   
   
Retained earnings to total Retained earnings in every COMPUSTAT&CRSP 
asset ratio quarter to total assets in the  
 balance sheet  
   
   
 
Interest expense to total Interest expenditure in COMPUSTAT&CRSP  
asset ratio every quarter to total asset   
 in the balance sheet   
    
Retained earnings to capital For every quarter COMPUSTAT&CRSP  
employed ratio    
    
Common equity to total For every quarter COMPUSTAT &CRSP  
asset ratio    
    
 Standard capital ratios COMPUSTAT  
CAPR1: Risk-Adjusted Capital Ratio 
- Tier 1 
CAPR2: Risk-Adjusted Capital Ratio 
- Tier 2    
    
CEQ: Common/Ordinary Equity - 
Total  COMPUSTAT  
    
    
    
RE: retained earnings  COMPUSTAT  
  
 
 
   
    
TIE: total interest expense  COMPUSTAT  
    
 
Other important variables needed for constructing the pay out variables, or as controls: 
CSHPRI: Common Shares Used to Calculate Earnings Per Share – Basic 
CSHO: Common Shares Outstanding 
CSTK: Common/Ordinary Stock (Capital) 
DLTT: Long-Term Debt – Total 
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OPREPSX: Earnings Per Share - Diluted - from Operations 
DPDC: Deposits - Demand – Customer 
DPLTB: Deposits - Long-Term Time - Bank 
Gvkey: Global Company Key 
Fyear: Data Year – Fiscal 
Indfmt: Industry Format 
Tic: Ticker Symbol 
Conm: Company Name 
STALT: Status Alert 
List of acronyms 
1. SOA: speed of adjustment, referring to various types of pay outs, namely, dividend pay 
outs and share repurchases. 
2. Half Life: Time taken in terms of quarters by the respective BHCs to adjust towards 
50% of the target pay outs level. 
3. BHC: bank holding companies. 
4. NPV: net present value. 
5. EMH: efficiency market hypothesis. 
6. Separating Equilibrium: if the signal sent by the firms in a market with information 
asymmetry problems (adverse selection or moral hazard) is costly enough, such that 
only high value firms can bear such cost, then equilibrium would be generated in which 
outside investors could distinguish between low and high quality firms and price them 
accordingly. Such an equilibrium is called as a separating equilibrium. In theoretical 
modeling this is achieved when certain constraints, like participation and incentive 
compatibility are maintained. 
7. VAR: vector auto regression (as explained in the methodology section of the second 
chapter). 
8. DPS: dividend per share of the respective bank holding companies. 
9. G causality: Granger Causality test for VAR (explained in the methodology section of 
the second chapter). 
10. VECM: vector error correction model. 
11. ETM: Earnings Trend Model. 
12. GMM: General Method of Moments 
13. Reta : retained earnings to total asset mix 
14. Ceta: common equity to total asset mix/ratio 
15. Ieta: interest expenditure to total asset ratio 
16. Npata: non performing asset to total asset ratio 
17. Lags: one quarter or one period lag, in some VAR models: L1 
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Extra TOBIT results 
The extra results for TOBIT regressions in the appendix for the full sample data provides 
results for the probabilistic impact of opacity dummy variables and the crisis dummy variables 
on the pay out variables: dividend per share, net share repurchases, and  cash dividends. 
Dummy opacity variables: size dummy, spread dummy, turn over dummy and tangibility 
dummy take the value 1 if the level is greater than the median level of the variable or 0 
otherwise. Crisis dummy takes the value 1 if the observation is between the crisis period (2007-
09 as explained earlier) or else 0.The control variables remain same through out. 
dividendspershare~r Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
sizedummy .0374567 .0062074 6.03 0.000 .0252867 .0496267 
crisis1 -.0208258 .0099928 -2.08 0.037 -.0404174 -.0012342 
cetalag .0179668 .0515696 0.35 0.728 -.0831389 .1190725 
retalag 2.033137 .1441499 14.10 0.000 1.750522 2.315753 
ieta .6788063 .0105785 64.17 0.000 .6580664 .6995461 
earningspersharelag -.0000701 .0001594 -0.44 0.660 -.0003826 .0002425 
npatal -.0055433 .00123 -4.51 0.000 -.0079547 -.0031319 
_cons -.0108643 .0061604 -1.76 0.078 -.0229421 .0012135 
/sigma .1839654 .0023118   .1794329 .1884979 
 
dividendspershare~r Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
spreaddummy .0296442 .0062324 4.76 0.000 .0174252 .0418633 
crisis1 -.0274006 .0101365 -2.70 0.007 -.0472738 -.0075274 
cetalag .037785 .0515632 0.73 0.464 -.0633082 .1388782 
retalag 1.955997 .1442523 13.56 0.000 1.673181 2.238814 
ieta .6836717 .010643 64.24 0.000 .6628054 .7045381 
earningspersharelag -.0000921 .0001598 -0.58 0.565 -.0004054 .0002213 
npatal -.006248 .0012341 -5.06 0.000 -.0086675 -.0038286 
_cons -.0066212 .0060616 -1.09 0.275 -.0185053 .0052629 
/sigma .1844399 .0023159   .1798994 .1889804 
 
 
 
logcashdividendlag Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
sizedummy .6094307 .1058209 5.76 0.000 .4019617     .8168996 
crisis1 -.1008602 .1677499 -0.60 0.548 -.4297451     .2280247 
cetalag -.9364985 .8827728 -1.06 0.289 -2.667234 .7942367 
retalag -.3463681 2.470765 -0.14 0.889 -5.190467 4.497731 
ieta .6005063 .3742317 1.60 0.109 -.1332001 1.334213 
earningspersharelag 0005498 .0028364 0.19 0.846 -.0050111 .0061107 
npatal -.0339447 .0188908 -1.80 0.072 -.0709814 .003092 
_cons 1.227621 .1100452 11.16 0.000 1.01187 1.443372 
/sigma 3.276177 .0078211   3.260843 3.291511 
 
totalsharesrepurc~r Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
sizedummy 1.276773 .1176004 10.86 0.000 1.046209   1.507336 
crisis1 -.4198506 .1854146 -2.26 0.024 -.7833684     -.0563328 
cetalag -.377361 .9751772 -0.39 0.699 -2.289261 1.534539 
retalag -49.63824 2.826963 -17.56 0.000 -55.18069 -44.09579 
ieta 5.898942 .4152691 14.21 0.000 5.084779 6.713105 
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earningspersharelag -.4184982 .0370278 -11.30 0.000 -.4910936 -.3459028 
npatal .0909036 .0207973 4.37 0.000 .050129 .1316782 
_cons 5.377136 .1219248 44.10 0.000 5.138095 5.616178 
/sigma 3.60069 .0425409   3.517286 3.684095 
 
totalsharesrepurc~r Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
turnoverdummy .5543466 .1183981 4.68 0.000 .3222191   .7864741 
crisis1 -.4245483 .1880366 -2.26 0.024 -.7932067     -.0558899 
cetalag -.2466479 .9950472 -0.25 0.804 -2.197505 1.704209 
retalag -50.48502 2.86337 -17.63 0.000 -56.09885 -44.87119 
ieta 6.443495 .4173482 15.44 0.000 5.625255 7.261734 
earningspersharelag -.4096641 .0375262 -10.92 0.000 -.4832367 -.3360915 
npatal .0729076 .0210061 3.47 0.001 .0317238 .1140914 
_cons 5.692556 .1225897 46.44 0.000 5.452211 5.932901 
/sigma 3.6501 .0431118   3.565576 3.734623 
One-sample t test 
 
totalsharesrepurc~r Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
spreaddummy .436766 .1197486 3.65 0.000 .2019909 .671541 
crisis1 -.5044273 .1903781 -2.26 0.008 -.8776764 -.1311782 
cetalag .3119618 .9880018 0.32 0.752 -1.625082 2.249005 
retalag -51.59368 2.874048 -17.95 0.000 -57.22844 -45.95891 
ieta 6.327068 .4211847 15.02 0.000 5.501308 7.152829 
earningspersharelag -.4040578 .0375938 -10.75 0.000 -.4777629 -.3303528 
npatal .0729897 .0210439 3.47 0.001 .0317317 .1142476 
_cons 5.74514 .1224515 46.92 0.000 5.505066 5.985215 
/sigma 3.656376 .0431741   3.571731 3.741022 
 
One-sample t test 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] 
ratio 989 1.906665 .558021 17.54885 .8116225 3.001708 
mean = mean(ratio)               t =   3.4168 
Ho: mean = 0 degrees of freedom =      988 
Ha: mean < 0       Ha: mean != 0                Ha: mean > 0 
ttest ratio == 1 
One-sample t test 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] 
 
ratio 989 1.906665 .558021 17.54885 .8116225 3.001708 
mean = mean(ratio)                t =   1.6248 
Ho: mean = 1 degrees of freedom =      988 
Ha: mean < 1       Ha: mean != 1                Ha: mean > 1 
Pr(T < t) = 0.9477 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.1045 Pr(T > t) = 0.0523 
 
As is evident from the above regression tables that the impact of opacity dummy and the 
crisis dummy variables are significant at 5% level in most of the cases for pay out variables, 
and significantly the impacts on net share repurchase variable is significant, which is in keeping 
with the results obtained in the main thesis, which again supports the substitution hypothesis. 
As another robustness check for the regression results the below LOGISTIC regression 
results are obtained with the full sample. Here the pay out variable used is total dividend pay 
out in Log form and the net share repurchases. The control variables are kept same through out. 
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Logistic Regression Results 
Logistic regression                               Number of obs = 3943 
LR chi2(6) = 500.18 
Prob> chi2 = 0.0000 
Log likelihood = -1884.8294              Pseudo R2 = 0.1171 
logdividendtotal Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
size .1594306 .0299302 5.33 0.000 .1007686 .2180926 
ceta 4.915707 1.428592 3.44 0.001 2.115717 7.715696 
dta -.7324417 .5634161 -1.30 0.194 -1.836717 .3718335 
reta 21.66966 1.291882 16.77 0.000 19.13762 24.20171 
ieta 29.45075 12.89563 2.28 0.022 4.175776 54.72572 
npatal .0163651 .0125299 1.31 0.192 -.0081932 .0409233 
_cons -1.276828 .2689915 -4.75 0.000 -1.804041 -.749614 
 
 
Logistic regression                               Number of obs = 3943 
LR chi2(6) = 478.39 
Prob> chi2 = 0.0000 
Log likelihood = -1895.7241                       Pseudo R2 = 0.1120 
logdividendtotal Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
tangibility 13.27452 4.698796 2.83 0.005 4.065045 22.48399 
ceta 5.306361 1.419761 3.74 0.000 2.52368 8.089042 
dta .1032767 .5489737 0.19 0.851 -.972692 1.179245 
reta 21.86303 1.299462 16.82 0.000 19.31614 24.40993 
ieta 13.09097 12.08126 1.08 0.279 -10.58787 36.76981 
npatal .0217599 .013074 1.66 0.096 -.0038647 .0473845 
_cons -.3532264 .1759815 -2.01 0.045 -.6981439 -.0083089 
 
Logistic regression                               Number of obs = 3943 
LR chi2(6) = 613.16 
Prob> chi2 = 0.0000 
Log likelihood = -1828.3422                       Pseudo R2 = 0.1436 
logdividendtotal Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
turnover -.1343478 .0114667 -11.72 0.000 -.1568222 -.1118734 
ceta 8.8392 1.53619 5.75 0.000 5.828322 11.85008 
dta -.0393808 .5608613 -0.07 0.944 -1.138649 1.059887 
reta 20.1939 1.292908 15.62 0.000 17.65985 22.72795 
Ieta 20.48251 12.46526 1.64 0.100 -3.948944 44.91397 
npata .0076902 .0113132 0.68 0.497 -.0144833 .0298636 
_cons -.2316943 .1605649 -1.44 0.149 -.5463958 .0830072 
 
Logistic regression                                                                                  Number of obs = 3943 
LR chi2(6) = 514.77 
Prob> chi2 = 0.0000 
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Log likelihood = -1877.5365                      Pseudo R2 = 0.1206 
logdividendtotal Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
sizelag .1480259 .0295335 5.01 0.000 .0901413 .2059105 
cetalag 6.45157 1.481774 4.35 0.000 3.547346 9.355794 
dtalag -.5638763 .5510053 -1.02 0.306 -1.643827 .5160742 
retalag 21.93717 1.301176 16.86 0.000 19.38692 24.48743 
earningspersharelag .012822 .0122913 1.04 0.297 -.0112685 .0369126 
npatal 5.950931 2.285801 2.60 0.009 1.470844 10.43102 
_cons -1.245878 .2551047 -4.88 0.000 -1.745874 -.7458816 
 
Logistic regression                               Number of obs = 3943 
LR chi2(6) = 496.12 
Prob> chi2 = 0.0000 
Log likelihood = -1886.8601                       Pseudo R2 = 0.1162 
logdividendtotal Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
tangibilitylag 12.81133 4.662334 2.75 0.006 3.673319 21.94933 
cetalag 6.749086 1.458002 4.63 0.000 3.891455 9.606717 
dtalag .1278229 .5392528 0.24 0.813 -.9290931 1.184739 
retalag 21.9846 1.309838 16.78 0.000 19.41737 24.55184 
earningspersharelag .0167182 .0127362 1.31 0.189 -.0082443 .0416808 
npatal 4.485911 2.231952 2.01 0.044 .1113647 8.860457 
_cons -.4506262 .1700459 -2.65 0.008 -.78391 -.1173423 
 
Logistic regression                               Number of obs = 3943 
LR chi2(6) = 500.38 
Prob> chi2 = 0.0000 
Log likelihood = -1884.7337                       Pseudo R2       =     0.1172 
logdividendtotal Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
intangibilitylag -8.59696 2.448367 -3.51 0.000 -13.39567 -3.798249 
cetalag 6.089751 1.453646 4.19 0.000 3.240658 8.938844 
dtalag -.0277887 .5420708 -0.05 0.959 -1.090228 1.034651 
retalag 22.10711 1.309973 16.88 0.000 19.53961 24.67461 
earningspersharelag .0141395 .0124548 1.14 0.256 -.0102713 .0385504 
npatal 4.958855 2.25187 2.20 0.028 .5452721 9.372438 
_cons -.0780469 .1475702 -0.53 0.597 -.3672793 .2111855 
 
Logistic regression                               Number of obs= 3943 
LR chi2(6) = 513.22 
Prob> chi2 = 0.0000 
Log likelihood =  -1878.312                       Pseudo R2 = 0.1202 
logdividendtotal Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
spreadlag -.06322 .0123864 -5.10 0.000 -.0874969 -.0389432 
cetalag 6.711531 1.462961 4.59 0.000 3.84418 9.578882 
dtalag .0249284 .544327 0.05 0.963 -1.041933 1.09179 
retalag 22.39263 1.311021 17.08 0.000 19.82308 24.96218 
earningspersharelag .0137905 .012494 1.10 0.270 -.0106972 .0382783 
npatal 5.672629 2.144344 2.65 0.008 1.469792 9.875465 
_cons -.0911216 .1447164 -0.63 0.529 -.3747604 .1925173 
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Logistic regression                               Number of obs = 2340 
LR chi2(6) = 15.54 
Prob> chi2 = 0.0164 
Log likelihood = -67.473091                       Pseudo R2 = 0.1033 
totalsharesrepurchasedquarter Odds Ratio Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
sizelag 1.117824 .2660812 0.47 0.640 .7010637 .7010637 
cetalag 3.79e+24 6.34e+25 3.38 0.001 2.17e+10 6.62e+38 
dtalag 295.104 1482.51 1.13 0.258 .0156244 .0156244 
retalag 6.24e-14 9.51e-13 -1.99 0.046 6.58e-27 .5914002 
earningspersharelag 1.025043 .0690589 0.37 0.714 .8982457 1.169739 
npatal .7619051 .8503083 -0.24 0.807 .0854939 6.789951 
_cons 2.369489 4.326765 0.47 0.637 .06612 84.91349 
 
VAR Extra Results 
Though in the main thesis there have been VAR results provided both for an unrestricted 
sample and a restricted sample, here a larger sample with dividend omission data is further 
used. The limitation with this sample is that this data set is obtained only with dividend per 
share data. The results however strongly supports the VAR outputs and nature of impacts 
obtained earlier. 
Number of obs = 6,557 
Log likelihood = 3707.595 AIC = -1.126611 
FPE = .0011111 HQIC = -1.1216 
Det(Sigma_ml)  =   .0011064 SBIC = -1.112117 
 
Equation Parms RMSE R-sq chi2 P>chi2 
dividendspersh~r 7 .145622 0.2093 1735.543 0.0000 
size 7 .228758 0.9723 230441.6 0.0000 
      
 Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
dividendspersharepaydatequarter       
ividendspersharepaydatequarter       
L1. .3094738 .0115653 26.76 0.000 .2868063 .3321414 
size       
L1. .016787 .0013781 12.18 0.000 .014086 .0194881 
ceta -.0463098 .0473836 -0.98 0.328 -.1391799 .0465603 
dta -.0509286 .0257327 -1.98 0.048 -.1013638 -.0004933 
reta .75441 .0484175 15.58 0.000 .6595135 .8493064 
ieta 3.370535 .5360553 6.29 0.000 2.319886 4.421184 
cons -.0770175 .0114599 -6.72 0.000 -.0994786 -.0545565 
       
size       
dividendspersharepaydatequarter       
L1. .0426035 .0181679 2.34 0.019 .006995 .078212 
size       
L1. .9847149 .0021649 454.86 0.000 .9804719 .988958 
ceta -.1747091 .0744349 -2.35 0.019 -.3205988 -.0288193 
dta .1470576 .0404236 3.64 0.000 .0678288 .2262864 
reta .1322536 .076059 1.74 0.082 -.0168194 .2813265 
ieta -.7298422 .8420898 -0.87 0.386 -2.380308 .9206235 
cons .1219859 .0180024 6.78 0.000 .0867018 .15727 
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Number of obs = 6,557 
Log likelihood = -11618.67 AIC = 3.548168 
FPE = .1191245 HQIC = 3.553179 
Det(Sigma_ml) = .1186169 SBIC = 3.562662 
 
Equation Parms RMSE R-sq chi2 P>chi2 
dividendspersh~r 7 .146361 0.2013 1652.096 0.0000 
size 7 2.36702 0.1462 1122.639 0.0000 
      
 Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
dividendspersharepaydatequarter       
ividendspersharepaydatequarter       
L1. .3204768 .0115526 27.74 0.000 .2978341 .3431194 
size       
L1. .0064889 .0007214 8.99 0.000 .005075 .0079029 
ceta -.0442812 .0476657 -0.93 0.353 -.1377042 .0491419 
dta .0133953 .0252635 0.53 0.596 -.0361203 .0629108 
reta .7354079 .0486925 15.10 0.000 .6399723 .8308435 
ieta 2.641599 .5345423 4.94 0.000 1.593916 3.689283 
cons .0292248 .0061455 4.76 0.000 .0171799 .0412698 
       
size       
dividendspersharepaydatequarter       
L1. 2.084634 .1868341 11.16 0.000 1.718446 2.450822 
size       
L1. .3225249 .0116671 27.64 0.000 .2996578 .3453919 
ceta -2.215602 .7708736 -2.87 0.004 -3.726486 -.7047172 
dta .3582887 .4085738 0.88 0.381 -.4425012 1.159079 
reta 2.34958 .78748 2.98 0.003 .8061477 3.893013 
ieta .863308 8.644885 0.10 0.10 -16.08036 17.80697 
cons 1.227613 .099388 12.35 0.000 1.032816 1.42241 
 
Number of obs = 6,557 
Log likelihood = 31570.37 AIC = -9.625245 
FPE = 2.26e-07 HQIC = -9.620234 
Det(Sigma_ml) = 2.25e-07 SBIC = -9.610751 
 
Equation Parms RMSE R-sq chi2 P>chi2 
dividendspersh~r 7 .147089 0.1933 1571.032 0.0000 
size 7 .003232 0.8777 47051.68 0.0000 
      
 Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
dividendspersharepaydatequarter       
ividendspersharepaydatequarter       
L1. .3365081 .0114388 29.42 0.000 .3140886 .3589276 
size       
L1. -.7845929 .2002096 -3.92 0.000 -1.176997 -.3921892 
ceta -.0902129 .0481349 -1.87 0.061 -.1845556 .0041298 
dta .0082931 .0254691 0.33 0.745 -.0416254 .0582116 
reta .7477931 .0489106 15.29 0.000 .6519302 .843656 
ieta 2.703252 .5386405 5.02 0.000 1.647536 3.758968 
cons .0579516 .0071971 8.05 0.000 .0438454 .0720577 
       
size       
dividendspersharepaydatequarter       
L1. -.0004296 .0002514 -1.71 0.087 -.0009223 .000063 
size       
L1. .93473 .0043997 212.45 0.000 .9261068 .9433533 
ceta .000147 .0010578 0.14 0.889 -.0019262 .0022202 
dta -.0004602 .0005597 -0.82 0.411 -.0015572 .0006368 
reta -.0002459 .0010748 -0.23 0.819 -.0023525 .0018607 
ieta .0965041 .0118369 8.15 0.000 .0733043 .1197039 
cons .0006292 .0001582 3.98 0.000 .0003192 .0009391 
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Number of obs = 6,557 
Log likelihood = -3495.567 AIC = 1.070479 
FPE = .009999 HQIC = 1.07549 
Det(Sigma_ml) = .0099563 SBIC = 1.084973 
 
Equation Parms RMSE R-sq chi2 P>chi2 
dividendspersh~r 7 .147161 0.1925 1563.047 0.0000 
size 7 .678898 0.9006 59379.88 0.0000 
      
 Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
dividendspersharepaydatequarter       
ividendspersharepaydatequarter       
L1. .3375442 .0114381 29.51 0.000 .315126 .3599625 
size       
L1. .0026824 .0008991 2.98 0.003 .0009202 .0044447 
ceta -.0926022 .0485074 -1.91 0.056 -.187675 .0024705 
dta -.0026876 .0261844 -0.10 0.918 -.0540082 .0486329 
reta .7712669 .0494021 15.61 0.000 .6744406 .8680932 
ieta 2.856657 .5475322 5.22 0.000 1.783514 3.929801 
cons .0075662 .0131188 0.58 0.564 -.0181462 .0332787 
       
size       
dividendspersharepaydatequarter       
L1. .1459548 .0527675 2.77 0.006 .0425325 .2493771 
size       
L1. .9385966 .0041479 226.28 0.000 .9304668 .9467264 
ceta .7364119 .2237793 3.29 0.001 .2978125 1.175011 
dta .6050561 .1207967 5.01 0.000 .3682989 .8418134 
reta -.5614795 .2279068 -2.46 0.014 -1.008169 -.1147905 
ieta -10.70847 2.525932 -4.24 0.000 -15.65921 -5.757735 
cons .795353 .0605212 13.14 0.000 .6767337 .9139723 
 
 
Two-sample t test with unequal variances 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] 
logcas~d 3,685 1.523037 .0334099 2.028122 1.457533 1.58854 
logdiv~l 3,685 1.904276 .0364985 2.21561 1.832717 1.975835 
combined 7,370 1.713656 .0248382 2.13233 1.664966 1.762346 
diff  -.3812394 .0494809  -.4782363 -.2842426 
diff = mean(logcashdividend) - mean(logdividendtotal) t =  -7.7048 
Ho: diff = 0 Satterthwaite's degrees of freedom =  7311.14 
Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff != 0 Ha: diff > 0 
Pr(T < t) = 0.0000 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000 Pr(T > t) = 1.0000 
Logcash: log of cash dividends paid, Log div: Log value of total dividend paid. 
Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
panel 3,685 43.15142 29.67957 1 105 
fiscaldata~r 3,685 20038.1 58.2999 19811 20132 
quarter 3,685 3318.87 1964.09 5 6665 
size 3,685 7.385198 1.463582 3.331597 14.4053 
sizelag 3,685 7.371864 1.462366 3.133928 14.4053 
ceta 3,685 .0914546 .0294859 -.0353205 .3345781 
cetalag 3,685 .0916211 .029372 -.0353205 .3345781 
dta 3,685 .0701281 .0733167 0 .4439754 
dtalag 3,685 .0699365 .0739741 0 .4730755 
tangibility 3,685 .0171335 .0086351 0 .0583998 
tangibilit~g 3,685 .0171517 .0086287 0 .0575578 
intangibil~y 3,685 .0100754 .0154105 0 .1997587 
intangibil~g 3,685 .0100091 .0153605 0 .1997587 
reta  3,685 .0409431 .0381746 -.19602  .1628012 
retalag 3,685 .0410462 .0382257 -.1988622 .1605832 
14 
 
ieta 3,685 .0058378 .0034563 0 .0660021 
ietalag 3,685 .0058366 .0034575 0 .0660021 
dividendsp~r 3,685 .1423083 .175876 0         3.3902 
dividendlag 3,685 .1421439 .1696949 0 2.6791 
logdividen~l 3,685 1.904276 2.21561 -6.214608 9.348623 
logdividen~g 3,685 1.88258 2.226312 -6.907755 9.348623 
cashdividend 3,685 67.29864 354.2809 .001 6990 
logcashdiv~d 3,685 1.523037 2.028122 -6.907755 8.852236 
logcashdiv~g 3,685 1.495432 2.040598 -4.961845 8.852236 
earningspe~e 3,685 1.913921 19.27733 -62.61 1153.17 
earningspe~g 3,685 1.932777 19.36936 -62.61 1153.17 
npata 3,685 .0131871 .1177284 0 7.055584 
npatal 3,685 .0133596 .1180966 0 7.055584 
divpershar~r 3,685 .1429119 .1710049 0 3.3902 
dividendex~g 3,685 .1434703 .1658688 0 2.6791 
turnover 3,685 13.58046 2.269858 6.214608 21.82201 
turnoverlag 3,685 13.55666 2.272071 6.214608 21.82201 
spread 3,685 2.073791 2.376277 0 34 
spreadlag 3,685 2.105454 2.447193 0 34 
 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
size 2,914 7.427284 1.387227 4.346088 14.4053 
ceta 2,914 .0947378 .0276233 0 .3345781 
dta 2,914 .0691349 .0727562 0 .4439754 
tangibility 2,914 .0171626 .0080085 0 .0583998 
intangibil~y 2,914 .0094477 .0143807 0 .1997587 
reta 2,914 .0469541 .0310761 -.1202497 .1628012 
ieta 2,914 .0059442 .0031771 0 .0259125 
dividendsp~r 2,914 .1799609 .1798363 .01 3.3902 
logdividen~l 2,914 2.01033 2.165124 -6.214608 9.348623 
cashdividend 2,914 79.96451 392.5566 .001 6990 
logcashdiv~g 2,914 1.645384 2.118872 -4.828314 8.852236 
earningspe~e 2,914 2.016839 21.59628 -18.93 1153.17 
npata 2,914 .0134472 .1315856 0 7.055584 
turnover 2,914 13.59638 2.280513 8.006368 21.82201 
spread 2,914 2.127927 2.329166 0 34 
 
GRAPHS 
 
 
Graph 1 
 
 
Initially the data universe consisted of all the bank holding companies based on the merged data 
from COMPUSTAT and CRSP since 1980Q1 to 2015Q4, however due to significant missing 
data for share repurchases, and consistent dividend pay outs, some constraints were put on the 
data. The main constraint put on the selection of data was that only those bank holding 
companies would be selected which had maintained consistency in dividend pay outs for the 
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last 4 quarters in any particular year. With this constraint it is observed that the no of omission for 
dividend pay outs in the final sample has reduced to zero, and also there is a drastic improvement in 
the omission of share repurchases data. One consistent finding is that since 2000 there has been 
regular share repurchases by such bank holding companies which have also opted for regular 
dividend pay outs, however since the latter half of the financial crisis there has been sharp increase 
in the share repurchases as compared to a decline in the cash dividend pay outs. Some graphical 
exposition of these trends have been shown in this appendix section. 
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Above is the graphical exhibition of the moving (quarterly) average of dividend per share 
paid out by the bank holding companies in the sample, from 2007Q1 to 2013Q4. The main 
reason for this graph is to describe the pattern of dividend pay outs over the crisis period. One 
clear message is that there has been a steady pay out by the BHCs with some sharp peaks/ 
spikes, which refers to some bank holding companies in specific during the very period. Here 
the subsample consists of 1320 firm quarter periods. 
 
The linear trend line also do show that the pay out has been steady over the firm quarter periods. 
This finding is in keeping with some recent studies, for example Floyd etal (2015), which have 
observed that BHCs have pursued a stable pay out strategy despite regulatory pressure to cut 
back dividends and build up more capital.  
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The current thesis has explained the very trend from different perspectives: neoclassical 
value signalling, life cycle factors, smoothing of pay outs as well as whether risk shifting has 
been exhibited via pay outs where the finding was insignificant. 
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The above graphical display is of the total cash dividend amount paid out by the bank holding 
companies in the sample over the period 2007-2013 quarterly. Here again the period is chosen to 
reflect any significant change or trend over the crisis period and beyond. Though linear trend line 
shows a small decline in the cash dividend amount in the later quarters after the crisis 
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period, overall the cash dividends have been quite persistent. Here the subsample consists of 
1350 firm quarter periods. 
 
Here however the importance of the other types of pay outs is called for, and in the current 
thesis, share repurchases and stock dividends have also been considered along with the total pay 
out values. Cash dividend pay outs certainly relates with the free cash flow theory, and in the 
banking sector due to severe agency conflict cash dividends can play more important roles as 
compared to the non-banking firms. For partial adjustment of pay outs, in the thesis it is 
observed that managers do use cash dividends per share basis for smoothing more than any 
other type of pay outs. 
 
There are some significantly larger peaks in the start of the crisis period rather, which has 
reduced over time, however this may not be risk shifting or wealth transfers from depositors/ 
creditors to shareholders, rather value signalling during downturn. 
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As mentioned in the thesis there has been a long standing debate on whether the share 
repurchases as another pay out tool is a perfect substitute of dividends. In the theoretical 
models, like of Bhattacharya’s (1979) ‘bird in the hand fallacy’, share repurchases have 
been conceptualised as perfect substitutes. However certainly there are tax consequences, 
and shareholder clientele effects. Here the subsample consists of 3850 firm quarter periods. 
 
The above graph shows the trend of share repurchases by the bank holding companies in the 
sample, over quarters for a larger period than the crisis period of 2007-2009. It is evident that 
in the earlier periods there has been some irregular spikes but the pay out via share 
repurchases has been irregular. There has been omission of share repurchases for a 
considerable number of quarters. Floyd et al (2015) and others have also found that the trend 
of share repurchases has caught up only in the later years. 
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The above graph now shows the trend of share repurchases by the BHCs for the crisis period 
quarters, rather than from very early periods. Here the pay outs are very regular and omission 
of share repurchases is rare. This finding further supports the view that since crisis the banking 
firms have changed strategies towards share repurchases, which is also impacted by the 
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Regulatory pressures. Here the graph contains 980 firm quarter periods covering the 2007 
onwards. 
 
 
 OUTPUTS FOR THE PARTIAL ADJUSTMENT MODEL 
The current section builds up a three step partial adjustment model aiming to achieve two fold analysis, one, analyse the direct impact 
of bank level opacity on bank specific adjustment speeds of pay outs, two after such adjustment speeds are measured using the partial 
adjustment model further indirect impacts of the bank specific characteristics on speeds of adjustments are measured. 
The following partial adjustment model has been developed, which is a modified partial adjustment model following Oliver etal (2015), 
Flannery and Rangan (2006) among others. In this form, a bank’s current pay out ratio (or DPS) is a weighted average of its target pay 
out ratio and the previous period’s pay out ratio, where the weight λ has the closed range (0,1), with a stochastic term, as below. 
DPSi,t= λ DPSi,t* + (1-λ)DPSi,t-1 + ei,t….(1)  
Hence ever period a bank can adjust towards the target level by λ proportion, which implies that smaller is the λ greater is the rigidity 
of the bank to change dividend pay outs towards the target. Hence, λ is considered as the speed of adjustment (SOA), and (1-λ) the 
portion of dividend pay out which is inertial. However since the target level is unobserved, and is a function of bank specific 
heterogeneities, it is further modelled as a function of bank level, and bank specific factors, as shown below: 
𝐷𝑃𝑆∗ = 𝛽𝑋 + 𝜈𝑖 + 𝜇𝑡 … . (2)  
In the above equation x is the vector of firm specific characteristics, and the two error terms represents heterogeneity across space and 
time. At this stage for firm specific factors we have used standard life cycle variables following the very literature. Substituting 2 in 1 
the following equation is generated. 
DPSi,t= λ(β xi,t-1 + νi +μt ) + (1-λ)DPSi,t-1 + ei,t  ….(3) 
Again as the standard literature (Flannery and Rangan (2006), Lemmon et al. (2008),Huangand Ritter (2009), and Gropp and Heider 
(2010)) suggest that in the presence of lagged dependent variable with a short panel data, using fixed effect models can generate 
biasedestimates for λ. Hence following the recent estimations (Oliver et al, 2015, Flannery and Hankins (2013)) a system GMM 
estimation of the model (3) is adapted here by the author. Again we assume that each banking firm will have its own SOA factor, which 
is again a function of some bank specific variables, which can be captured in the following way: 
λi,t = λ0+αZi,t-1, where Z is the vector of firm specific variables, here we use the opacity level as one of such  firm  specific  variables  
to  explicitly  measure  the  impact  of  degree of information asymmetry on the adjustment process. hence substituting again this in 3 
we get, DPS*-DPS =(λ+αZ)( βx + ν+μ–Y )+e …(4) 
Again the last term in the bracket can be expressed as the difference between the target level and the lagged dependent variable, this can 
be termed as GAPi,t-1, hence symbolically the partial adjustment model can now be written as  
Yi,t-Yi,t-1 =( λ0+αZi,t-1)GAPi,t-1+ei,t ...(5) 
Overall following Jiang, Hong and Molleneaux (2015), who have used a similar partial adjustment model for investigating capital 
structure adjustment of bank holding firms, the estimation of the above steps have been done. Hence the first step which contains the 
lagged dependent variable has been estimated using system GMM method, whereas the remaining steps have been estimated using 
standard panel data fixed effect estimation method. There have been a huge literature on such estimation methods, specifically on the 
advantages on using GMM estimation techniques for panel data models. Following is the brief account of the three steps in which the 
partial adjustment model is run in the current paper. The paper follows studies by Flannery and Rangan (2006), De Jonghe and Oztekin 
(2015), and Xiang et al (2015) among others for a three step partial adjustment model, which allows for bank specific and time varying 
pay out targets and heterogeneous adjustment speeds. First a constant adjustment speed λ is assumed for all banking firms for measuring 
target pay outs for each quarter, this is the first step of the model. In the second step the gap between the actual pay out level and the 
estimated target pay out level for each bank is used to measure the varying speed of adjustment for each bank. Finally, in the third step, 
the varying target pay outs for each bank is re-estimated using the varying speed of adjustment measured from the second step. 
In a partial adjustment model, a bank’s current pay out level/ pay out ratio ( k ) is a weighted average of its target  ( k *  ) and its 
previous period’s (in the current study previous quarter) pay out level/ ratio, Ki,t = λ K
*
i,t +(1-λ)Ki,t-1+µi,t (2). Substituting the equation 1 into 
the equation 2 we get the following equation: Ki,t=λβXt-1+(1-λ)Ki,t-1+µi,t (3). However the assumption of the constant speed of adjustment 
can be relaxed, and we can have a firm specific adjustment speed which varies over time or bank quarters: λi,i=Z i ,t 1, where Z is 
another firm specific characteristics vector.  Hence we get the equation(4) as  Ki,t-Ki,t-1=Z i ,t 1(βXi,t-1-Ki,t-1)+µi,t. 
i ,t i ,t  
    
 
Then the model is estimated in a three step procedure. Assuming a constant adjustment speed λ  a standard partial adjustment model is 
estimated in (3), for this step the estimation technique is system GMM (as explained earlier, and here the widely cited study of De 
Jonghe and Oztekin (2015) is followed, who have used system GMM mainly for the presence of the lagged dependent variable). The 
main purpose for the first step is to calculate an initial set of estimated β s , which are then used to measure the initial estimates of the 
target pay outs by the banks, K*i,t =β Xi,t-1, for each bank quarter. These estimates are likely to be biased since λ is assumed to be constant. 
Hence in the second step, the gap between the estimated and the actual pay outs by banks in the previous quarter is estimated, say, Gi,t, 
which is then substituted in the equation (3), Gi,t= β Xi,t-1-Ki,t-1 (5), hence Ki,t-Ki,t-1 =Z i ,t 1G+µi,t (6), where G is the estimate of the gap 
as defined. 
The equation (6) is used to calculate the estimates of, which is required for estimating the varying speeds of adjustments of the banking 
firms for each quarter. The varying speed of adjustment is given by the formula, λi,t=()Zi,t-1.Hence the estimation of varying speed of 
adjustment comprises the second step of the model. 
In the third step the pay out measures are re-estimated by using the varying speed of adjustment obtained in the second step into the 
equation (3), hence after re-arranging the equation we have the following equation, Ki,t-Ki,t-1(1-Zi,t-1)=βXi,t-1+µi,t(7), where the 
estimated values have been used for , in this step bank specific adjustment speed is used for measuring the bank specific and time 
varying pay out targets, which can be perceived as the optimal pay outs.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The table below provides results for the first step of the partial adjustment model, which is used to estimate the target pay outs under the constraint of constant adjustment speed of 
the BHCs (COMPUSTAT-CRSP). Following Oliviera et al (2014) the estimation technique for the first step has been system GMM, since this is dynamic partial adjustment 
model, all explanatory variables are one period lagged to control for any possible endogeneity problem. Variables are explained in the data and variables section. *, **, ***, 
represents significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
                                                      DPS                                                       TOTAL DIVIDEND PAY                                                                     TOTAL PAY  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
No. of observations 3358 3358 3358 3358 3360 3360 3360 3360 3395 3395 3395 3395 
const -0.058 0.071 0.049 0.034 -0.021 0.355 0.315 0.301 -0.372 0.734 0.589 0.745 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.762) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.137) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) 
Common Equity/TA 0.159 0.123 0.178 0.199 0.506 0.771 0.811 0.825 1.137 1.119 2.136 2.778 
 (0.116) (0.232) (0.082) (0.049) (0.229) (0.185) (0.162) (0.155) (0.468) (0.481) (0.298) (0.176) 
RE/TA 0.737 0.711 0.683 0.648 -0.111 -0.981 -1.004 -1.021 0.027 -0.150 3.025 2.289 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.736) (0.092) (0.086) (0.080) (0.982) (0.901) (0.131) (0.253) 
Non-Perf. Assets/ TA 0.007 0.007 0.005 0.007 0.004 0.067 0.066 0.067 -0.298 -0.308 -0.091 -0.079 
 (0.753) (0.775) (0.814) (0.773) (0.965) (0.474) (0.480) (0.473) (0.381) (0.367) (0.781) (0.810) 
Size 0.015***    0.017**    0.143    
 (0.000)    (0.043)    (0.000)    
TANGIBILITY  -1.047    -2.407    -3.903   
  (0.002)    (0.365)    (0.428)   
TURNOVER   0.012    0.103    0.302  
   (0.884)    (0.809)    (0.000)  
SPREAD    0.008    0.005    0.030 
    (0.000)    (0.325)    (0.094) 
DPS t-1 0.331 0.352 0.356 0.333         
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)         
LOG DIV     0.941 0.838 0.838 0.838     
     (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)     
TOTAL PAY t-1         0.676 0.686 0.516 0.521 
             
                  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 section 2 
 
 
The table below provides results for the second step of the partial adjustment model, which is used for estimating bank specific speeds of adjustments, namely of 
dividend per share (First four columns), total dividend pay outs (column 5-8), and of total pay outs including share repurchases (as explained in the variables 
section) (columns 9-12). Following Oliviera et al (2014) this step is estimated using fixed effect estimator for panel regressions. Significance levels are 
represented in the similar way. Detailed explanation of the impacts are discussed in the result sections. All explanatory variables are one period lagged to control for 
any possible endogeneity problem. 
 
 
 
 
  
R-squared 0.319  0.317  0.322  0.318  0.063  0.061  0.061  0.062  0.090  0.088  0.088  0.090  
Adjusted R-squared 0.298  0.297  0.301  0.297  0.034  0.033  0.032  0.033  0.063  0.060  0.060  0.062  
F(109, 3574) 15.37  15.24  15.57  15.29  2.20  2.15  2.13  2.17  3.25  3.15  3.15  3.23  
P-value(F) 0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   
cons 0.014 *** 0.017 *** 0.014 *** 0.015 *** 0.073 *** 0.075 *** 0.077 *** 0.075 *** 0.279 *** 0.320 *** 0.316 *** 0.286 *** 
CE/TA LAG 0.095 *** 0.205 *** 0.172 *** 0.120 *** -0.067  0.210 ** 0.272 *** -0.025  -0.367  1.396 *** 1.354 *** -0.324  
RE/TA LAG 0.130 *** 0.101 *** 0.091 *** 0.125 *** 0.128  0.008  0.009  0.126  1.213 ** 0.661  0.652  1.256 ** 
     NPA/TA LAG 0.000  0.001  0.000  0.001  -0.047 * -0.048 ** -0.047 ** -0.047 * -0.050  -0.045  -0.045  -0.047  
      SIZE LAG 0.001 ***       0.005 ***       0.022 ***       
     TANGIBILITY LAG   -0.091        -0.585        -0.207      
SPREAD LAG     0.002 ***       0.001        0.001    
TURNOVER LAG       0.047 **       0.212 **       1.116 *** 
Table 3 section 2 
The following table provides results for the third step of the partial adjustment model (EQUATION) which is used to estimate the bank specific target pay outs, which are based on 
varying adjustment speeds of such pay outs, which vary across banks as well as over periods. Following Oliviera et al (2014) a standard fixed effect estimator is used in this step 
for estimation of the coefficients. *.**,***, represents significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. All explanatory variables are one period lagged to control for any 
possible endogeneity problem. 
 
 
SUMMARY OF THE THREE STEPS AS RUN ABOVE: 
 
     
Dependent variable TOTAL PAY DPS LOG_DIV_TOTAL 
Size  
0.288**
* 
    
0.012**
* 
    
0.199**
* 
   
  (0.000)     (0.001)     (0.000)    
Common Equity/TA  -6.292 8.848 -7.498 12.017  0.229 0.926 0.492 0.900  -1.929 9.272 -1.339 9.319 
  (0.272) (0.026) (0.265) (0.001)  (0.347) (0.000) (0.077) (0.000)  (0.620) (0.000) (0.762) (0.000) 
DEBT/TA  -1.742 2.426 -0.901 2.789  0.094 0.313 0.205 0.284  -4.153 -0.905 -3.372 -0.976 
  (0.499) (0.310) (0.726) (0.245)  (0.475) (0.009) (0.122) (0.085)  (0.037) (0.612) (0.088) (0.584) 
RE/TA  20.594 18.201 22.040 18.657  0.731 0.775 0.775 0.585  3.709 1.941 4.235 2.537 
  (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002)  (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.084)  (0.204) (0.515) (0.150) (0.383) 
Turnover    
15.48**
* 
    0.325     
9.663**
* 
 
    (0.001)     (0.143)     (0.003)  
Spread     0.054     0.003     0.056 
     (0.501)     (0.451)     (0.274) 
Tangibility   -27.63     
-
1.05*** 
    -8.32   
   (0.370)     (0.003)     (0.473)   
Non-Performing/TA  -0.307 -0.240 -0.246 -0.193  0.013 0.019 0.016 0.009  -2.297 -2.247 -2.273 -2.233 
  (0.766) (0.816) (0.812) (0.852)  (0.843) (0.767) (0.803) (0.892)  (0.027) (0.031) (0.029) (0.032) 
Constant  0.225 0.216 0.222 0.227  -0.008 0.000 -0.005 -0.004  0.065 0.076 0.068 0.076 
   (0.003) (0.007) (0.004) (0.005)  (0.147) (0.936) (0.390) (0.523)  (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
 
The above results in the three subsequent tables are based on the three steps of the modified partial adjustment model, as 
described earlier in the methodology section. The main aim of these tables are to estimate the bank specific variable adjustment 
speed. Based on the adjustment speed calculations the respective half-life periods are also estimated. 
 
These values of speed of adjustments and half-lives are then used in the following tables for analyzing the signalling content of such 
measures. One critical consideration is that different sets of bank specific variables are used in these two sections, which means that 
the set of bank specific life cycle variables and opacity variables which are used in the three steps of the partial adjustment model, are 
not repeated for analyzing the further results on signalling. 
 
The current thesis is the first such application for deciphering bank holding firms pay out smoothing measures, earlier attempts 
have been directed to measure bank specific adjustment speeds of capital structure adjustments (Oliver et al 2015, Jiang et al, 
2015). 
 
 
The table below provides results for the probabilistic impacts of the bank specific opacity and life cycle control variables on three dependent pay out variables, namely, dividend 
pershare (DPS), Log value of total cash dividend payed (CASH DIVIDEND), and money value of share repurchases. Opacity variables are as discussed earlier, namely, 
tangibility(TAN)), spread, and turnover, all the variables being lagged. The life cycle variables are size, common equity to total assets (CE/TA), retained earnings to total assets 
(RE/TA), interest expense to total assets (IE/TA),  
And non performing assets to total assets (NPA/TA) ratios (variables discussed in the data section), crisis dummy (as discussed) is included.  
For each regression time dummy is used. The estimation method is standard TOBIT regression. Coefficients of each variable is reported with significance levels, *** implying p 
value<0.01, ** implying p value < 0.05, and * implying p value<0.10, meaning significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. The table provides impacts of opacity levels on 
different pay outs, and captures marked contrast between dividend signalling and share repurchase signalling (full discussion in result section). 
 
 
                                         DPS (1-4)                                              CASH DIVIDEND (5-8)                                 SHARE REPURCHASE (9-12) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
No. of observations 3943 3943 3943 3943 3943 3943 3943 3943 3943 3943 3943 3943 
SIZE LAG 
 
0.374*** 
   
0.609*** 
   
1.27*** 
   
TAN LAG  -0.0028*    -0.14*    -0.17*   
CISIS -0.027*** -0.020 -0.020 -0.020 -.100* -.086 -0.113 -0.083 -.41** -0.39* -.42** -.50** 
  
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
        
CE/TA LAG 0.017 0.043 0.026 0.025 -.933 -.619 -.669 -.566 -.377 -0.323 -0.24 -0.233 
             
RE/TA LAG 2.033*** 1.999*** 2.005*** 1.956*** 0.340 0.991* 0.981* 0.761* -49.6** -50.97** -50.48** -51.5** 
             
IE/TA LAG 0.678*** 0.697*** 0.695*** 0.683*** 0.600 0.865** 0.815** 0.901** 5.89*** 6.50*** 6.44*** 6.32** 
             
TURNOVER LAG 
  
0.0133** 
   
0.540* 
   
0.554*** 
 
             
SPREAD LAG 
   
0.029*** 
   
0.040 
   
0.436** 
             
EPS LAG 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.003 -.459*** -0.453** -.409** -.404** 
             
NPA/TA LAG -0.005*** -0.006*** 
 
-0.006*** -0.033** -0.04** -0.04* -0.043* 0.090*** 0.071** 0.072** 0.072** 
             
Prob> chi2   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.029 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Table above of this section provides results for the TOBIT model, where the dependent variables are dividend per share, total cash 
dividend pay out in log terms, and the money value of share repurchases (as described in the variables section). The reason for including 
different types of pay outs is that the general literature on dividend signalling or pay out signalling holds that impact of firm specific factors 
on the level of signalling may be different for different types of signalling. 
 
The probabilistic impacts of the bank specific characteristics on the dividend per share level is in line with recent studies like Forti and Schiozer 
(2015). However in the above table the main signalling hypothesis is investigated, which following the seminal theoretical models like of Miller 
and Rocks (1985), hypotheses’ that greater information asymmetry level will generate greater dividend pay outs for solving or mitigating the 
adverse selection of equity capital. Again as observed in the last table the results are in contradiction to the prediction of the pecking order 
theory, which predicts the opposite of the signalling theory. 
 
Here the first four columns provide the results for the probabilistic impacts of the explanatory and control variables on the dividend per share 
levels. The first impact is of the size variable, which is one period lagged value relative to the dividend pay out, and the positive significant 
impact shows that greater is the size of the bank higher is the probability of paying out. Since the coefficients are of a probabilistic estimation 
they can not be interpreted in the same way as that for the linear model estimations, but the significant p values (which is indicated by the *) 
can reveal information about the greater or lower probability of pay outs. 
 
The impact of size is according to the earlier table, which can be explained by either agency theory, or signalling theory. There can be either 
free cash flow problem faced by large banks (which is a critical issue in the financial crisis period, since that is argued to generate excessive 
risk taking), or the larger size can also show greater opacity in case of banks due to larger opaque assets, which is a different argument than the 
non banking firms, where the standard diversification or the reputation capital argument would predict that greater size represents less opacity 
instead. 
The second main explanatory variable is the one period lagged tangibility value which is found to have significant negative probabilistic impact 
on the dividend per share level. This is again in accordance with the earlier causality model which supports the standard signalling hypothesis 
rather than the alternative hypothesis of pecking order theory. 
 
Aivazian et al (2006) in a comprehensive econometric study have shown that firms which have better bond ratings are also those which have 
greater transparency in asset quality, and such firms also do smooth their pay outs. Hence this analysis will be critical in later section where 
investigation is based in the pay out smoothing of the banks in the sample. In this section the result is in harmony with the prediction of 
signalling theory. 
 
The crisis dummy, which has been explained in the variable section, interestingly has a significant negative probabilistic impact on the 
dividend per share level. This finding is accordance with the results of Forti and Schiozer (2015), and hence similar to their finding the above 
results show that banks in the sample have at an average reduced dividend pay outs due to the impact of crisis, which can again be supported by 
the regulatory pressure of cutting back dividends and raising more capital. 
 
Such negative impact of crisis is further investigated in details in the subsequent sections, where dividend smoothing, and later on possibility of 
risk shifting via dividend pay outs and smoothing is investigated, since there has been some recent claims by Achraya et al (2014) that crisis 
period may have produced risk shifting incentives to the larger banks in specific, who have maintained large dividend pay outs. The current 
analysis investigates whether such behaviour can be observed in general or not. As of now the above results do not support the view of risk 
shifting via dividend pay outs, rather supports the signalling view developed by Forti and Schiozer(2015), and Kuoku (2012). However one 
way the current analysis extends the above mentioned study is by investigating the impact of bank specific variables on other types of pay outs, 
specifically share repurchases which may throw some interesting insights. 
 
In the above table the probabilistic impacts of the turnover lag and the spread lag remains positive and significant, which is consistent with the 
last VAR results which further provides support to the signalling story to mitigate adverse selection problem. 
 
Among the bank specific control variables retained earnings, and one measure of default risk, namely non per performing assets to total asset 
ratio are found to have significant probabilistic impacts on the dividend per share levels. 
 
The nature of impact of retained earnings is in line with the free cash flow theory (Jensen, 1986) and is also according to the general studies like 
by De Angelo et al (2006), where the banks with greater retained cash flow have found optimal to distribute larger dividends, which can also be 
considered as a signal for mitigating agency conflict. 
 
The negative significant impact of the default risk measure on dividend pay outs is again in line with the recent study by Forti and Schiozer 
(2015), where banks with greater default risk level have found it optimal to cut back dividends, which may also be supported by the regulatory 
pressure of capital building or skin in the game approach. 
 
Again this results are in line with recent studies and contradictory to the claim of Acharya et al (2014) that dividend s are used to expropriate 
the debt holders. 
 
Overall the impacts on the dividend pay outs reveal the signalling behaviour of the banks to the debt holders in general. In the above table 
(TOBIT outputs) results the impact of the bank specific variables along with the opacity levels support the results for the dividend pay out per 
share level (which is the total dividend comprising stock, and cash dividend divided by the no of shares out standing). There is a strong evidence 
that both industrial firms and banks have increased dividend pay outs over years till the last financial crisis (Floyd et al, 2015). However the 
empirical studies argue that the reasons for increase in the pay out decisions are different in both cases. For the industrial firms the increase in 
dividend pay outs are also simultaneous with the increase in share repurchases, which is also evident in banks, as also in the current thesis. 
 
However standard literature suggests that for the non banking industrial firms it is the free cash flow problem which stands out as the main 
reason for increasing dividend pays among the large firms (De Angelo et al, 2008). Again dividend increase in these firms are also consistent 
with the managerial reluctance to cut back dividends, which is again consistent with the dividend smoothing literature of Lintner (1956) to Brav 
et al (2005). However as Floyd et al (2015) observes the nature of signalling for banks dividend is fundamentally different from the industrial 
firms’. 
 
The authors are in view that banks dividend signalling is more to convey future financial strength of the banks. This can be compared to the 
concept of value signalling as in the original signalling literature (for example in Miller and Rocks, 1985). The above results do support the 
original signalling theory as relative to the pecking order theory, or agency cost theory, though it is also clarified from the above results that the 
life cycle control variables also do have significant impacts on dividend pay outs. 
 
The last four columns of the table above provides results for the impact of bank speciifc caharacterisctics on the share repurchases. Grullon et 
al (2002) have proposed the substitution hypothesis. According to this widely cited study there has been an increasing tendency to use funds 
otherwise used for dividends for share repurchases. This trend is increasing for the USA based firms in general. 
Even more recent studies, for example, Andriosopolous et al (2013) have found that share repurchases have increased over the last 30 
years along with the reluctance to cut back dividends. There are interesting theoretical as well as empirical observations on the 
substitutability between the dividend payments and the share repurchases. 
 
Most of the early theoretical models, for example, by Bhatttacharya (1979) or Miller and Rocks (1985) have argued that these two pay out forms 
are perfect substitutes, since the source of transaction costs in these models are not associated with the choice between these pay outs. In 
Bhattacharya (1979) the source of cost associated with signalling is raising new capital, once a stable dividend pay out is committed by the 
manager. 
 
However there is arguments on whether share repurchases can constitute signalling equilibrium, which separates good firms with future financial 
prospects from the bad firms with less financial prospects. Studies on substitution hypothesis have mentioned that since dividends attract 
institutional investors more than the share repurchases, undervalued firms signal via dividend pay outs rather than buy backs and that may create 
separating equilibrium. 
 
Hence according to these studies there is no perfect substitutability between share repurchases and dividends. However its is also important to 
explain why then there is a simultaneous rise in buy backs along with dividend pay outs by industrial firms as well as banks. In the current thesis 
a comparative study of signalling content of these pay outs by banking firms is presented. Share repurchases by bank holding companies have 
increased drastically over the last few decade, and importantly over the last financial crisis (Floyd et al, 2015). Rather authors (Floyd et al, 2015) 
have been surprised by observing dividend rigidity among banks along with the rise in repurchases, since repurchases have greater flexibility, 
tax advantages and related benefits (Guay and Harford, 2008, Skinner, 2008). 
There is some disagreement among the authors on whether share repurchases can be considered as costly signalling, since there is no ongoing 
commitment for share buy backs (Floyd et al, 2015) there is a view that they cannot be consistently used as signals. 
 
However as shown in the current thesis, as well as recent studies, there is a persistency among the banks to maintain share repurchases along 
with dividend pay outs over considerable period of time. Hence it can be argued that share repurchases also do act as signals, and convey some 
important information to the information sensitive investors. 
 
Baker and Wurgler (2012) have argued that changes in dividend per share is easy to observe, however it is difficult to gauge the magnitude of 
share repurchases1.  
 
In the current study the finding on bank share repurchases is compatible to the findings of Floyd et al (2015) which is that there has been a 
consistent and adjacent increase of share repurchases along with the rigidity of dividend pay outs by banks. However in the above mentioned 
study there is no investigation of information content of share repurchases along with that of the dividend pay outs by banks. The above table 
provides some of the information content of share repurchases which is supplemented by later results. 
 
The lag value of size has the similar positive and significant impact on repurchases as on the dividend pay outs, which means that greater is 
the lag value of bank size higher is the probability of the banks to repurchase. Such result is consistent with the studies of Jgannath and 
Stephens (2002), and Andriosopoluous et al (2013) who have observed that the buyback programs are completed mostly by the larger firms. 
The last paper has also found that share buyback is positively associated with information disclosure for the firms in general. 
 
In keeping with the finding that information disclosure and buy backs are positively associated the above results show that share buy backs are 
also impacted in the similar way by opacity levels (tangibility, spread and turnover measures) as the pay outs. These results suggest that buy 
backs can also be used by banks to signal financial strength of banks (Floyd et al, 2015), or as according to the signalling theory, mitigate 
                                                          
1 There can be other difficulties in share repurchases, for example as observed by Ikenberry and Vermaelen (1995) that per share amount of repurchases is not reported, 
amounts paid out are not tied to specific periods, and in some cases after the repurchases are announced the action is carried out over few years’ time. 
 
adverse selection problems. 
 
Specifically the study by Floyd et al (2015) finds that any pay out strategy by banks, whether dividend pay outs or buy backs can be related to 
signalling of future financial strength. The above results supports the view. However more bank specific results are reported in later tables. 
 
Among the other bank specific control variables retained earnings has a strong negative probabilistic impact on the buy backs, which is expected 
since one reason for buy backs is to build up own capital by banks. The impact of profitability, as reflected in the EPS measure is also as 
expected in theory, i.e. less profitable firms go for more share buy backs. This also relates to the standard literature that undervalued firms prefer 
to go for buy backs more than the overvalued firms which may impact their equity prices positively. 
 
Another striking result is the impact of lag nonperforming asset ratio on buy backs which is significantly positive, as compared to significantly 
negative on dividend pay outs. However this is also supported by the argument that if the default risk level increases for banks then there is 
incentive for the managers to cut back dividends and increase own capital, which can be again accomplished through increasing buy backs. 
 
Overall the last two tables do suggest that there is enough evidence at the firm level to suggest that both pay outs and share buy backs can be 
used as signals for financial strength, or mitigation of adverse selection. However there are important differences between the respective signals 
too. 
 
The first two tables in the current section has demonstrated that dividend pay outs as well as share repurchases by banks can be considered as 
costly signalling, which is based on general value signalling concept of the signalling theory (Bhattacharya, 1977, Miller and Rocks, 1985 
and others). 
 
However it is extremely critical to recognize that banking firms are different than the non-banking firms, and such differences are based on the 
specific features of banking which is absent among the industrial firms. There is a strong and sound literature which posits banks differently 
than non-banks (Berger et al, 1995, Calomiris and Wilson, 2004,Diamond and Dygvig , 1983, Kashayap et al, 2002, Laven, 2013). The main 
differences emerge from the fact that banks create liquidity by taking more liquid deposits as relative to the opaque and illiquid assets created as 
loans, hence they are highly leveraged and rely heavily on depositors for short term financing. 
 
For high opacity it is very hard for the outsider investors to assess the quality and value of assets. Hence as recent studies like Forti and 
Schiozer (2015) suggest that banks do have responsibilities towards information sensitive creditors for maintaining confidence, where the 
dividends can act as costly signals for solvency. Again if the confidence of the creditors break down then the funding model of banking will 
also collapse which may lead to runs and various other costs of distress. 
 
Hence dividend signalling by banks also reveals inherent fragility of banks (Floyd et al, 2015, Acharya et al, 2011). It is also true that banks are a more 
homogenous group than industrial firms, hence are vulnerable to more common shocks, such features also make dividends worthy 
 
signals to market in general.  
 
 
Keeping these distinctions of banking firms in mind it is critical that information content of bank pay outs is investigated in more specificity, 
which is attempted in the table 3 of this section. Specifically probabilistic impact of bank specific levels of leverage, credit growth, capital 
adequacy, loan risk, are studied on the dividend pay outs and share repurchases. This analysis is an extension of standard analysis as posed 
by Forti and Schiozer (2015). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
